Archive for July 21st, 2011
09BANGKOK2405 THAILAND’S MARCHING SEASON: BRAWL NEAR BORDER CONTRASTS WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION IN BANGKOK
“226127″,”9/21/2009 11:23″,”09BANGKOK2405″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,
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SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002405
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER, WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND\’S MARCHING SEASON: BRAWL NEAR BORDER
CONTRASTS WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION IN BANGKOK
REF: A. 08 BANGKOK 3032 (POLITICAL CRISIS RETURNS TO THE
STREETS)
B. BANGKOK 983 (THAI PM ABHISIT BRIEFS AMBASSADORS)
C. BANGKOK 2386 (RED SHIRTS PREPARE TO MARCH )
D. BANGKOK 2369 (THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE)
BANGKOK 00002405 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: POL Counselor George Kent, reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (SBU) Summary: September 19 proved to be a day of dueling
political rallies in Thailand. The United Front for
Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), aka \”the red-shirt\”
supporters of fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, gathered in Bangkok to mark the third anniversary
of the military coup which removed Thaksin from office. The
rally, which featured a phone-in from the fugitive
billionaire, was peaceful; the crowd dispersed shortly after
midnight. Members of the People\’s Alliance for Democracy
(PAD), aka \”the yellow-shirts,\” marched in Sisaket Province
near the disputed Preah Vihear temple on the Cambodian border
to protest what they see as Cambodian encroachment on Thai
territory. A reported twenty people were injured in clashes
between PAD supporters and local red-sympathetic villagers
before officials negotiated a compromise which allowed PAD
leaders to issue a statement from a hilltop near the Preah
Vihear temple. The main column never reached closer than
three kilometers to the Thai-Cambodian border.
2. (C) Comment: In marked contrast to the violent
demonstrations that rattled Thailand from August-December
2008 and March-April 2009 (REF B), security forces in Bangkok
and Sisaket held their lines and prevented protesters from
both the red and yellow camps from reaching their stated
destinations (General Prem\’s residence and the border
hilltop, respectively). While Bangkok braced for possible
trouble from red-shirts that ultimately failed to
materialize, the real action this past weekend took place in
Sisaket, with the first red-yellow direct clashes since late
2008. In addition, elements of the so-called \”blue shirt\”
supporters of coalition party de facto leader Newin Chidchob
played an ambiguous and potentially provocative role, and the
police failed to keep locals and PAD marchers separate, but
the military eventually ensured the PAD march stopped well
short of the border. End summary and comment.
ALL QUIET ON THE BANGKOK FRONT…
———————————
3. (SBU) The red rally in Bangkok was peaceful as advertised
(REF C). An afternoon rainstorm scattered the early
arrivals, but by 9:00 p.m., when Thaksin addressed the crowd
by videolink, Bangkok police estimated there were about
32,000 people at Sanam Luang. Speeches by Thaksin and other
UDD leaders addressed the usual litany of red-shirt
grievances: the economy was doing worse; the judiciary was
politicized; Prime Minister Abhisit was feckless; and Privy
Council chair Prem was to blame for all of it, often-times
characterized in crude and profane terms. Thaksin again
played coy about his eventual return, concluding: see you in
Thailand, though I don\’t know when.
4. (SBU) The rally continued for several hours after Thaksin
spoke, breaking up at around 12:30 a.m. Thanks to concerted
police action to block the streets leading to Prem\’s
residence nearby, the red-shirts did not follow-through on
their previously stated intent to march to Prem\’s home.
…BUT A HOT TIME IN SISAKET NEAR PREAH VIHEAR
——————————————— -
5. (SBU) In contrast, the PAD march in Sisaket province near
the Preah Vihear temple and Cambodian border turned nasty.
PAD secondary leader Veera Somkwamkid led an estimate 4,000
PAD supporters (note: none wearing yellow; they were clad in
either the black of the self-styled \”Sri Vichaya warriors\” or
the blue of the civilian followers of the Santi Asoke sect,
end note) to demand Cambodia withdraw its presence from the
disputed territory around the Preah Vihear temple site and to
protest Thai government and army inaction in the face of
Cambodian actions.
BANGKOK 00002405 002.2 OF 002
6. (SBU) Local authorities and up to 2000 red-sympathetic
villagers were in no mood to facilitate the march, however,
and formed a blockade in a town roughly 10 km from Pha Mo I
Daeng hill, the PAD intended destination. At about 1320, the
PAD marchers broke through the police line, and the PAD
marchers and villagers began a rolling brawl which lasted on
and off for three hours. Veera subsequently claimed to us
the local authorities paid the intoxicated villagers 300 baht
each.
