06BANGKOK2330 LIFTING THE BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE TRAINING
“61279″,”4/21/2006 8:44″,”06BANGKOK2330″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
210844Z Apr 06
“,”C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002330
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PHUM, PTER, TH
SUBJECT: LIFTING THE BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE TRAINING
REF: 2003 BANGKOK 2246
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (U) This is an action message. Please see paragraph 8.
2. (C) SUMMARY and action request: Since 2003, we have
barred the use of INL funds for training of provincial
police, due to their suspected involvement in extrajudicial
killings in the war on drugs. Post recommends that we relax
this absolute ban, and permit limited training of provincial
police, consistent with Leahy amendment provisions, in order
to improve the RTG\’s ability to combat terrorism connected to
the ethnic Malay-Muslim insurgency in the far South. END
SUMMARY and action request.
BACKGROUND
———-
3. (C) In 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin initiated a three
month \”War on Drugs\” campaign intended to eliminate narcotics
from the country. In the wake of the campaign, there were
approximately 1,300 killings of suspected drug traffickers.
The government claimed that most of these killings resulted
from disputes among those involved in the drug trade. Other
sources, including Thailand\’s National Human Rights
Commission, disputed this claim and called for thorough
investigation of all EJKs. The subsequent government
investigation lead to few accusations against police or
military officers. There was, and still is, broad public
support for the crack-down on drug-related crime. As post
reported three years ago: \”The precise number of
extra-judicial killings of drug suspects since February 1 –
and the identities of their perpetrators — is not known or
knowable to the Mission. Nonetheless, the preponderance of
evidence suggests that a significant number of these killings
were perpetrated by the police or by individuals acting on
behalf of the police. The evidence also suggests that most
of the killings associated with the police are associated
with the provincial police forces rather than with those who
work for the divisions of police tasked with specific
functions, for example: Immigration police, Crime
Suppression Police, Special Branch or Border Patrol Police.\”
In that report, post included a recommendation to limit the
training that would be provided to provincial police due to
these concerns, noting, \”In addition to the fact that the
provincial police appear most heavily involved in the (EJKs),
we as a mission have also traditionally had far less contact
with provincial police than with the Border Patrol Police,
Special Branch, Immigration, and other non-police law
enforcement entities.\” (reftel) Department subsequently
implemented a ban on INL funding for provincial police
training.
4. (C) Since the conclusion of the \”war on drugs,\” there has
not been another spike in suspected EJKs to compare with
2003. For example, the total number of presumed
insurgency-related deaths from every cause (insurgent or
security force) for the past two years is about 1,100. The
problems of poor police performance and lack of
accountability remain serious, however.
POLICE FAILURES FUEL SOUTHERN INSURGENCY
—————————————-
5. (C) As we have discussed the RTG\’s difficulties in
countering the insurgency in the far south, it has become
increasingly apparent that this poor performance and lack of
accountability are obstacles to Thailand\’s counter-terrorism
efforts. Everyone from foreign experts to Muslim southerners
point to similar problems. The police are often incapable of
performing the most basic police work – gathering evidence,
following up on leads, making a case that prosecutors can
bring to court. According to one source, the police have
identified suspects in only about 12 percent of the suspected
insurgent attacks. There are few convictions, and courts
have acquitted suspects in several high-profile cases because
of lack of evidence. When a crime or insurgent attack
occurs, the first unit that reaches the scene — provincial
police, other police, or military — usually takes charge of
it. They are usually unable to identify useful evidence, and
they permit bystanders and the press to contaminate the
scene. Trained officials, for example, those who have the
background to do a post-blast investigation at a bombing
site, arrive to find the crime scene being hosed down and
reopened to traffic. The inability of the police to find the
perpetrators of crimes/insurgent violence obviously makes it
easier for insurgents to act. In addition, it has fed the
local suspicions about the origins of the violence. Local
contacts say southerners point to the lack of prosecutions or
even arrests as evidence that Thai security forces or other
third hands (including the US) are \”really\” behind the
violence.
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
———————-
6. (C) Septel will describe post\’s proposals to ramp up
certain kinds of training for the police to improve their
counter-terrorism abilities. In order for these proposals to
have the desired impact, it is essential that provincial
police be included as part of the training
– As reftel makes clear, the ban on provincial police
training was not made strictly pursuant to Leahy standards.
Post did not have \”credible evidence\” that the provincial
police were behind specific killings. Based on the
information available to post at this time, it appears that
our decision was over and above the legally required
response.
– Although we are not satisfied with the RTG government
response to the 2003 EJKs, we recognize that the campaign
ended quickly and has not been repeated. We believe that
strong international reaction against the killings had the
desired effect, making clear to the Thai that there would be
a price to pay for continued killings. We note that,
although there have been some credible reports of EJKs by
security forces in the southern provinces, the number is
limited. We cannot document a specific link between EJKs in
the south and the provincial police.
– We believe that the inability of the police to gather
evidence to make credible cases is disastrous on several
fronts. First and most obvious, genuinely dangerous
supporters of terrorism may well be acquitted by the
independent courts, which must have evidence on which to base
a conviction. Second, there is palpable and growing
frustration on the part of government officials that
terrorism suspects cannot be convicted. This could lead to a
higher level of EJKs, as police take the law into their own
hands.
7. (C) We could move forward with our proposal for increased
counter-terrorism training without including the provincial
police, but this would leave a significant gap. The
provincial police are often the first to respond to a
insurgent incident. They have an important role to play –
at a minimum, to understand how to secure a crime scene and
refrain from destroying the evidence until trained personal
arrive. Post would make clear to the RTG that our inclusion
of provincial police would be limited to training we believed
necessary to support our common counter-terrorism objectives.
Our goal is to foster institutional change, therefore, we
would not rule out any participation from police other parts
of the country. However, our priority is the South.
Participants would of course be vetted to ensure respect for
Leahy standards and Department policy, and human rights
training would be a key element in the program.
8. (C) Action request: Post requests that the Department
approve the inclusion of provincial police in targeted
INL-funded training. End Action request.
BOYCE
“
