Archive for July 6th, 2011
05BANGKOK2261 AMBASSADOR HILL’S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION MP SURIN PITSUWAN
“29753″,”3/30/2005 12:00″,”05BANGKOK2261″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002261
SIPDIS
SEOUL FOR AMBASSADOR HILL. DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV. HQ
USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, TH, BM, BURMA, ASEAN,
ARF – Asean Regional Forum, Southern Thailand,
NRC – National Reconciliation Committee
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR HILL\’S MEETING WITH
OPPOSITION MP SURIN PITSUWAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission, Alex A. Arvizu, Reason: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary: A/S Designate for East Asia and Pacific and
U.S. Ambassador to Korea Christopher Hill met with opposition
Democrat Party (DP) Deputy Leader and former Foreign Minister
Dr. Surin Pitsuwan on March 29. Surin urged the U.S. to
continue to pressure Thailand and ASEAN partners to seek
democratic reform in Burma by withholding the ASEAN
chairmanship from the SPDC in 2006. He stated that the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) should become more than just a
discussion group, and suggested appointment of an ARF
\”special envoy\” for the Korean peninsula. Surin opined that
the new National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), chaired by
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, might prove to be
more than Prime Minister Thaksin bargained for. End Summary.
2. (U) U.S. Ambassador to Korea Christopher Hill, the A/S
Designate for EAP, Ambassador Boyce and Poloffs from Embassy
Seoul and Bangkok met with opposition DP Party Leader Dr.
Surin Pitsuwan, a former foreign minister in the Chuan
Leekpai administration. The veteran Muslim MP recalled how
former Secretary of State Colin Powell, at the ARF meeting in
Phnom Penh in June 2003, had set the right tone for U.S.
relations in Southeast Asia with the statement that although
the fight against terror must be made, the U.S. must uphold
human rights at the same time. Surin said that he had
recently spoken with some Thai economists who were surprised
at the recent U.S. Human Rights Report chapter on Thailand.
Surin\’s contacts were under the (obviously uninformed)
impression that the US was only concerned about the war on
terror and other security issues and no longer interested in
human rights.
KEEP THE PRESSURE ON BURMA
3. (C) Surin stated that \”Southeast Asia is coming back\” in
the area of human rights, citing recent democratic changes in
Indonesia. He commented that the current Thai government has
an \”authoritarian bent\” under Prime Minister Thaksin. He
lamented being in the opposition and the magnitude of his
party\’s defeat in the recent national elections, but said
that the DP and other opposition parties will continue to
debate the government, albeit with a weaker voice. He
stressed that, because of the governing Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party\’s dominance in Parliament, U.S. dialogue with the RTG,
especially via ASEAN, is vital. On Burma, Surin said he
thought that U.S. approaches to ASEAN to \”pressure\” the SPDC
to skip their slated 2006 chairmanship would meet with a
favorable response at this time. He suggested that one
compromise would be to allow the SPDC to host some ASEAN
meetings, but not serve as chair. Surin thought that ASEAN
was undertaking a \”real evaluation\” of the issue. The EU and
Australia were \”coming around\” to this point of view and,
with help from the US, Japan might as well. Ambassador Boyce
mentioned his recent meeting with Japanese Deputy Foreign
Minister Tanaka and Tanaka\’s recent meeting with Burmese
Prime Minister Soe Win (Septel).
ARF ROLE IN KOREAN PENINSULA?
4. (C) Surin raised the issue of the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) and its need to play a more meaningful role in the
region. He suggested that an ARF \”special envoy\” to the
Korean peninsula be appointed, not as a mediator, but as a
\”messenger\” — one who could gather information and share it
among the members of the six-party talks. Ambassador Hill
said he would raise this idea in Washington once he takes up
his new post.
SOUTHERN THAILAND
5. (U) On continuing violence in the three southernmost
provinces of Thailand, Surin commented that the south has
been a problem for many previous governments. The Thaksin
government had seriously miscalculated by dismantling
previous successful security structures shortly after it
assumed power in 2001, Surin said. This led to a crisis in
human rights violations and in the rule of law as the
government tried to quell rising violence. Surin noted not
only the thousands of suspected extrajudicial killings
nationwide in 2003 during the government\’s anti-narcotics
campaign — which he said some put as high as 3,000 — but
claimed that he has heard of thousands of disappeared or
\”kidnapped\” Muslim \”suspects\” in the South. (Comment: These
numbers, in both cases, strike us as exaggerated. End
Comment.)
EDUCATION REFORM, THE NRC AND COUNTERING THAKSIN\’S WEEKLY
RADIO ADDRESS
6. (U) On other topics, Surin discussed the need for
education reform in Muslim schools (pondoks or madrasas). In
most areas of the far south, he said, the traditional Muslim
curriculum was taught in the morning, while the \”modern\”
curriculum was left for the afternoons, resulting in a
\”half-baked\” education that left the youth entering the job
market with few skills or educational achievements. The
curricula in Thai, English, math, science and information
technology must be strengthened. Surin commented that the
composition of the newly formed National Reconciliation
Commission (NRC) was good, balanced and hopeful. He wondered
openly what the Commission will do with its 9-month mandate
and expressed his hope that recommendations can be passed
along quickly for action, and that meetings can be held as
events take place. Surin was pleased that Anand Panyarachun,
the highly respected former prime minister, was not afraid to
openly criticize Thaksin, noting Anand,s call for public
release of the reports of the Independent Commissions
investigating the incidents at the Krue Se mosque in April
2004 and at Tak Bai in October 2004. Surin noted that
\”Thaksin may come to regret appointing Anand.\” He also
mentioned the worrisome trend toward concentration of
corporate and RTG control of the broadcast media and said
that DP opposition leader Abhisit Vejjajiva will propose an
equal air time \”right of reply\” to counter PM Thaksin,s
influential weekly Saturday radio address.
7. (U) Ambassador Hill did not have the opportunity to clear
on this message.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2257 THAI POLITICAL UPDATE — MARCH 30, 2005
“29740″,”3/30/2005 9:47″,”05BANGKOK2257″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED”,”05BANGKOK2017″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS BANGKOK 002257
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, TH, Thai Political Updates
SUBJECT: THAI POLITICAL UPDATE — MARCH 30, 2005
REF: BANGKOK 2017
1. (U) HOUSE SPEAKER\’S PARLIAMENTARY PERFORMANCE HARSHLY
CRITICIZED
The opposition Democrat Party (DP) again walked out in
protest of actions by House Speaker Bhokin Bhalakula. The
latest protest occurred on March 25 when Bhokin rejected a
request by Democrat Party Chief Advisor (and former prime
minister) Chuan Leekpai to clarify references made to him by
Deputy Interior Minister Sermsak Pongpanich. This is the
second walkout in less than two weeks (reftel). Bhokin, who
was strongly backed Prime Minister Thaksin and his wife for
the House Speaker\’s position has been subject to ridicule
even by some Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party colleagues, especially
the Mod Dum (Black Ant) faction led by First Deputy House
Speaker Suchart Tanchareon, for his clumsy performance as
Speaker. DP MPs, of course, are scathing in their accusations
that Bhokin is biased and prejudiced in a position that
should be at the least nominally neutral. Critics of a
Thai-language daily even dubbed him \”dictatorial Bho-Shin,\”
sarcastically rhyming his name with that of the PM Thaksin,s
Shin Corporation. More serious commentators have criticized
Bhokin but also chastised the DP for being so quick to walk
and trivializing its role as the lead opposition party.
2. (U) BUT THAKSIN DENIES BHOKIN ABOUT TO BE REPLACED
Prime Minister Thaksin subsequently defended Bhokin\’s
performance as House Speaker, saying that he was
\”straightforward\” in his approach to the job but also
suggesting that Bhokin could be \”more compromising\” in
conducting House sessions and seek more cooperation from both
Government and Opposition whips in settling any conflict.
Thaksin denied any truth to widespread rumors that House
Speaker Bhokin was about to be replaced, claiming that any
new speaker would face the same challenges from Opposition
members.
3. (U) TRT FACTION LEADER SANOH REPORTEDLY SNUBS THAKSIN\’S
GOLF INVITATION
Meanwhile, Sanoh Thienthong, leader of the TRT Wang Nam Yen
faction, is apparently still smarting over Prime Minister
Thaksin\’s \”insulting\” offer to appoint him as honorary chief
advisor to the government whip. He has spurned the Prime
Minister\’s offer to join in a conciliatory round of golf.
The invitation from Thaksin came after last week\’s strong
public grumbling by Sanoh and his faction supporters over
what they considered a paucity of positions allocated to
their faction – the last straw being the offer to Sanoh of
the honorary whip advisor\’s post — a position that Sanoh
described as \”a joke.\” Thaksin shrugged off the snub,
telling reporters that he had not invited only Sanoh to play
and besides that, The Prime Minister added, the only purpose
of his game was \”to have fun and relax.\”
4. (U) CABINET MAKES NEW APPOINTMENTS
On March 22, the Cabinet announced the appointment of a
number of MPs and others to political posts. Some of these
include:
(1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Pracha Kunakasem (Party List 2) – appointed as the
Foreign Minister\’s Advisor
Mr. Pitiphong Temcharoen (Bangkok MP) – appointed as the
Foreign Minister,s Secretary
Mr. Phairot Tanbanchong (Phayao MP) – appointed as the Deputy
Foreign Minister\’s Secretary
(2) Dr. Phansak Winyarat – appointed as Chairman of the PM,s
Policy Advisory Board.