7. (C) As captured on film and published in the next day\’s
papers, both sides were armed with rudimentary weapons:
sticks, rocks, clubs, machetes, and slingshots — the most
dramatic shot showed a machete-ared villager looking to
slash a barefoot PAD marcer sprawled on his back in a field;
twenty peopl were injured in the melee. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX said that \”blue shirt\” brawlrs
associated with Newin, the political godfathe of Sisaket
province, played a role in sparking he clash, as they
allegedly did in Pattaya with ed-shirts in April (note:
Newin\’s faction was allied with Thaksin and part of the
red-shirt movemet until December. End note). Sisaket
Governor aphi Phongbunphakit, a political ally of Newin,
old us that five of those injuries warranted an ovrnight
stay in the hospital, without specifying to which faction
they belonged. PAD leader Veera nsisted that 15 of those
wounded were PAD supporers.
8. (SBU) Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thuasuban authorized
acting National Police Chief Thnee Sombounsap to negotiate
with the PAD on behalf of the government. Thanee
participated via phoe, while Governor Raphi, the second area
army comander and Sisaket deputy police chief, negotiated
face-to-face with Veera and the PAD. Raphi toldus the
resulting agreement permitted a limited group of PAD members
to climb Pha Mo I Daeng hill o Sunday, September 20 to read
the PAD statement.The army steadfastly refused to let the
main PADcolumn get within three kilometers of the border.
The reading of the PAD statement took place without incident
September 21, and the PAD protesters dispersed.
JOHN
“
09PHNOMPENH664 CAMBODIA’S MINISTER OF DEFENSE PREPARES FOR WASHINGTON
“223512″,”9/3/2009 10:23″,”09PHNOMPENH664″,
“Embassy Phnom Penh”,
“UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
“,”UNCLAS PHNOM PENH 000664
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MOPS KTIA, CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA\’S MINISTER OF DEFENSE PREPARES FOR
WASHINGTON
REF: PHNOM PENH 638
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a September 3 call on Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh, the
Ambassador previewed the Minister\’s upcoming travel to
Washington where he will meet Secretary of Defense Gates,
congratulated the Minister on Cambodia\’s diplomacy with
respect to the dispute over Preah Vihear, highlighted the
continued strengthening of military-to-military relations,
and introduced the new U.S. Embassy Defense Attache. Tea
Banh expressed his commitment to reduce troops and help
settle the Preah Vihear dispute peacefully. He also stressed
the importance of Cambodia\’s upcoming Capstone training event
and detailed peacekeeping operations planned for Chad and the
Central African Republic. The Minister rounded out the
meeting by outlining areas of defense reform and continued
engagement. END SUMMARY.
Tensions Subside in Preah Vihear
——————————–
2. (SBU) In preparation for his upcoming Washington visit,
which will include a meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea
Banh provided an overview of areas of mutual interest,
specifically noting the calmed situation in Preah Vihear.
Tea Banh detailed the history of the dispute over Preah
Vihear and recent troop reductions in the border area (Ref
A). He stated that both the Thai and Cambodian sides have
drawn back in order to decrease the potential of further
tension. Declaring that \”there is no longer a worry of
conflict,\” Teah Banh said that some troops would remain to
stand guard and maintain the area as normal, but that a large
number of troops is no longer necessary. He indicated that
he is optimistic about further troop reductions and
redeployments away from Preah Vihear in the future. However,
Tea Banh said that the lower levels within the Thai and
Cambodian armed forces still need to meet in order to avoid
small flare-ups.
3. (SBU) Decreased tensions with Thailand have resulted in
small numbers of tourists returning to the Preah Vihear
temple. The Ambassador congratulated the Minister on the
restraint and diplomacy required to get to this point, and
noted the need to fully resolve the military and border
situation in order for Cambodia to take full advantage of the
World Heritage site designation and to increase tourism and
development in a very poor area. Tea Banh responded that
both he and the Thai Minister of Defense will meet to discuss
and find solutions to the border issues in order to create an
open area in Preah Vihear for development, trade and
business. He said that Cambodians are already beginning to
move and build houses along a better-understood border, and
he is optimistic that there will soon be a defined border
with Thailand.
Increased Military-to-Military Relations
—————————————–
4. (SBU) Both the Ambassador and the Minister praised the
strong and growing military-to-military relations between
Cambodia and the United States. Tea Banh specifically
expressed his appreciation of U.S. assistance with the Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). He stated that his
office is working closely with the Embassy\’s Defense Attache
office in order to prepare for the July 2010 multilateral
Capstone training exercise, which will showcase Cambodia\’s
increased capacity and expertise. Tea Banh also detailed
current and future peacekeeping assistance, stating that
Cambodia\’s PKO work in Sudan has received positive reports.
When asked about publicized future operations in Chad and the
Central African Republic, Tea Banh indicated that there are
some issues to be worked out before Cambodian peacekeepers
can be deployed. He said that thus far, 40 members of the
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) have been trained and are
prepared for deployment. However, an RCAF observer went to
Chad and based on his report, it was determined that the
total number of required peacekeepers should be increased
from the originally agreed upon 100 to 200. In order for
this to happen, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must initiate
a new MOU for the increased numbers.
The Road Ahead
————–
5. (SBU) The upcoming meeting between Minister of National
Defense Tea Banh and Secretary of Defense Gates marks an
important step forward for both countries. As further
evidence of the improved and growing military-to-military
relations, the Ambassador introduced the Embassy\’s new
Defense Attache, Col. Mark Gillette, noting that the two
countries have an exchange of attaches for the first time in
some decades. Col. Gillette will escort Tea Banh to
Washington, and both will participate in a portion of the
Defense Strategic Review, supported by DoD, prior to meeting
with Secretary Gates. The Minister stated that based on a
recent bilateral defense dialog held in Hawaii, specific
areas for defense reform and continued U.S. engagement
include maritime security, border security, humanitarian
disaster response, and counterterrorism – an area where the
two countries already have close cooperation. Tea Banh
stated he is proud of what the two countries have
accomplished thus far, and said there remains much work to be
done, with reform a key priority.
RODLEY
“
09PHNOMPENH638 CAMBODIA WITHDRAWS TROOPS; STILL WAITS FOR THAI MOVEMENT ON PREAH VIHEAR
“222705″,”8/28/2009 8:49″,”09PHNOMPENH638″,
“Embassy Phnom Penh”,
“UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,”",
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FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1126
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY”,
“UNCLAS PHNOM PENH 000638
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, KTIA, CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA WITHDRAWS TROOPS; STILL WAITS FOR THAI
MOVEMENT ON PREAH VIHEAR
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR DISSEMINATION ON THE
INTERNET.
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)
sources confirmed a recent reduction in Cambodian troops from
around the disputed Preah Vihear border area, but could not
readily give the full scope or extent of those movements. The
senior RGC border official assigned to the Preah Vihear
dispute noted that Cambodia is \”still waiting\” for the Thai
parliament\’s approval of already agreed communiques marking a
clear path forward for border negotiations, including joint
demining and demarcation, but expressed deep skepticism that
the Thai government would act soon. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Following through on a public vow made by Prime
Minister Hun Sen on August 22, senior military leaders from
the Cambodian and Thai armed forces met on August 24 in Phnom
Penh, and declared an end to hostilities on the border. Thai
General Songkitti Jaggabatra announced that \”the border will
not be the cause of any further disputes.\” Cambodian troops
started withdrawing from the Preah Vihear temple area on
August 26. Military officials in Phnom Penh could not yet
confirm how substantial these withdrawals have been, but
field commanders have confirmed the target is a 50 percent
reduction in the Cambodian troop presence. Var Kim Hong,
Senior Minister and Chairman of the Border Committees, told
Pol/Econ Chief that Deputy Prime Minster and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Hor Namhong had raised the Preah Vihear
border dispute with both Thai Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva (Aug. 4) and Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya
(Aug. 5) during participation in the Cambodian-Thailand Joint
Policy Commission in Bangkok. Hor Namhong \”pushed to have
the Thai parliament agree to the communiques we already
negotiated with the Thai,\” said Var Kim Hong. Commenting
that it is already the end of August, he said the RGC was
\”still waiting.\”
3. (SBU) Confirming the Cambodian troop reductions, Var Kim
Hong also noted that Thai soldiers still had not withdrawn
from the small pagoda at the base of the Preah Vihear temple
and thus agreed-upon joint demining and border demarcation in
that area could not commence. Citing a \”negative\” article in
Bangkok\’s English-language daily \”The Nation\” on August 27
which took a stand against the Abhisit government settling
the Preah Vihear dispute, Var Kim Hong expressed skepticism
that the Thai government would honor the agreements made with
his Thai counterpart in the bilateral Joint Border
Commission. Nonetheless, he said, Cambodia would keep
waiting.
4. (SBU) Separately, when questioned at the opening ceremony
for a Kampong Speu health center refurbished by U.S. Marines,
on August 27, the Ambassador noted to the local press that
reports of the withdrawal were an encouraging development and
a positive sign that showed the border dispute could be
solved by peaceful means.
5. (SBU) COMMENT: The Cambodian troop withdrawals from
Preah Vihear follow the very positive talks between the Thai
and Cambodian commanders in chief in Phnom Penh earlier in
the week. If the Thai military responded with troop
\”re-deployments\” to match, including from sensitive areas in
the disputed territory which they had not occupied before
July 2008, then a first concrete and positive step to resolve
this dispute bilaterally will have been completed, providing
a good basis for further diplomatic progress.