(3) Mr. Jakrapop Phenkhae (the ex-Government Spokesman)
appointed as Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Surakiat
Sathienthai,s Secretary.
(4) Former Justice Minister Phongthep Thepkanchana appointed
as Head Government Whip.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2255 NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ANNOUNCED
“29739″,”3/30/2005 9:46″,”05BANGKOK2255″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,
“05BANGKOK1528″,”This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002255
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TH, NRC – National Reconciliation Committee
SUBJECT: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ANNOUNCED
REF: BANGKOK 1528
1. (U) Summary: On March 28, Prime Minister Thaksin
officially appointed a broad-based 48-member National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to explore solutions to the
ongoing separatist turmoil in Thailand\’s predominantly Muslim
southern provinces. NRC Chairperson and former Prime
Minister Anand Panyarachun, who is not a political ally of
Thaksin, expressed satisfaction at the Prime Minister\’s
immediate acceptance of the list of recommended members he
submitted. Anand told the press that he had tried to
assemble a diverse group and noted that some members were
critics of Thaksin\’s policies. Local observers have praised
the composition of the NRC for its balance of government,
academic, NGO, military and political opposition
representatives. About one third of the NRC\’s members are
Muslims. Anand counseled patience to the public, saying that
the NRC will likely need a full nine months to finish its
work and present policy recommendations. The first meeting
of the Commission is slated for April 8. The NRC membership
follows in para 2.
2. (U) National Reconciliation Commission Members are:
Chairman: Anand Panyarachun – Former Prime Minister
Deputy: Prawese Wasi – Noted social critic and Ramon
Magsaysay winner for Government Service (1981)
Civilian Representatives (from the South):
Gen. (retd.) Narong Dejudom – Former 4th Army Commander
Netr Chantharasami – Businessman and department store
owner in Hat Yai
Bancha Pongpanich – Former Rector of Walailak
University, Nakhon Si Thammarat Province
Prasit Meksuwan – Secretary-General of the Teachers
Confederation in five southern provinces
Piya Kitthavorn – Faculty of Humanities and Social
Science, Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani
Petdao Tohmena – Medical Doctor and daughter of Senator
Den Tohmena
Maryam Samoh – Director of the Orphanage Center in
Pattani Province
Muhamad Adam – Director of the Narul Islam Bhumi School
in Pattani Province
Ratiya Salae – Lecturer, Thaksin University, Songkhla
Province
Woravit Baru – Vice-Rector, Prince of Songkhla
University, Pattani
Aedueramae Mamingli – Chairman of the Pattani Islamic
Committee
Ananchai Thaiprathan – Advisor to the Young Muslim
Association
Ismail Lutfi Japakiya – Rector of Yala Islamic College
Abduirohmae Jehsae – Chairman of the Yala Islamic
Committee
Abduraman Abdulsamad – Chairman of the Narathiwat
Islamic Committee
Asmadsomboon Bualuang – Lecturer, Prince of Songkhla
University
Civilian Representatives (from other regions of Thailand):
Chaiwat Satha-anand – Lecturer and Director of the Peace
Information Center, Foundation for Democracy and
Development Studies
Dejudom Krairit – President of the Law Society of Thailand
Naree Charoenpolpirlya – Instructor at the Peace Information
Center
Pichai Rattanpol – Chairman of the National Security
Council\’s Non-Violent Strategy Committee
Piphob Thongchai – Advisor to the Campaign for Popular
Democracy
Paisal Promyong – Deputy Secretary-General of the
Central Islamic Committee of Thailand
Phra Paisal Visaro – Abbot of Wat Pasukato, Chayaphum
Province
Mark Tamthai – Director of the Religious and Cultural
Studies Center, Pyap University
Srisak Wallipodom – Historian and Archaeologist
Saowanee Chitmuad – Lecturer Rajabhat University
Ammar Siamwala – Honorary Advisor to the Thailand
Development and Research Institute (TDRI)
Political Representatives:
Kanchana Silpa-archa – Chart Thai Party MP from
Suphanburi Province
Chaturon Chaisaeng – Deputy Prime Minister
Pol.Gen. Chitchai Wannasathit – Deputy Prime Minister
and Interior Minister
Prasert Pongsuwansiri – Democrat Party MP from Yala
Province
Pongthep Thepkanchana – Thai Rak Thai Party-List MP and
Government Head Whip
Surin Pitsuwan – Democrat Party Deputy Leader and
former Foreign Minister
Sophon Supapong – Bangkok Senator
Government:
Kittipong Kityarak – Director-General of the Probation
Department, Ministry of Justice
Jiraporn Bunnag – Deputy Secretary-General of the
National Security Council, The Prime Minister\’s Office
Pornnipa Limpapayom – Secretary-General of the Office
of the Basic Education Commission, Ministry of Education
Vichai Thienthawom – Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Public Health
Lt.Gen. Weipote Srinual – Assistant Chief-of-Staff,
Royal Thai Army
Sirachi Choterat – Deputy Director-General of the
National Intelligence Agency, The Prime Minister\’s Office
Pol. Lt.Gen. Somsak Khwaengsopa – Commissioner of the
Border Patrol Police
Gen. Sirichai Thanyasiri – Director-General of the
Southern Border Provinces Peace Promotion Center
Sucharit Patchimnant – Director-General of the
Provincial Administration Department, Ministry of Interior
National Reconciliation Commission Secretariat Office:
Bavornsak Uvanno – Secretary-General of the Southern
Border Provinces Peace Promotion Center
Gothom Ariya – Lecturer, Peace Solution Studies and
Development Center, Mahidol University
Surichai Wankaeo – Lecturer, Political Science Faculty,
Chulalongkorn University
A DIVERSE GROUP
3. (SBU) As noted above, Anand recruited a diverse group of
nationally-known academics, government officials, opposition
politicians, and social activists to the NRC. For example,
Police General Chitchai Wannasathit is the senior Deputy
Prime Minister, Interior Minister, a close personal associate
of Thaksin and his designated overseer of security activities
in the south. Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, on the other hand, is a
nationally-regarded opposition Democrat Party Member of
Parliament (MP), a Muslim, and former foreign minister in
Chuan Leekpai\’s government. He has sharply criticized the
Thaksin Administration\’s policies in the South. Prawet Wasi
is a sharp-tongued social commentator and frequent Thaksin
critic. Ammar Sianwalar is an Advisor to the Thailand
Development Research Institute, and Gothom Ariya was Chairman
of Forum Asia, the regional human rights NGO. Mark Tamthai
is a prominent academic and senior advisor to the Thai
National Security Council (NSC) on southern issues. Ismael
Lutfi Japakiya is the highly controversial Rector of Yala
Islamic College. Many of the NRC civil society members
strongly criticized Thaksin for seeking to establish a
\”zoning policy\” in southern Thailand, that would have
punished villages in \”red\” areas for \”cooperating\” with
separatist groups. Widespread opposition to this zoning
policy eventually led to Thaksin\’s formation of the
Commission and selection of Anand to head it (Reftel). More
detailed bio material on NRC members will be provided septel.
NOW ANAND HAS HIS MISSION
4. (SBU) Comment: Thaksin\’s choice of the widely-regarded
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to head the
high-profile NRC was a surprise. During a meeting March 29
with visiting A/S Designate Chris Hill and the Ambassador
(Septel), opposition MP and commission member Surin noted
Anand\’s ability to openly criticize Thaksin, even as the NRC
is just being formed. \”The Prime Minister may regret that he
appointed Anand to head this commission,\” Surin said. Some
cynics say that Thaksin wants to pass the responsibility for
solving the chronic troubles in the South to Anand and his
Commission, while others have insisted that Thaksin,
realizing that he\’s hit a dead end in resolving the violence
is sincerely hoping Anand and the NRC come up with a workable
plan. We lean towards the latter characterization of the
Prime Minister\’s attitude. For now, all eyes will be on the
commission at the outset of what will be a long and difficult
process to find ways to peacefully resolve the increasingly
bloody conflict in the Muslim south.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2137 MEGAPROJECTS: WE KNOW WHY, NOBODY KNOWS HOW
“29541″,”3/25/2005 5:18″,”05BANGKOK2137″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,
“05BANGKOK1266″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002137
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND EB
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR WEISEL AND COEN
TREASURY FOR OASIA
COMMERCE FOR 4430/EAP/MAC/OKSA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, EFIN, ETRD, PREL, TH
SUBJECT: MEGAPROJECTS: WE KNOW WHY, NOBODY KNOWS HOW
REF: BANGKOK 1266
1.(SBU) Summary. The economic centerpiece of Prime Minister
Thaksin\’s second term is a series of major infrastructure
projects estimated to cost US$57.5 billion over five years.
It remains unclear how the RTG will finance these projects
given self-imposed fiscal constraints, previous projects that
disadvantaged private investors and an illiquid bond market.
Given the importance Thaksin attaches to these projects, we
expect he will engineer a formula to try and attract
financing without any government guarantee of repayment.
Whether he actually convinces enough investors to put their
money where the PM\’s mouth is must await specifics. End
Summary.