RODLEY
“
09BANGKOK2187 THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THAI ARMY ASSESSES NO REDUCTION IN CAMBODIAN TROOPS AT PREAH VIHEAR
“222744″,”8/28/2009 11:23″,”09BANGKOK2187″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",
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“C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 002187
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PBTS, TH, CB
SUBJECT: THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE: THAI ARMY ASSESSES
NO REDUCTION IN CAMBODIAN TROOPS AT PREAH VIHEAR
Classified By: Political Counselor George P. Kent, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
1. (C) Thai and Cambodian press reports over the past week
indicated that Cambodia would reduce the number of troops in
the Preah Vihear area after Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen
August 22 announced a troop reduction, possibly by much as
fifty percent. Hun Sen\’s announcement preceded a visit by
Thai Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatara to
Cambodia that included a meeting with Cambodian armed forces
leader Pol Sarouen. Songkitti was reported to have said that
there would be no more problems between Thailand and Cambodia
after his meetings in Phnom Penh.
2. (C) At this point it is unclear whether the reduction, if
true, would apply to the number of troops within the temple
grounds (reported to be about 10 on each side), troops
located in the disputed territory, or to the larger numbers
in the vicinity of the disputed territory. While estimates
of troops numbers vary, Colonel Werachon Sukondhapatipak,
Director of the Royal Thai Army\’s Foreign Liaison Division,
had told us earlier that Thailand had 3,000 troops in the
area and that the RTA assessed Cambodia to have approximately
5,000 troops in the vicinity of the disputed territory.
3. (C) Colonel Saranyu Viriyavejakul, Aide de Camp to RTA
Commander General Anupong Paochinda, told us late August 28
that the RTA had not observed any troop reduction on the
Cambodian side. Thai Army observations from the disputed
area were that Cambodian troops had shifted positions in and
around the disputed territory, but that there had been no
change in the number of Cambodian troops. Saranyu told us
that the RTA believed that Cambodian statements over the past
week were posturing in regard to a deadline imposed by the
World Heritage Committee for Phnom Penh to institute an
International Coordinating Committee for the Preah Vihear
temple. The original deadline for establishing the Committee
was February 2009 but Cambodia had received an extension.
The RTA believed Phnom Penh would miss the deadline again and
was trying to make public statements of troop withdrawals to
garner support from the international community, Saranyu
said.
JOHN
“
09BANGKOK1939 AMBASSADOR ENGAGES FM KASIT ON US-THAI RELATIONS, DRPK, BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAO HMONG, VIKTOR BOUT
“219861″,”8/7/2009 9:18″,”09BANGKOK1939″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”09BANGKOK1842″,
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1784
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7300
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001939
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PREF, PHUM, BM, TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES FM KASIT ON US-THAI
RELATIONS, DRPK, BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAO HMONG, VIKTOR BOUT
REF: BANGKOK 1842
BANGKOK 00001939 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: Ambassador engaged Thai FM Kasit Piromya
August 6 on U.S.-Thai relations, DRPK and the ARF Chair
Statement, Burma and Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), Cambodian
border issues, the Lao Hmong, and Viktor Bout\’s extradition.
Ambassador and Kasit agreed on the need to elevate the nature
of the U.S.-Thai diplomatic-security dialogue to a more
strategic level. Ambassador stressed U.S. displeasure with
the July 23 ARF Chair language on North Korea; Kasit asserted
that ASEAN had intended to keep channels of dialogue to
Pyongyang open while emphasizing to the DPRK that following a
path of confrontation was futile. Kasit characterized
increasing ASEAN pressure on Burma and said that ASEAN could
not move forward absent fundamental change in Burma.
Recently concluded Thai-Cambodian meetings showed progress,
but Kasit said there would need to be a grand package of land
border and off-shore Joint Development Area (JDA) agreements
to overcome bilateral distrust and nationalists in both
countries. Ambassador thanked Kasit for recent increased
access to the Lao Hmong in Phetchabun and pushed for a rapid
change in the status of Hmong held in Nong Khai; Kasit
expressed hope there would be progress in the near future.
Ambassador reiterated U.S. interest in a successful
conclusion in the Viktor Bout extradition case, with a
decision due August 11. End Summary
Kasit: Thanks again for S engagement in Phuket
——————————————— -
2. (SBU) FM Kasit once again conveyed a \”profound\” thank you
for Secretary Clinton\’s presence at the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) in Phuket July 22-23. Her participation engendered
good will, elevated the quality of the discussions, and
helped make ARF a success, he said.
3. (SBU) Kasit urged quick and substantive follow-up to the
Lower Mekong initiative, and asked for U.S. plans for next
steps, including on the Mississippi-Mekong partnership in
exploring riparian state responsibilities. For his part,
Kasit planned to meet soon with the ESCAP Executive Director,
the ADB, and the World Bank to take stock of possible
programming in the Lower Mekong region, with a focus on
technical cooperation and human resource development.