\”COMMITTED PROJECTS\” NOT A PROBLEM
———————————-
2.(SBU) As reported previously (reftel), the Thaksin
government has announced plans to undertake massive
infrastructure expansion and modernization projects estimated
to cost Bt2.35 trillion (US$57.5 billion) over the next five
years. The total RTG budget for FY2005 is about Bt1.2
trillion (US$30.8 billion) and 2004 GDP was Bt6.6 trillion
(US$169.3 billion). Projects the RTG describes as \”committed\”
include the purchase of new aircraft by parastatal Thai
Airways, rail links to the new Bangkok international airport
and industrial development in the area around the airport,
expansion of the existing Skytrain and subway lines,
expansion of the highway system, expansion of the gas
pipeline system and low-income housing development. Projects
that are planned but \”non-committed\” include expansion of the
railroad network, expansion and modernization of the water
grid and development of a refinery and oil pipeline
associated with the \”land bridge\” project across the Thai
isthmus between the Andaman Sea and Gulf of T
hailand.
WHY THE SUDDEN URGE TO SPLURGE
——————————
3.(SBU) The RTG has several goals in pursuing these ambitious
\”megaprojects.\” First, is to stimulate investment as the new
driver to the Thai economy now that domestic consumption and
export growth are leveling off. The second goal is to upgrade
Thailand\’s infrastructure so that the country is better able
to compete internationally. The stated intention is to reduce
the cost of logistics in Thailand to less than 10 percent of
GDP from its current level of about 19 percent (U.S. and
Japan figures are 10 and 11 percent respectively). It is also
intended to improve worker productivity by reducing the
amount of time Bangkokians spend commuting. In the aftermath
of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, little new public
infrastructure investment has been made. Finally, in keeping
with Thaksin\’s self-image as Thailand\’s CEO, he views the
on-going excess liquidity in the banking sector (estimated to
be Bt200-300 billion -US$5.1-7.7 billion) as an
under-utilized asset that should be mobilized.
FISCAL POLICY TO REMAIN CONSERVATIVE
————————————
4.(SBU) The RTG does not intend to pay for these projects out
of current budget expenditures or by increasing the net debt
on the government\’s balance sheet. \”Fiscal sustainability\”
is the government\’s watchword: defined, in part, as a maximum
public debt/GDP ratio of less than 50 percent (currently
about 47.9 percent – down from 52.9 percent in January 2002 -
with an RTG goal of reducing this number to 40 percent by
2009), a balanced budget and debt service comprising less
than 15 percent of the yearly RTG budget. With additional
calls on the budget ranging from increasing the salaries of
low-paid civil servants to tsunami and drought relief efforts
to expenditures related to quelling the separatist movement
in the south, there is little room in the RTG budget to
finance the megaprojects and within the defined fiscal limits
even if the economy continues to grow at 6 percent each year.
SO HOW TO PAY FOR IT ALL?
————————-
5.(SBU) The official capital-raising framework outlined by
the Ministry Of Finance plans for 26 percent of the required
capital to come from the government budget, 35 percent from
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 39 percent from \”other
means such as securitisation or property development of areas
adjacent to the projects.\” In fact, to bridge the apparent
gap between fiscal rectitude and an investment binge, the
Thaksin administration is studying a variety of approaches to
keep these projects off the government books. First, many of
the \’committed\’ projects will be undertaken by SOEs (Thai
Airways, Airports of Thailand, PTT) that will finance the
projects themselves either on the strength of their own
balance sheets, through asset-backed financing or by forming
joint ventures with private sector companies and/or financial
institutions. Market observers seem confident that these
established organizations can use the cash to be generated by
the projects, backed by their other substantial assets, to
secure proj
ect financing.
6.(SBU) For the mass transit expansion projects – extensions
of the Skytrain, subway and toll roads – the RTG would like
follow its previously successful method of granting long-term
concessions (typically 25 years) to Special Purpose Vehicles
- companies created specifically to build and operate these
concessions. Existing examples of such entities are Bangkok
Metro PCL – subways, Bangkok Expressway PCL – toll roads, and
Bangkok Mass Transit PCL – Skytrain. These companies are
typically joint ventures between leading Thai companies with
the key foreign infrastructure suppliers (e.g. Siemens,
Obiyashi) often taking an equity stake. The problem is that
the equity investors in these projects have not done well.
The RTG has limited the amounts the ventures may charge for
their services (fares and tolls) and is currently trying to
force operators of the Skytrain and subway to sell out to the
mass transit regulatory authority at what the companies
consider a low price. This history will make it very
difficult to
convince new private investors to commit to any equity
positions in the proposed projects.
7.(SBU) The most likely structure will be for the RTG to
create \”Public-Private partnerships\”, not-for-profit limited
liability companies with initial capital provided by the
government and granted a concession to built and operate a
subway line or toll road or some other potential asset. These
entities will issue bonds backed by the value of the
anticipated future cash flow from its concession. There would
be no RTG guarantee backing the debt.
BOND MARKET PROBLEMS
——————–
8.(SBU) There are several problems with this model. First,
given the inherent risk of construction delays and over-runs,
the debt will have to be very attractively priced (i.e. offer
a high yield) in order to attract investors, especially in
the absence of RTG backing. Second, if Bt2.3 trillion in new
projects actually start-up over the next five years, in a
domestic bond market which currently has severe liquidity
problems and rising interest rates, the effect on corporate
borrowing rates and crowding out effect could be severe.
There is considerable skepticism among Thai market
participants whether the domestic market has sufficient depth
to absorb this much new paper. In November 2004, the total
value of all outstanding bonds in Thailand was Bt2.74
trillion (US$70.3 billion) of which Bt2.51 trillion (US$64.4
billion) was either issued or backed by the RTG.
9.(SBU) Some observers posit that the RTG will provide the
necessary capital to the PPPs with no effect on the RTG net
debt level through the proceeds from IPOs of State-Owned
Enterprises EGAT (electricity) and CAT and TOT (telecom)
while also removing the government guarantee from the debt of
these entities (thereby making room for new RTG debt to be
issued under the debt/GDP cap). While this would be a start,
the total of all RTG-guaranteed SOE bonds outstanding is only
about Bt322 billion (US$8.3 billion); not enough even with
the IPO proceeds to fund everything anticipated. Others
point to the Asian Bond market initiative as a source of
funds. There is no indication, however, that ASEAN central
banks are interested in funding Thai infrastructure
development, or even having more than a nominal exposure to
Baht. This nascent effort for a pan-Asian debt market would
have to develop much more quickly than it has to date in
order to be a source of funds for the mega-projects
10.(SBU) COMMENT. We have spoken to money managers, bond
market senior officials, academics and RTG officials
responsible for managing government debt and designing some
of the projects. None have been able to explain how the
government will follow through on its seemingly contradictory
promises of expanding investment while reducing debt. Most
are dubious it can be done, with some arguing that the entire
exercise is designed to channel funds to Thaksin family and
cronies (septel will examine the issue of corruption in
Thailand – anecdotally it appears that large scale corruption
may be getting worse while petty corruption may have
marginally improved).
11.(SBU) The mega-projects are the single most important new
plank in Thaksin\’s economic strategy for his second term. As
an economist who helped design the \”dual track\” economic
policy of Thaksin\’s first term told us, \”Keynesian demand-led
recovery is played out. We must move on to the next level for
the economy to continue to grow.\” He continued: \”In creating
economic value, Thailand is ahead of China and about ten
years behind Taiwan and Korea. We must maintain our pace to
stay ahead of fast-moving China. We can\’t do that without
significant new investment in infrastructure and improving
human resources. I just don\’t know how we will pay for it.\”
Although many here believe the PM\’s program is mostly talk
and the majority of projects won\’t get off the ground, the
Prime Minister\’s penchant for financial engineering means we
cannot rule out a scheme that, at least on its face, gets the
mega-projects underway. We suspect that Thaksin will be
aggressively marketing portfolio investment in Thailand to
foreigners
beginning with a planned visit to New York in June.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2088 THE AMBASSADOR\’S MEETING WITH THAI NSC SECRETARY GENERAL WINAI
“29385″,”3/23/2005 9:24″,”05BANGKOK2088″,”Embassy Bangkok”,
“CONFIDENTIAL”,”",”This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002088
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, PRM, EAP/BCLTV. GENEVA FOR RMA. HQ
USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PTER, PGOV, TH, BM, BURMA, Refugee
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR\’S MEETING WITH THAI NSC SECRETARY
GENERAL WINAI
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason: 1.4 (d)
1. (C) Summary. Thai National Security Council Secretary
General Winai told the Ambassador on March 21 that after two
postponements of the original August 2004 deadline for the
move of the urban Burmese to the border camps, there would be
no further extensions of the current deadline of March 31.
Only a small percentage of the urban Burmese have registered
so far for the camp transfer. The Ambassador emphasized U.S.
concern about the camp move and expressed hope that there
would be no general crackdown on urban Burmese who did not
register, and particularly no refoulement of urban Burmese
refugees. Winai said the RTG was not planning any crackdown
or searches for urban Burmese but Thai immigration law would
be applied to those who were detained by Thai authorities.
The Ambassador noted U.S. interest in further discussions
with the RTG on refugee resettlement from the Burma border
camps and the planned April visit of PRM DAS Ryan in which
this issue could be explored further. Winai welcomed the
news of Ryan\’s visit and said the RTG was open to
resettlement from the camps. Winai also described the
evolution in the RTG\’s assessment of the violence in southern
Thailand. The RTG had not initially understood the situation
and that real sensitivities and grievances existed which
needed addressing. The RTG believed the strategy of those
behind the violence was to separate the people from the
government and internationalize the issue. The latter and
the possibility that the southern situation would become a
religious conflict were what the RTG feared most. At the
conclusion of the meeting, Winai told the Ambassador that he
did not expect to remain long in his position. End Summary.
2. (C) On March 21, Ambassador called on General Winai
Phattiyakul, Thai National Security Council Secretary
General, and raised refugee issues and the situation in
southern Thailand.
————————————
Urban Burmese Refugee Issue
————————————
3. (C) General Winai began the discussion by expressing Thai
gratitude for the U.S. resettlement programs for the Hmong
and urban Burmese. Winai noted that both groups were in a
difficult situation and had few opportunities in Thailand.
The urban Burmese in particular faced an uncertain future.
It was unclear whether there would be positive political
developments in Burma that would allow them to return there.
Winai said that some in the group were driven by political
principles and were involved in political activities. Others
were engaged in criminal activities. Thailand had to exert
some control over them. The Ambassador replied that the
Hmong resettlement program had been delayed by a disease
outbreak that would delay the completion of the program for
several months. He asked General Winai to explain the
background of the urban Burmese situation and the current
plan to move them to the border camps.
4. (C) Winai recounted that political demonstrations in
mid-2003 by urban Burmese outside the Burmese Embassy in
Bangkok, which criticized Thai and Burmese government
policies had led Prime Minister Thaksin to direct that the
urban Burmese be moved to the border camps by August 2004 and
not engage in political activities. Winai added that the
Prime Minister had also accused UNHCR at the time of
conducting refugee status interviews for this group without
informing the Thai government. (Comment. UNHCR had in fact
regularly kept the Thai Foreign Ministry appraised of its
refugee interview activities. End comment.) The Thai
government had decided also that the urban Burmese could
choose resettlement to third countries. UNHCR had not
contested the Thai government position. Winai continued that
the United States had then stepped in and offered to resettle
the urban Burmese. As August 2004 approached, the United
States and UNHCR had asked for an extension of the deadline
for the border camp move. The RTG had agreed to this and
also to a subsequent request to postpone the deadline to the
end of March 2005. Over this period the number of urban
Burmese whom UNHCR said had refugee status had increased from
about 1,800 to about 4,400. Resettlement countries had taken
so far about 2,000 of the 4,400.
5. (C) Winai said that there could not be further extensions
of the March 31 deadline. He added that there was space for
1,800 persons in three of the refugee camps near the
Thai-Burma border. To ensure there was enough room in the
camps, the urban Burmese could be staged into the camps
according to their position in the resettlement pipeline.
That is, those who had been refused by resettlement countries
should be moved first and those who had appealed a negative
decision by a resettlement country could be moved next.
Those who already had a date for departure to a third country
should be the last to move to the camps. Winai noted that
only a small number of urban Burmese in Bangkok had
registered so far for the camp transfer. The number in Mae
Sot was about 400. UNHCR had told the urban Burmese that
they would lose their right to resettlement if they did not
report for the transfer. Resettlement countries would be
able to continue processing of the urban Burmese after they
went to the camps.
6. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that there was serious
concern among NGOs and in the U.S. Congress about the planned
move. He added that some of the refugees had worries about
camp conditions. Others might have medical or security
problems if they moved to the camps. The Ambassador said
that the U.S. hoped that there would not be a strong RTG
reaction against those urban Burmese who did not register for
the camp transfer. In particular the United States opposed
any refoulement of refugees.
7. (C) Winai responded that, &frankly,8 the RTG was not
planning a general crackdown or large-scale searches for the
urban Burmese after the March 31 deadline passed. However,
the urban Burmese would be subject to Thai immigration law
after March 31. He added that the Thai government had not
formally deported refugees to the Burmese authorities, but
acknowledged that some were taken to the Burma border and
released there, whereupon they typically returned to Thailand.
——————————————-
Burma Refugee Camp Resettlement
——————————————-
8. (C) The Ambassador said that the U.S. was interested in
resettlement of refugees from the Burma border camps. As a
start, the U.S. wanted to look at the Tham Hin refugee camp.
Resettlement from that site could begin towards the end of
this year. He noted that PRM DAS Kelly Ryan would be
visiting Thailand April 20-22 and would have more to say on
this issue.
9. (C) Winai responded that he looked forward to Ryan\’s
visit. He said that the situation in Tham Hin was not good
and the refugees there had little opportunity to develop
themselves. Many had been in the camps for 20 years. The
best alternative would be if they had an opportunity to
return to Burma. Winai described how a recent Thai military
delegation to Rangoon had raised this issue and Burmese
leader Maung Aye had said that the Burmese government, in a
policy shift, was now willing to issue passports to Burmese
workers who returned to Burma from Thailand so they in turn
could come back to Thailand under the Thai migrant worker
registration program. Winai said this statement by Maung Aye
would have to be pursued further to determine if it
represented a real change. Maung Aye had also said Rangoon
was willing to accept back to Burma those who had left
because they were fleeing fighting. However, Rangoon was not
willing to permit those Burmese who rebelled against the
government to return. Winai said that it was not clear what
distinction there was between the second and third groups.
10. (C) Winai said that when he first took the position of
NSC Secretary General, there had been concern in the RTG that
any resettlement program from the border camps would be a
pull factor and draw more Burmese into Thailand. Now,
however, there was little fighting in eastern Burma and so
concerns in this area had lessened. The RTG, including the
Prime Minister, was agreeable to resettlement from the border
camps. Winai said it was important now also for the camp
refugees to have greater educational and vocational training
opportunities. This would give them skills that they could
use if they were able to return to Burma. If, on the other
hand, they stayed in Thailand and became Thai, they could
make a contribution to Thai society.
————————–
Situation in the South
————————–
11. (C) Winai said that the RTG\’s views about the situation
in southern Thailand had changed over the past two years.
Initially, the RTG had thought that the perpetrators of the
violence were bandits, criminals involved in illegal
activities, or influential local persons who had differences
with Thai officials. The RTG also believed that some in the
South, particularly the younger generation, still had notions
of separatism, but did not have the means to put such ideas
into action. Later, the RTG realized the situation was more
complex and that some Southerners felt that Thai society and
Thai officials did not treat them justly. These feelings
were genuine, different from the feelings of other Thai.
Southerners were very sensitive on this point. The RTG also
discovered that the Ministry of Education had little
knowledge about the teachers and curriculum in the Muslim
schools in the South. It learned that many Thai students
were going to schools in Indonesia. The Indonesian
government had asked for the Thai government\’s assistance in
tracking the movements of these students.
12. (C) Winai said those behind the southern violence wanted
to separate the people from the government, draw foreign
attention to the situation, and internationalize the issue.
The RTG feared most that the situation would become a
religious conflict and become internationalized. Winai noted
that it was not yet clear what role the newly formed National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by former Prime
Minister Anand Panyarachun would play. He thought it would
try to identify legitimate grievances and what could be done
to address them.
13. (C) The Ambassador said that as a friend of Thailand, he
was concerned about the situation in the South. He
understood the issue of the sensitivity of Muslim feelings
based on his experience in Indonesia. The Ambassador said
there seemed to be disagreement on whether the disbanding
several years earlier by Prime Minister Thaksin of the
long-standing commission of military, police, officials and
southern civilians that had addressed general problems in the
region was a mistake and contributed to the current
instability. Winai responded that he felt the old commission
had played a useful role. However, the Prime Minister at the
time had been told that law enforcement officials could
handle the situation and that the number of persons with guns
in the South totaled no more than 50. In addition, the three
southern provinces were a part of Thailand and should not
necessarily be treated or governed differently from the rest
of the country. Winai added that the problems in the South
had ebbed and flowed for about 100 years.
14. (C) Winai said that the new RTG approach would be to
accept that there were cultural differences with the South.
These differences should be looked at as an asset.
Southerners would also have full religious freedom. However,
there would be no special autonomy. The RTG was now giving
Southerners special preferences in the test for entering the
police force since they would otherwise not pass. Many of
the 1,900 new police hired for the South would be from the
region. The Ministry of Education would also take a much
more active role in improving the curriculum in the Islamic
schools. The schools currently did not teach regular
subjects and this made it difficult for graduates to obtain
jobs. Winai stated that senior southern religious leaders
had recently met with the RTG and said that they wanted a
return to normalcy. They asked the RTG to improve security
in the South and said that most southerners wanted peace.
15. (C) In an aside to the Ambassador at the conclusion of
the meeting, General Winai said that he did not expect to
remain long in his current position. He hoped to return to
the military and retire from there.