Bilateral Relations – Strategic Dialogue
—————————————-
4. (C) Ambassador and Kasit traded thoughts on implementing
the promise of an enhanced strategic dialogue discussed by
Kasit and the Secretary during Kasit\’s April visit to
Washington. Ambassador emphasized the need to switch from
the transactional approach of the past several years to a
more strategic partnership. Kasit agreed, reiterating his
views shared with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary Steinberg,
and S/P director Slaughter in April: Thailand for the past
eight-ten years has been reactive to piecemeal U.S. requests
(\”send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, give us access to
Utapao\”), rather than being a partner in discussing policy
together. That was his goal, even if Thailand only rose to a
\”junior\” strategic partner.
5. (C) If the U.S. were to explain its overall approach to
the Asia-Pacific region for the future, Kasit continued,
Thailand\’s role as an ally in advancing a shared agenda of
promoting peace and stability in the region could flow
naturally. Cooperative efforts in disaster relief
management, upgrading civil-military capacity, peacekeeping
in a UN/regional context, and capacity-building in countries
like Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam, and eventually Burma, were all
prospective topics to be discussed in his view. Ambassador
added that the Thai position in ASEAN, the relationships with
China and India, and a socio-cultural component including
educational exchanges should also be part of the agenda; late
October/early November might be appropriate timing.
6. (SBU) Kasit mentioned that PM Abhisit planned to attend
the UN General Assembly in September. Abhisit would seek
business meetings in New York, and plan to engage Congress in
BANGKOK 00001939 002.2 OF 004
Washington, even if executive branch meetings proved too
difficult to arrange.
7. (C) Referencing his conversation with NSA GEN Jones in
April, Kasit passed a list of equipment the Thai military
hoped might be available via Excess Defense Articles (EDA) or
other military assistance mechanisms as the U.S. drew down in
Iraq. Most of the current Thai armored unit equipment was
30-40 years old, Kasit noted, making it difficult to stay
interoperable with the U.S. Ambassador agreed to pass the
equipment list via our Military Assistance Group but
suggested equipment requests would best be discussed in
context of Thailand\’s strategic needs as part of a broader,
deeper political-military strategic dialogue component.
Kasit acknowledged this point, and agreed with Ambassador on
the utility of closer collaboration between Foreign and
Defense officials in both countries as part of the strategic
dialogue. Kasit noted he met or spoke with Defense Minister
Prawit weekly.
ARF Statement\’s DPRK language
—————————–
8. (C) Kasit raised his July 31 telcon with Deputy Secretary
Steinberg on the ARF statement\’s language on North Korea. He
said China had pushed Thailand hard to give the DPRK room and
to avoid language that would cause the North Koreans to walk
away and possibly never come back to the ARF or the Six Party
process. The Thai and ASEAN also believed a quiet and soft
approach was the order of the day. Kasit had told the DPRK
head of Del in Phuket, Ambassador Pak Kun-gwang, that North
Korea could not continue on its current confrontational path;
firing rockets and testing nuclear weapons would get it
nowhere. The outside world was prepared to provide
assistance if it adopted a different approach; confrontation
was futile. Kasit felt that the North Korean delegation left
Phuket understanding their obligations, that the channel of
dialogue had remained open, with the expectation that the
North Koreans should return to the Six Party Talks.
9. (C) Kasit and the Chinese FM had a long discussion about
this issue in Phuket; China would be working hard behind the
scenes to bring the DPRK back to the Six Party table. Kasit
had thought about going to Pyongyang as ASEAN Chair to
facilitate progress; the Thais had been in a dialogue with
Pyongyang for 5-6 months, with Vice Ministers Panich having
traveled to Pyongyang to try to secure high level attendance
at the ARF, and Kasit raising it on the margins of the
mid-July Sharm-el-Sheik NAM meetings.
10. (C) Ambassador emphasized there remained significant
disagreement over the ARF statement, and Secretary Clinton
had asked that he convey her disappointment with the
language. The July 2- AMM communiqu language on the Korean
Peninsula was good, the July 23 ARF statement not so
(reftel). While we understood the Thai position that China
and Russia had come to the Thai claiming they did not want to
be associated with the language, the fact remained that there
had been agreement among representatives of the five
countries on the language. Furthermore, when the Secretary
and Kasit had met, Permsec Virasak had characterized the
state of play on DPRK language very differently, suggesting
the DPRK wanted a call on all parties to exercise restraint,
and that the DPRK was willing to engage in dialogue. The
final language was much different, was imbalanced, and
suggested an equivalence between the two positions – near
consensus of ARF vs. DPRK propaganda, which was substantively
wrong, and procedurally had been handled poorly. Ambassador
urged that the RTG consult more closely with the U.S. on this
issue in the future.
11. (C) Kasit acknowledged that the Thai were fully aware of
the possible consequences of the statement as issued, but he
reiterated his view of the importance of keeping open the
channel. By accommodating them \”a bit\” on language, it kept
the DPRK in play, with no other direction to turn but to
re-engage in talks. \”This is a process,\” and ASEAN felt it
had a role to help push the parties in the right direction.
Russia and China now had to deliver on their end of the
bargain. Kasit expressed hope the release of the two U.S.
BANGKOK 00001939 003.2 OF 004
journalists on former President Clinton\’s visit to Pyongyang
would provide positive momentum to substantive negotiations
as well.
Burma and impact on ASEAN
————————-
12. (C) Kasit reconfirmed that PM Abhisit\’s visit to Burma
had been postponed to avoid potentially coinciding with the
expected verdict in Aung San Suu Kyi\’s (ASSK) trial. Kasit
predicted that the Burmese would sentence ASSK to three
years, but \”whatever it is, it will be unacceptable.\” After
constant pushing in recent months at a series of ASEAN
meetings, most recently in Phuket, Kasit asserted the Burmese
knew well the damage they would do to themselves and to ASEAN
with a conviction. ASEAN countries are consistently harping
on the \”centrality of ASEAN\” in regional architecture but
ASEAN must earn its role, in Kasit\’s view. Without
fundamental change in Burma, ASEAN would have no credibility,
and would not be able to advance further as a community,
Kasit stated.
13. (C) Kasit said that he would travel to Indonesia and
Malaysia in the near future to consult about the way forward.
He predicted various ASEAN states would complain separately
in the aftermath of an ASSK conviction. Thailand would seek
to ally with \”old ASEAN\” members to push a more forceful
line. He and Singapore FM George Yeoh had repeatedly pushed
their Burmese FM counterpart to convey the views of ASEAN,
and the need for change, fully to Than Shwe. The recent
visit of Singapore Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong to Burma to
hammer home ASEAN concerns was also important; \”there needs
to be more of such regional pressure.\” For his part, Kasit
planned to suggest to the Burmese FM in their next discussion
that if the regime were to convict ASSK, they pardon her
immediately.
14. (C) The Burmese had asked Kasit to facilitate another
round of talks with the Karen, Kasit revealed. Kasit had not
yet set a place and date, but his message to Karen National
Union (KNU) leaders would be: go negotiate. The KNU had no
chance whatsoever at a military victory; their situation only
worsened with constant pressure by the Burmese Army and Karen
DKBA proxies. Kasit felt the KNU\’s best option was to
negotiate a deal, and then coordinate with the other cease
fire groups with similar interests. Kasit personally
believed Burma should be configured as a federation, not a
union. The military would of course \”cheat\” and dominate the
lower house of any parliament, but the states could have
representation in an Upper House, and a process of
self-cleansing of the system could begin.
15. (C) Ambassador thanked Kasit for the rapid Thai reaction
to the influx of new Karen refugees in June. Kasit said that
he had pushed the Burmese FM to create a safe area in Karen
state to which the new arrivals could return without
guaranteed harrassment from the Burmese army.
Cambodia – border negotiations and JDAs
—————————————
16. (C) Kasit characterized the August 4-5 meetings of the
Thai-Cambodian Joint Committee, and the visit of Cambodian
DPM and FM Hor Namhong, as successful. He asked Hor Namhong
to tell the Cambodian media that Cambodian-Thai relations
were actually much smoother that the press indicated. The
Thai were financing roughly 80 technical assistance and
development projets, drawing on soft loans and the resources
of the Ministry of Finance and several other ministries. Hor
Namhong suggested the Thai invite the Cambodian Minister of
Information for a visit, identifying him as a one of the key
officials stoking a more confrontational public line.
17. (C) While border issues were not directly discussed,
Kasit said that both sides are aware of the rough parameters
of what each side could accept, and not; there would need to
be give and take on disputed areas and jointly developing
areas (JDAs) off-shore in the Gulf. The promise of peace and
mutually economic gain should eventually win the day, in
Kasit\’s view. In the meantime, fixing the location of
boundary stone 73 (note: near the coastline), and agreeing on
BANGKOK 00001939 004.2 OF 004
the watershed definition of six points near Preah Vihear,
would pose the chief challenges. Thai DPM Suthep and
Cambodia\’s Sok An had led the JDA discussions, coming close
to an agreement in principle, but the maritime deal would
need to be packaged together with a deal on the disputed land
areas near Preah Vihear. This would be necessary due to the
elements of distrust in the relationship, as well as
nationalists in both countries who would oppose any
compromise. Leaders in both countries would have to be
brave, and explain the pluses and minuses to a packaged deal.
18. (C) Kasit said that he had passed critical comments to
Total over the recent announcement of a provisional deal for
exploration rights in the disputed Gulf areas and would file
a note of protest to the Cambodians. In the end, any
unilateral concessions for exploration would not go forward,
and would be superceded by whatever JDA agreement emerged,
just as had happened in the late 1990s when Thailand and
Malaysia reached a similar JDA agreement.