16. (C) Comment. Winai\’s comment that there are no plans for
a general crackdown on urban Burmese after the March 31
deadline is positive, but Embassy will watch this issue
carefully. UNHCR and the RTG are now working feverishly to
put in place the necessary logistical arrangements for the
camp transfer. While some arrangements have been made
already, whether they will be sufficient will likely depend
on how many of the urban Burmese sign up for the camp move
and the pace of the movements.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2087 AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER APHISIT
“29382″,”3/23/2005 9:16″,”05BANGKOK2087″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,”05BANGKOK1933″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002087
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, INR/B
PACOM OF FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH, Political Parties, Southern Thailand, US-Thai FTA, BIO Info
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON NEW DEMOCRAT PARTY
LEADER APHISIT
REF: BANGKOK 1933
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On March 21 the Ambassador met with
newly installed Democrat Party (DP) leader Aphisit
Wetchachiwa. Aphisit spoke candidly about mistakes made by
the DP during the election and discussed how he hoped to form
the party into an effective opposition to Prime Minister
Thaksin\’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. Acknowledging the
seriousness of the situation in southern Thailand, Aphisit
said the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission
(NRC) offered the Thaksin administration a rare opportunity
to change its current failing policy; but the DP was not
convinced Thaksin would turn from populist calls for a
continued hard-line approach. Aphisit said Free Trade
Agreements would continue to be the government\’s highest
external priority. Aphisit is young, smart, telegenic,
articulate, and ambitious and could develop into a serious
future challenger for Thaksin. END SUMMARY
AFTER THE ELECTION DISASTER, A NEW DEMOCRAT LEADER
2. (U) On March 21 the Ambassador met with newly installed
Democrat Party (DP) leader Aphisit Wetchachiwa at the party\’s
headquarters. Aphisit assumed leadership of the DP after
Banyat Bantadtan stepped down (along with the entire DP
Executive Board) on February 8, 2005 following the party\’s
staggering defeat in the general election. The DP\’s 96 seats
in Parliament leave them unable to raise censure motions
against Prime Minister Thaksin\’s ministers.
3. (U) The DP, with more that 3.8 million registered
members, is Thailand\’s oldest active political party and has
deep roots in modern Thai democratic history (reftel).
However, the party has struggled with its current role as the
opposition party and has developed few successful approaches
to confront Thaksin and the TRT. During the election, the DP
was unable to pose a strong alternative to Thaksin, offering
policies that mimicked the TRT\’s while virtually conceding
defeat more than a year in advance.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DEMOCRATS IN THE ELECTION?
4. (SBU) Discussing the recent election, Aphisit admitted
the DP never offered a credible alternative to Thaksin and
Thai Rak Thai (TRT). He said the DP had \”no clear message,\”
and didn\’t offer policy ideas clearly different from
Thaksin\’s populist measures. Aphisit said the DP would not
be an effective opposition party until they convinced the
public that they could effectively govern the country. He
promised that the DP would start offering alternatives to
Thaksin and TRT, instead of just criticizing from the
sidelines.
5. (SBU) Aphisit has indicated publicly that he is serious
about restructuring the DP to be more pro-active and capable
of dealing with the new style of politics that Thaksin has
introduced. He has also set a target of attracting at least
14 million votes in the 2009 general election; almost double
the votes the party received in February of this year.
Aphisit told the Ambassador that the DP would learn from
Thaksin and TRT\’s sophisticated campaign methods.
BECOMING AN EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION
6. (SBU) Aphisit agreed that Thai politics is evolving into
a two party system. However, the DP has a long way to go
before it is a credible alternative to Thaksin\’s TRT.
Aphisit said that the DP\’s goal was to establish a \”shadow\”
cabinet within two years, and within four years to have
developed enough credibility with the public to be viewed as
a real alternative to TRT.
WILLING TO WORK WITH THAKSIN ON THE SOUTH
7. (SBU) The Democrats won decisively in southern Thailand,
winning 52 of the region\’s 54 seats. They did especially
well in the three troubled provinces of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat, winning 10 of 11 seats — including six held by
TRT incumbents. The DP\’s strong regional victory seems to
indicate a popular backlash to the Government\’s heavy-handed
security policy. Following the election, Aphisit has
traveled to the region, and has publicly discussed
alternatives to Thaksin\’s policies.
8. (SBU) Aphisit told the Ambassador the situation in
Thailand\’s far south is a \”national problem,\” and that he is
willing to work with the Thaksin administration. He said
there had been some hopeful recent developments in the South,
leading to a more conciliatory atmosphere. Aphisit said as
members of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) are
publicly announced — and as new policies were presented –
the DP would offer suggestions and would not be overly
critical.
9. (SBU) Aphisit opined that the creation of the NRC gave
the government a small window of opportunity to change its
approach to the problems of southern Thailand. Aphisit said
Anand Panyarachun, the universally respected former Prime
Minister and designated Chairman of the NRC, will give the
government good advice, and would not be unduly influenced or
bullied by Thaksin. Aphisit is worried, however, that
Thaksin will \”respond\” to public opinion — which clamors for
a hard-line approach — and end up ignoring the NRC\’s
findings.
10. (SBU) Aphisit blames Thaksin for the deteriorating
situation in the south and the widening gap between the
Buddhist and Muslim communities. He cited Thaksin\’s decision
to dissolve the combined civilian, military and police
command (CMP-43), which had been successful in building trust
among the local populace and coordinating security forces,
and his insensitive statements about Muslims. He said
Thaksin\’s hard-line approach plays right into separatist
hands by further alienating the population.
U.S./THAI RELATIONS – FOCUS ON THE FTA
11. (SBU) Turning toward the state of U.S./Thai relations,
Aphisit noted that much of the public\’s perceptions of the
U.S. would be influenced by developments in Iraq. He said
the government, however, is focused on the FTA. Aphisit
believes that Thaksin wants Thailand to become the first
country to have an FTA with China, India, Japan, and the U.S.
He said that the FTA will be the focus of our bilateral
relationship, and is correspondingly at the top of the DP\’s
agenda.
COMMENT
12. (SBU) Aphisit is very articulate and speaks in a crisp
English accent. He has made for TV good looks, and appears
even younger than his 40 years. With his appearance,
intellect, and experience, Aphisit could evolve into a
formidable political presence. However, he has yet to
demonstrate a forceful personality needed to counter
Thaksin\’s. Aphisit also has a huge challenge in crafting the
often fractious Democrats into a real opposition party, with
national reach, that can stand up to Thai Rak Thai and
recapture Government House. END COMMENT
BIOGRAPHIC NOTE
13. (U) Aphisit was born on August 3, 1964, in Bangkok.
His father, Dr. Atthasit Wetchachiwa, was Deputy Public
Health Minister in the Anand Panyarachun Administration. He
completed junior and senior high school at Eaton College,
England. Aphisit continued his studies in England, receiving
a bachelor\’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
(with First Class Honors) from Oxford University in 1986.
Upon returning to Thailand he taught economics for two years
at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, earning the rank of
Army Sub-Lieutenant. During this period he earned a LL.B.
from Ramkhamhaeng University. Aphisit then returned to
England where he completed a master\’s degree in Economics at
Oxford University, ranking first among 200 graduates.
14. (U) Due to his extraordinary academic record Aphisit
was admitted to the Economics Faculty of Thammasat University
in 1990 without undergoing the normal written examination.
During his two-year teaching stint at Thammasat he was well
regarded by both colleagues and students. During a one-year
period after the 1991-coup d\’etat Aphisit joined the
well-known economist and TV commentator Dr. Choemsak Pinthong
in running a political-oriented TV program \”Mong Tang Mum\” or
\”From Different Angles\”. Aphisit was an active academic
during this period, and publicly stood against the
military-dominated regime.
15. (U) Aphisit began his political career in March 1992
when he won a close race over a Phalang Tham Party candidate
to become the DP\’s only Bangkok MP. His decision to enter
politics came as no surprise to colleagues familiar with his
political ambition. He won successive elections in September
1992, July 1995, and November 1996. In the January 2001 and
February 2005 elections, he was elected from the DP Party
List.
16. (U) Aphisit was Government Spokesman from 1992-1994,
Deputy Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1995, Chairman of
the House Standing Committee on Education during 1996-1997,
and Minister attached to the PM\’s Office from 1997-2001 –
his first ministerial assignment. At the DP\’s general
meeting on April 20, 2003, he lost a bitter leadership
contest to Banyat Bantadtan after former Prime Minister Chuan
Leekpai stepped down as DP leader. In that meeting, he was
chosen as the first deputy party leader.
17. (U) Following the TRT\’s landslide victory in the
February 2005 general election, the DP General Assembly
elected Aphisit as the new Party Leader with veteran southern
MP Suthep Thuaksuban as the Party Secretary General.