Lao Hmong
———
19. (C) Ambassador thanked Kasit for PM Abhisit\’s assurances
to the Secretary that there would be no forced repatriation
of the Lao Hmong in Phetchabun. Referencing recent moves by
the Thai military to provide more access to the Phetchabun
camp and the first meaningful U.S. participation in
discussions about the Lao Hmong August 7, Ambassador also
pushed Kasit for a quick resolution of the 158 Hmong in the
Nong Khai detention center, perhaps allowing them to return
to relatives in Lopburi. Kasit said that he was trying to
bring the Ministry of Social Welfare into the picture to
improve the situation at Nong Khai. If the discussions at
Phetchaburi went well, he hoped there would be forward
progress. Kasit said he had underscored the need for humane,
humanitarian treatment of the Hmong to his military
counterparts.
Viktor Bout
———–
20. (C) Ambassador reiterated the Secretary\’s message to PM
Abhisit and FM Kasit on the importance we placed on a
successful conclusion to the Viktor Bout extradition case,
with the judge\’s decision expected August 11. The U.S.
continued to be concerned about ongoing Russian efforts to
influence the decision. Kasit said he understood and agreed.
JOHN
“
08BANGKOK1933 THE PARLIAMENT’S TURN – NO CONFIDENCE DEBATE SCHEDULED
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REF: BANGKOK 1917 (ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATORS)
Classified By: A/DCM Anne Casper, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: While peaceful demonstrators continue to
surround Government House, the government has agreed to send
the affected ministers to participate in the no-confidence
debate requested by the opposition Democrat Party on June
24-25, and to appear before the Senate to answer questions on
June 23. The Democrats have little expectation that the
no-confidence motion will pass, but in the wake of weeks of
street demonstrations, they want to bring the political
process back to the Parliament. It is not clear how the
demonstrators will respond to the no-confidence vote. It is
possible that further concessions by the government –
particularly pledges not to interfere in the court cases
against former PM Thaksin — could be enough to end the
demonstrations. However, a PAD supporter told us that the
protests might also escalate, if the demonstrators viewed the
Parliament\’s action as ineffectual. The government will take
a pounding from the Parliament this week, but it still
appears to have the votes to weather the no confidence
debate. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) With the People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
demonstration surrounding the Government House and calling
for the PM\’s resignation, the government agreed to put the
opposition request for a no-confidence debate on the
Parliament\’s schedule for this week. The government also
agreed to accede to the request by a group of senators who
wanted to debate the government\’s performance. The Senate
action is taking place on Monday, June 23, while the
no-confidence debate in the lower house will be held on
Tuesday and Wednesday.
3. (C) The Democrats — the sole opposition party — say that
there is little expectation that the government coalition
will crack as a result of the no-confidence debate or the
current level of protests. The party\’s Secretary-General
told us on Friday that there was no coordination between the
Democrats and the PAD about the timing of the motion, which
he did not expect to pass. Former Ambassador to the US
Kasit, who is both a Democrat party advisor and a frequent
speaker at PAD rallies, told us much the same thing today.
He did add that the strong emotions evoked by the
Thai-Cambodian negotiations over the inscription of the
ancient Khmer Preah Vihear temple could sway some of the
coalition parties and even some of the ruling People\’s Power
Party (PPP) MPs, particularly those from the Northeastern
provinces close to the temple. Amb. Kasit said, as had the
Party\’s SecGen, that the Democrats did not want to bring down
the government of PM Samak. In fact, as the Dems are broke,
they really do not want to face new elections too soon.
4. (C) The Democrats, according to Kasit, are holding the
debate because they want to bring the political process back
into the Parliament. The Democrats and the PAD share some
goals, but differ widely on tactics; the PAD reflects the
views of much of Thai civil society in disdaining and
distrusting political parties and politicians. Kasit was
unsure how the PAD would respond if the no-confidence motion
failed and PM Samak continued to resist stepping down. On
the one hand, the PAD leaders might agree to end their
demonstration if the government agreed to certain conditions,
including a promise not to interfere with the judicial
process in any of the cases against former PM Thaksin, a
pledge not to harass or transfer officials who had cooperated
with the post-coup government on those investigations, and
agreement to drop support for inscribing the Preah Vihear
site, at least without significant modifications to the
agreement with Cambodia. On the other hand, Kasit was
concerned that the failure of the no-confidence motion would
only confirm in the mind of the PAD leaders that the
Parliament was largely irrelevant to the political process,
and encourage PAD to escalate their protests. One possible
next step would be for the state-owned enterprise leaders to
make good on their threat to start cutting water and
electrical service to some areas. Kasit said some union
leaders had met with him and told him they were prepared to
take that step.