18. (U) Aphisit is married to Phimphen, the daughter of a
political scientist of Chulalongkorn University, Phongphen
Sakuntaphai, and a Bank of Thailand Assistant Governor,
Praphaiphan. They have 2 young children. END BIOGRAPHIC NOTE
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2017 THAILAND\’S WEEK IN POLITICS, MARCH 13-18, 2005
“29122″,”3/18/2005 11:47″,”05BANGKOK2017″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,
“05BANGKOK1375|05BANGKOK1739|05BANGKOK1819″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002017
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV; HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, TG, Thailand\’s Week in Politics
SUBJECT: THAILAND\’S WEEK IN POLITICS, MARCH 13-18, 2005
REF: (A) BANGKOK 1819 (B) BANGKOK 1739 (C) BANGKOK 1375
THAKSIN RANK ORDERS HIS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS
1. (SBU) Prime Minister Thaksin has announced the ranking
of his six deputy prime ministers and delineated their
individual oversight authorities. The Public Administration
Act allows the Prime Minister to delegate to the deputy prime
ministers, including designating the order in which they are
authorized to act on his behalf in his absence from the
country. The deputy prime ministers are ranked as follows:
Deputy Prime Minister (and Finance Minister) Somkid
Jatusripitak – In addition to being first among equals in
acting on Thaksin\’s behalf in the event of the Prime
Minister\’s absence from Thailand, Somkid is tasked with
overseeing the Finance Ministry, Tourism and Sports Ministry,
Commerce Ministry, Industry Ministry, the Budget Bureau, and
the National Economic and Social Development Board. In the
event that Thaksin died in office, Somkid would become acting
PM in the short period before Parliament would be expected to
officially chose a new prime minister.
Deputy Prime Minister (and Interior Minister) Pol. Gen.
Chidchai Vanasatidya, although a newcomer to the Cabinet, is
second in line to act for Thaksin. His oversight duties
include the Defense Ministry, Interior Ministry, Justice
Ministry, the National Security Council, the National
Security Agency, and the Royal Thai Police. He will also
reportedly act as the ex-officio Chairman of the National
Security Council, the National Policy Commission, the Police
Commission, the Narcotics Control Board and the Anti-Money
Laundering Commission.
Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisang, third in line, is
overseeing the Information and Communications Technology
Ministry, the Education Ministry and the National Buddhist
Bureau.
Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, the former
Foreign Minister, will be fourth in line to act for Prime
Minister Thaksin. His oversight responsibilities include the
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Social development and Human
Security Ministry and the Labor Ministry.
Deputy Prime Minister Pinij Jarusombat, fifth in line, is
overseeing the Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry, the
Natural Resources and Environment Ministry, the Public Health
Ministry, the Consumer Protection Board, and the National
Village and Urban Community Fund.
Wissanu Krea-Ngam, sixth in line, oversees the Transport
Ministry, the Energy ministry, the Prime Minister\’s Office,
the Council of State, the Civil Service Commission, the
National Economic and Social Advisory Board, and the Office
of the Civil Service Development Commission.
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS ALSO TASKED TO OVERSEE COUNTRY\’S
ADMINISTRATIVE ZONES
2. (SBU) Govt Spokesman Pol. Gen. Chaloemdet Chomphunut
disclosed after the cabinet meeting on March 15 that PM
Thaksin has also tasked the deputy prime ministers, and one
minister, to oversee the \”overall administration\” in
Thailand\’s 76 provinces. To facilitate this goal, the
Thaksin team reportedly divided the country into 19
administrative zones, excluding Bangkok, and doled out to
each deputy PM at least 3 zones for their oversight.
However, this new system is not as significant a change as it
might appear. For example, the deputy prime ministers\’ new
provincial \”oversight\” responsibilities do not give them
direct authority over the governors or other Thai provincial
authorities. Deputy prime ministers must still go through
the Interior Minister Pol. Gen. Chidchai Vanasatidya, who is
also a deputy prime minister, to suggest changes to be
implemented by the governors. The new responsibility appears
to amount to each deputy prime minister having a special
brief to keep on top of developments in certain provinces and
advise PM Thaksin. The allocation of zones is as follows:
Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak:
Zone 1 (Chiang Rai / Chiang Mai / Nan / Phayao / Phrae / Mae
Hong Son / Lampang / Lamphun)
Zone 9 (Chanthaburi / Chon Buri / Trat / Rayong)
Zone 17 (Krabi / Phang-nga / Phuket)
Deputy Prime Minister Pol. Gen. Chidchai Vanasatidya:
Zone 14 (Yasothon / Si Sa Ket / Amnat Charoen / Ubon
Ratchathani)
Zone 18 (Narathiwat / Pattani / Yala)
Zone 19 (Songkhla / Satun)
Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisang:
Zone 6 (Kanchanaburi / Nakhon Pathom / Ratchaburi / Suphan
Buri)
Zone 8 (Chachoengsao / Nakhon Nayok / Prachin Buri / Samut
Prakan / Sa Kaeo)
Zone 11 (Kalasin / Nakhon Phanom / Mukdahan / Sakon Nakhon)
Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart Sathirathai:
Zone 2 (Tak, Phitsanulok / Phetchabun / Sukhothai / Uttaradit)
Zone 3 (Kamphaeng Phet / Nakhon Sawan / Phichit / Uthai Thani)
Zone 16 (Trang, Nakhon Si Thammarat / Phattalung)/
Deputy Prime Minister Pinij Jarusombat:
Zone 10 (Nong Khai / Nong Bua Lam Phu / Loei / Udon Thani)
Zone 12 (Khon Kaen / Maha Sarakham / Roi Et)
Zone 13 (Chaiyaphum / Nakhon Ratchasima / Buriram / Surin)
Zone 15 (Chumphon / Ranong / Surat Thani)
Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam:
Zone 4 (Nonthaburi / Pathum Thani / Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya
/ Angthong)
Zone 5 (Chainat / Lop Buri / Saraburi / Sing Buri)
Zone 7 (Prachuap Khirikhan / Petchaburi / Samut Songkhram /
Samut Sakhon)
Prime Minister\’s Office Minister Suranand Vejjajiva has been
given oversight of the administration of Bangkok.
SPARKS FLY IN FIRST PARLIAMENT BUSINESS SESSION
3. (SBU) Opposition Democrat Party (DP) MPs walked out of
Parliament on February 16 during its first business session
after Speaker Bhokin Bhalakula ejected one of their fellow
members following an altercation over voting procedure.
According to reports, Democrat MP Rangsima Rodrasamee accused
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) MP Phayap Punket of voting more than
once, using an absent TRT MP\’s electronic voting card.
Phayap demanded an apology from Rangsima. Rangsima refused.
After exchanges between government and opposition MPs, Bhokin
told Rangsima to withdraw her accusation or leave the
chamber. Rangsima chose to depart, sparking a walkout by her
DP colleagues. The vote that started the bitter
recriminations was over a disagreement between TRT and DP MPs
over what time to start the next meeting of the lower
chamber. In addition to criticism from DP lawmakers for
ejecting Rangsima, Bhokin has also reportedly been criticized
by members of the Wang Nam Yen faction of the TRT Party, who
accused the Speaker of mishandling the whole situation.
Former Deputy House Speaker and Chart Thai Party MP Somsak
Prisanananthakun characterized Bhokin\’s chairmanship as a
\”rubber stamp.\”
4. (SBU) Comment: Feelings were already raw among DP MPs
over what they consider the Speaker\’s blatant lack of
neutrality. Bhokin was previously Thaksin\’s Interior
Minister and took the untraditional step of voting for
Thaksin last week when he was formally elected Prime Minister
(see Bangkok 1739). By his abrupt decision to eject Rangsima
from the Parliament chamber he has shown a lack of political
finesse by ignoring the expectation that the Speaker will
strive to appear objective and non-partisan. TRT
subsequently admitted that several MPs had engaged in
covering up for absent colleagues by using their electronic
cards to vote.
REPORTS OF RUMBLINGS IN MAJOR TRT FACTION OVER SPOILS
5. (SBU) Members of the Wang Nam Yen (WNY) faction of
influential politician Sanoh Thienthong are grumbling over
what they consider a disproportional allocation of
ministerial and assistant slots to Bangkok MPs rather than to
the MPs from the other regions of the country, especially the
Northeast, their bailiwick, which brought in a massive TRT
seat tally. His faction members especially complained to
Sanoh about the following appointments: former Health
Minister and Thaksin\’s Bangkok campaign manager (and TRT
faction leader in her own right) Sudarat Keyuraphan as
Agriculture Minister; Suranand Vejjajiva as Prime Minister\’s
Office Minister; Phumtham Wechayachai as Deputy
Communications Minister; Pimon Sriwikorn as Deputy Secretary
General to Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister
Chidchai; and Pitipong Temjareon as Secretary to the Foreign
Minister. The WNY MPs are also unhappy over the replacement
of Sanoh as party Chief Whip former Justice Minister Pongthep
Thianthong, who they view as more junior and less capable.
Sanoh reportedly told his followers to be patient and see
what develops over the coming months.
6. (SBU) Comment: Sanoh has been battling to maintain his
position vis-a-vis other TRT factions over the past three
years, particularly with the rise in influence of the Wang
Babuan faction headed by Thaksin\’s sister Yaowapa Wongsawat.
He has also seen his star eclipsed by the very low rankings
that his faction members received on the TRT party list
compared to those given members of rival factions. His
private secretary and confidant Burin Hiranburans, for
example was ranked no 95 on the list compared to the number
52 ranking he held in the 2001 election. In another case,
close aide Boonthueng Panpanit was ranked 88th this time
around, compared to 56th in the previous election. Sanoh\’s
followers don\’t need much more evidence to sense that their
leader\’s influence within the TRT is on the wane.
CHUWIT COMES UP WITH HIS OWN COLOR ZONES – FOR THAKSIN\’S NEW
CABINET MEMBERS
7. (SBU) In an obvious spoof of Thaksin\’s use of color
codes to denote the level of security in Thailand\’s southern
provinces\’ districts (ref. C), outspoken Chart Thai Party
List (Bangkok) MP Chuwit Kamolwisit, announced on March 16
his idea of categorizing the Prime Minister\’s new cabinet
ministers by color. Chuwit straight-faced declared that
under his plan, he would divide all new ministers into 3
colored groups; \”Green\” for those with acceptable
qualifications, \”Yellow\” for those with doubtful
qualifications, and \”Red\” for those with unacceptable
qualifications. According to Chuwit, ministers in \”Yellow\”
and \”Red\” groups must be kept under close watch. He
identified 9 of Thaksin\’s new Ministers who in his view
qualify for the \”Red\” group.
Chuwit\’s \”Red\” list
Pinij Jarusombat (Deputy PM)
Wissanu Krea-Ngam (Deputy PM)
Sudarat Keyuraphun (Minister of Agriculture & Cooperatives)
Suriya Jungrungruengkit (Minister of Transport)
Pracha Maleenont (Minister of Social Development and Human
Security)
Somsak Thepsutin (Minister of Tourism and Sports)
Adisai Bodharamik (Minister of Education)
Watana Muangsook (Minister of Industry)
Newin Chidchob (Deputy Minister of Agriculture & Cooperatives)
8. (U) Chuwit added that there are 14 ministers in the
\”Green\” group and 12 in the \”Yellow\” group. He reportedly
intends to evaluate all the ministers every 6 months, and
those with better or more satisfactory performance would be
re-categorized into a better color group. (Note: Chuwit did
not explain if those in the \”Green\” group would be degraded
if their performance got worse. End note.)
9. (SBU) Comment: Chuwit, the \”Massage Parlor Tycoon,\”
gained immense public popularity in Bangkok when he
threatened to reveal the names of police and other officials
who had demanded bribes and other payoffs from his brothel
operations over the years. Chuwit ran for governor last year
and came in a strong third. He won a Chart Thai (CT) Party
List seat in the February general elections. True to his
independent image, Chuwit was the only MP to register a vote
against Thaksin for Prime Minister in the Parliament after
the other CT members (save CT Leader Barnharn Silpa-archa)
and the opposition Democrat Party decided to abstain.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK2010 LOCKHEED MARTIN PROMISES COUNTERTRADE TO THAILAND AS PART OF F-16 DEALE
“29102″,”3/18/2005 9:12″,”05BANGKOK2010″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”04BANGKOK7550″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002010
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV AND EAP
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISA (STERN AND POWERS). PLEASE PASS TO
DSCA/AP (NMORGAN)
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2015
TAGS: MASS, MARR, PREL, PGOV, TH, POL/MIL
SUBJECT: LOCKHEED MARTIN PROMISES COUNTERTRADE TO THAILAND
AS PART OF F-16 DEAL
REF: 04 BANGKOK 7550
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke. Reasons 1.4 (a).
Summary.
1. (C) In a March 17 meeting with Defense Minister Gen.
Thamarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya, Lockheed Martin Director
for Industrial Cooperation Richard Jannarone made it clear
that Lockheed Martin is willing to offer a \”100 percent\”
countertrade deal if the RTG selects F-16 as the fighter
aircraft to replace the aging F-5s in its fleet. Lockheed
made the offer in response to similar promises made by SAAB
to support their pitch to sell Gripen fighters and by Sukhoi
to support their efforts to sell SU-30 aircraft to Thailand.
Thai law now requires that all procurement of foreign goods
by state agencies valued at more than approximately 8 million
USD be balanced by countertrade transactions equal to at
least 50 percent of the value of the purchased goods. Good
news for Lockheed Martin\’s bid was Thamarak\’s expressed
concern that MOD wants a fighter that has a proven logistics
support chain. Nonetheless, post is concerned over continued
indications from other Thai contacts that, irrespective of
the operational performance advantage F-16 holds over Gripen
and SU-30, the RTG will make its final decision based solely
on the countertrade deal cobbled together. Swedish and
Russian sales reps are allegedly offering offsets and
countertrade at more than 100 percent. Thai Government
officials interested in F-16 winning the fighter contract
have suggested to us that senior U.S. officials weighing in
in support of Lockheed Martin would be useful to counter
recent statements of support the King of Sweden and President
Putin have made in support of their country\’s planes. END
SUMMARY.
LOCKHEED WILL OFFER 100 PERCENT COUNTERTRADE AND/OR OFFSETS
2. (SBU) Although the Royal Thai Government has not
officially requested RFPs nor clearly outlined mission
requirements, for a year RTG officials have expressed their
intention to purchase 18 multi-role fighters to replace aging
F-5s in the RTAF fleet. Although Thailand now has 59 F-16s
in its inventory, press stories for the past several months
have reported on Thai pilots traveling to Sweden to examine
SAAB FAS-39 Gripens or to Russia to look at SU-30\’s. Embassy
officials, including the Ambassador in a meeting with Prime
Minister Thaksin, have emphasized that F-16 is a more capable
aircraft, at a better price, easier to maintain, and more
likely to help Thailand\’s future efforts to procure the Joint
Strike Fighter when it becomes available for export in years
to come. Thai officials have responded by pointing out that
Thai law now requires any large-scale purchase of foreign
goods by the RTG to include a countertrade deal equal to at
least half the price of the purchased goods. Press reports
in the lead up to last month\’s national elections noted the
RTG\’s efforts to craft a deal with a fighter manufacturer
that would help Thailand sell approximately 80,000 tons of
frozen chickens stockpiled in Thai poultry processing company
freezers in the wake of the avian flu crisis. Embassy
contacts said that until Lockheed Martin offered a proposal
to sell F-16s that included countertrade, the RTG could not
seriously consider its offer. Contacts also suggested that
an offer that included an agreement to buy Thai chicken would
be especially welcome.
3. (SBU) In response to this information, on March 17,
Lockheed Martin\’s senior countertrade expert, Richard
Jannarone, met with Thai Defense Minister Gen Thamarak to
clearly spell out Lockheed Martin\’s willingness to offer a
comprehensive package of countertrade and/or industrial
offsets. Jannarone explained that Lockheed Martin has more
experience in countertrade than any other defense
manufacturer, having completed programs in 27 countries
valued at over 22 billion USD. Lockheed Martin is willing to
offer a \”100 percent countertrade package\” for a long list of
Thai goods, including agricultural products, and/or an
industrial cooperation plan that could upgrade existing Thai
maintenance facilities for C-130 cargo planes, F-16 engines
or F-16 radars, among others. Jannarone emphasized his
company\’s willingness to put together a package that would
allow Thailand to purchase the most capable plane under
consideration in a manner that meets the concerns of the
Prime Minister\’s office.
THAMARAK SEEMS RECEPTIVE
4. (SBU) Thamarak explained that he had only reassumed the
role of Defense Minister a week earlier but noted his defense
procurement plan would have each of the Thai services clearly
outline their new equipment needs and request list with a
focus on a reliable logistics train after purchase, training
follow-up and technology transfer. While quick to emphasize
that other agencies within the RTG would have to vet any
proposal on fiscal and other policy grounds, Thamarak twice
pointed out F-16\’s comparative advantage from a logistics
standpoint. He noted that since Thailand already owns
F-16\’s, it would be easier to train mechanics and perform
maintenance on new model F-16s. He indicated that he would
forward Lockheed Martin\’s proposal to include countertrade to
the other agencies concerned.
COMMENT: POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON SOUGHT
5. (C) While we were encouraged by Thamarak\’s favorable
opinion of F-16, our collective sense is that Lockheed Martin
is playing catch-up in the fighter competition. The Swedes
and the Russians have worked aggressively and have made it
clear for several months that they are willing to explore
buying Thai chicken as part of a fighter deal. If the
decision to purchase were left up to the military, F-16 would
win easily. It is more capable and easier for the RTAF to
maintain than the other aircraft. However, officials in the
Commerce Ministry and PM\’s office seem convinced that all
three fighters are fungible and that Thailand should
therefore focus on the best business deal. As of March 18,
we were unable to arrange a meeting for Lockheed Martin with
the new Commerce Minister, Thanong Bidaya due to his only
having been appointed on March 11. We intend to follow up
with Thanong quickly because his Ministry seems to have the
most influence over the PM\’s perception of the countertrade
issue. Several RTAF contacts have mentioned to JUSMAGTHAI and
Lockheed Martin officials that both Sweden and Russia have
applied high-level political pressure in support of their
planes. Both the King of Sweden and President Putin have
raised the fighter purchase with PM Thaksin. Fans of F-16
within the RTAF have suggested that phone calls from senior
U.S. officials to key Thai decision makers could go a long
way towards helping Lockheed Martin win the figher
competition.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK1933 AMBASSADOR CALLS ON FORMER PRIME MINISTER CHUAN LEEKPAI
“28907″,”3/16/2005 10:52″,”05BANGKOK1933″,”Embassy Bangkok”,
“CONFIDENTIAL”,”05BANGKOK1578|05BANGKOK948″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
161052Z Mar 05
“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001933
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV. HQ USPACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV, TH, Southern Thailand, Elections – Thai, BURMA, US-Thai FTA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON FORMER PRIME MINISTER CHUAN
LEEKPAI
REF: (A) BANGKOK 1578 (B) BANGKOK 0948
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH L. BOYCE. REASON: 1.4 (D)
1. (C) Summary: During a March 8 meeting with the
Ambassador, former Prime Minister and Democrat Party (DP)
leader Chuan Leekpai said that Prime Minister Thaksin did not
understand the problems in southern Thailand and indeed his
policies were exacerbating the situation. Chuan feared that
if Thaksin\’s hard-line policies in the region continue,
international terrorist organizations such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda could be tempted to take advantage
of the situation. Chuan described the recent general
elections as the dirtiest he had seen in his political career
and accused the Thaksin administration of using troops and
provincial government officials to interfere in the voting.
Chuan described Thaksin as a formidable politician who uses
his control over much of the media to extend his political
power. End Summary.
CHUAN CONCERNED OVER SITUATION IN THAILAND\’S DEEP SOUTH
2. (C) During a March 8 meeting with the Ambassador, former
Prime Minister and Democrat Party leader Chuan Leekpai said
that Thaksin\’s policies are exacerbating the situation in the
southern Muslim majority provinces bordering Malaysia. To
Chuan, the Government does not appear to be interested in
solving the real problem, but variously blames the violence
on drugs, criminal gangs and separatists. Thaksin\’s approach
was superficial and frivolous, he said. The Thai Rak Thai\’s
(TRT) massive electoral loss in the southern border provinces
demonstrated the populace\’s rejection of his policies. \”They
saw the video of the security forces actions at Tak Bai,\”
Chuan said.
3. (C) According to Chuan, when the military was initially
in charge of security in the region during the tenure of the
Southern Border Provinces Center and the
Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43, things were
relatively peaceful. With Thaksin\’s disbanding of those
structures and the ascendancy of the police in these \”special
areas,\” the situation deteriorated. Muslim feelings of
alienation increased.
4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Indonesian Government
had a policy of recruiting police from local villages. Thai
officials, on the other hand, have maintained that most Thai
Muslims in the southern region who take the written test fail
because of inadequate education from the \”pondok\” (Islamic
school) system. This results in a police force that is from
the outside and does not understand local culture and
customs. The Ambassador added that Thaksin seemed
insensitive to Thai Muslim feelings by initially blaming the
suffocation deaths at Tak Bai on the weakness of arrested
protesters from Ramadan fasting.
SAYS THAKSIN ALIENATING MUSLIM NEIGHBORS
5. (C) Chuan said that he was concerned that if Thaksin\’s
hard-line policies continue, international terrorist
organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or al-Qaeda could
be tempted to try to take advantage of the situation created
by the conflict. He criticized Thaksin,s accusations that
neighboring countries Malaysia and Indonesia are sites for
training separatists. This is not the policy of these
countries and all Thaksin succeeds in doing is to anger them,
Chuan said. Chuan noted that Thaksin did not call Prime
Minister Badawi to discuss a suspected separatist held by the
Malaysian authorities but instead talked to the press about
wanting the prisoner turned over to Thailand. There are
complicated ties involved between Muslims living in southern
Thailand and in Malaysia, he continued. Malaysia and
Indonesia are majority Muslim countries and their people feel
for their fellow Muslims in southern Thailand when they see
films of Tak Bai. Chuan also expressed concern that Muslim
religious schools, by not concentrating on teaching
marketable skills, are producing graduates with poor
employment prospects who could turn to violence in
frustration. Chuan said that the southern Thailand region
needs investment in education and industry. He noted the
earlier success of \”growth triangles\” in the region and
suggested that an Indonesia/Malaysia/South Thailand triangle
with complementary factory and industrial production would
energize the region\’s economy.
6. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that in Indonesia,
religious schools in 99 percent of the cases are moderate,
almost secular in tone and include mainstream subjects in
their curriculum. He noted that in the three Thai provinces
Sharia law governs issues such as birth, death, marriage and
divorce. Religion and country should be able to coexist, he
said, and all could be made to feel Thai and not singled out
as different.
RECENT ELECTION \”DIRTIEST\” YET
7. (C) Turning to party politics, the Ambassador asked
about the recent elections in which the Democrat Party (DP)
was massively defeated by Thaksin\’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party. Chuan responded that election was the dirtiest he had
seen in his political career. He accused the Thaksin
administration of using the bureaucracy to influence the
voting. He said that provincial governors and police had
interfered in the election process and that soldiers were
used to vote in early elections in attempts to unseat DP
candidates.
8. (C) Chuan specifically noted as an example the election
campaign fought by prominent DP MP (and former foreign
minister) Surin Pitsuwan in Nakorn Sri Thammarat. Surin
fought a tough race against his TRT challenger. Fortunately,
Chuan said, Surin collected enough support to overcome the
thousands of votes by troops bussed in by the government to
vote for the TRT candidate in early voting, a misuse of a
procedure that allows voters unable to get to the polls on
election day (such as soldiers on duty) to cast ballots
beforehand (Bangkok 0948). Chuan said that the use of army
and police personnel to interfere in the election was
indicative of increasing control in general by Thaksin. He
said that Thaksin controls virtually all of the media,
including television stations such as ITV and UBC. The Prime
Minister has a strong sense of public relations style and
will continue to use his control over the media for his own
political ends, he predicted.
ABHISIT HAS WORK CUT OUT FOR HIM
9. (C) Following the DP,s loss and Banyat Bantadtan,s
resignation, it is now Abhisit Vejjajiva,s turn as the
party\’s leader, Chuan said. The DP would have lost by less
if Abhisit had been leader at the time of the election.
Banyat was a straight talker but he couldn\’t compete with the
populist message of Thaksin. Abhisit will have to do a
better job inspiring the voters in his speeches.
BURMA
10. (C) The Ambassador noted the unpopularity of Thaksin\’s
Burma policy in the United States. He pointed to sharp
reaction to Thaksin\’s recent reported characterization of
Than Shwe\’s rationale for Aung San Suu Kyi\’s continued
detention as \”reasonable.\” Even if the remarks were quoted
out of context, the widespread impression is that Thaksin is
acting as an apologist for the Burmese regime and his
engagement policy is helping it to hold onto power.
11. (C) Chuan responded that as Prime Minister he never
visited Burma under the military regime. He didn\’t want to
demonstrate any form of support or sense of legitimacy to the
regime. He did meet Than Shwe in Chiang Rai to discuss
counter-narcotics and border security issues. Than Shwe
promised to cooperate on those issues. Chuan recalled that
he had used the army to clamp down on violence along the
border. He described Than Shwe as a \”religious\” man who told
Chuan that he hoped one day to visit the Buddhist temples of
Thailand.
12. (C) The Ambassador said that ASEAN should play a more
assertive role on the Burma issue. Next year, Burma will
have the Chair of ASEAN and that is a problem. The
Ambassador cited as \”encouraging\” the recent efforts by the
Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Committee, made up of
parliamentarians from some of the ASEAN member countries, to
quietly address this issue (see Bangkok 1578).
CAUTIOUS RESPONSE ON FTA
13. (C) In response to the Ambassador\’s question regarding
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the U.S., Chuan said that
he supports it, but with reservations. He noted that
Thailand\’s FTA with China was \”not to our advantage.\” He
said that unfortunately in trade, \”one party prospers more
than the other.\” The biggest challenge is to figure out how
to adjust to the market changes that come about from free
trade patterns, and how to cushion the effects as industries
have to restructure in the face of competition. This is
difficult to explain to the public, he concluded.
BOYCE
“
05BANGKOK1924 CHILD MARRIAGE
“28898″,”3/16/2005 9:06″,”05BANGKOK1924″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”UNCLASSIFIED”,”05STATE36341″,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
“,”UNCLAS BANGKOK 001924
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV AND G/IWI: L KHADIAGALA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ELAB, PHUM, PGOV, SCUL, SOCI, KWMN, TH, HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: THAILAND: CHILD MARRIAGE
REF: STATE 36341
1. (U) The legal age of marriage for men and women in
Thailand is 18. Persons under 18 may be legally married with
the consent of both parents or a single surviving parent or
legal guardian. In some cases, the Court can approve a legal
underage marriage. This is usually granted when requested by
a couple which includes a woman who became pregnant under the
age of 18 wishes to marry before the birth of the child.
2. (U) Underage marriage among the general population is not
a significant problem. However, the practice persists in
unknown numbers in some hill tribe communities in Northern
Thailand and occasionally in Thailand\’s minority Muslim
population. None of the government offices or NGOs contacted
by post were able to provide statistics on child marriage.
Most embassy contacts expressed concern about teenage sex and
unwanted pregnancy, which sometimes results in underage
marriage but most often couples just live together. Underage
marriage and/or teen pregnancy often means that teenagers
drop out of school and are forced to find work away from
traditional home and family support structures.
3. (U) Post is unaware of any U.S.-funded initiatives that
aim to reduce the incidence or address the negative affects
of child marriage specifically. Some anti-trafficking
programs focusing on women\’s empowerment seek to educate
women about their legal rights and therefore address issues
of child marriage. Local NGOs focused on women\’s rights can
address this issue through education and outreach to
hilltribe and Muslim women, but also to various groups of
young women most vulnerable to exploitation in the poorer
Northeast and Northern areas of the country.
BOYCE
“