COMMENT
——-
5. (C) The government has probably made the right call in
permitting the debates in the Parliament, but we will see how
BANGKOK 00001933 002 OF 002
the excitable PM Samak handles the grilling he and his
ministers are likely to receive. There is a lot of buzz
about the possible resignation of the PM, but the governing
coalition still has more than enough seats to weather the
no-confidence vote. Samak is embattled, but not defeated.
JOHN
“
09BANGKOK1901 THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR WEBB’S VISIT
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SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR WEBB’S VISIT
BANGKOK 00001901 001.2 OF 004
1. (SBU) Senator Webb, Embassy Bangkok looks forward to
welcoming you back to Thailand. Your visit will afford a
chance to express the United States’ commitment for
Thailand’s democracy in meeting its current challenges and
emerging strengthened, as well as to engage Thai officials
and others on the U.S. foreign policy agenda in Asia,
particularly challenges like Burma and North Korea. It is
also an opportunity to underscore our appreciation for the
long-standing bilateral relationship, which has facilitated
shared benefits in the fields of security, law enforcement,
and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking
health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee
support.
CALM IN THE KINGDOM, BUT FOR HOW LONG?
————————————–
2. (SBU) Nearly eight months after your last visit, which
came in the immediate wake of the late 2008 airport takeover
and change in government, the political scene on the surface
has calmed considerably, but it is likely the calm of the eye
of a still churning storm. Thailand remains deeply divided,
politically and socially, and struggles to break free of an
inward focus. The traditional elite, urban middle class and
the mid-south are on largely one side (Democrat in
parliament, “yellow” in the street) and the political allies
of Thaksin, with largely rural supporters in the North and
Northeast on the other (opposition Puea Thai in parliament,
“red” in the street).
3. (SBU) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic,
eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has
progressive instincts about basic freedoms, social
inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the
troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency.
Whether Abhisit can deliver on change is another matter.
Although he has performed well, holding his government
together and restoring stability in the face of significant
political pressure is a persistent challenge. He is beset
with a fractious coalition, as well as a resurgent post-2006
coup military. His Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya is a
capable strategic thinker, but Kasit is controversial due to
his 2008 affiliation with the yellow-shirt People’s Alliance
for Democracy (PAD) movement. Kasit recently had to answer a
court summons regarding the 2008 PAD takeover of Bangkok’s
airports, leading to calls that he step down.
4. (SBU) Since your last visit, the most dramatic political
development was the mid-April red-shirt riots in Bangkok and
Pattaya. The United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD), disrupted a regional Asian Summit and burned busses in
Bangkok, leading to two deaths, after ex-PM Thaksin, now a
fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction,
called for a revolution to bring him home. The opposition
Puea Thai Party and red-shirt movement will continue to seek
to drive Abhisit from office, call for changes to the
constitution which ban Thaksin’s cronies from participating
in politics, and demand the amnesty for the former Prime
Minister, who was convicted in a 2008 abuse of power case.
The latest red-shirt move is to appeal to the King for a
pardon for Thaksin, a not so subtle effort to drag a monarchy
which is supposed to be above politics into the political
fray; after several months of quiet after the April riots,
the red-shirts have resumed weekly rallies. The PAD
yellow-shirt movement has indicated it will oppose all of
these UDD initiatives.
5. (SBU) Both major parties in Thai politics are favorable
towards the U.S.; in fact, there are no radical, non-middle
of the road parties represented in the Thai parliament. On
the street, while both yellow and red try to lay exclusive
claim to the mantle of democracy, neither side of this split
is as democratic as it claims to be. Both movements reflect
deep social concerns stemming from widespread perceptions of
a lack of social and economic justice in Thailand, but both
seek to triumph in competing for traditional Thai
hierarchical power relationships. New elections would not
appear to be a viable solution to political divide, and
political discord could very well persist for years. We
continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need for all
parties to avoid violence and respect democratic norms within
the framework of the constitution Qd rule of law, as well as
our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its
BANGKOK 00001901 002.2 OF 004
current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory
democracy.
6. (SBU) Linked to the political uncertainty in Bangkok is
the RTG’s inability to resolve an ethno-nationalist Malay
Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand which has claimed an
estimated 3,500 lives since 2004. The fundamental issues of
justice and ethnic identity driving the violence are not
unique to southern Thailand, and ending the insurgency will
require the government to deal with these issues on a
national level – which the on-going political instability in
Bangkok has, to this point, prevented. In the mean time, the
insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and beheadings to
challenge the control of the Thai state in the deep South.
The government has responded through special security laws
which give security forces expanded power to search and
detain people.
7. (SBU) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the
future of the monarchy. On the throne for 62 years, the
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand’s most prestigious
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate.
Many actors are jockeying for position to shape the expected
transition period Thailand during royal succession after the
eventual passing of the King, who is currently in poor health
and rarely seen in public anymore.
THAI FOREIGN POLICY
——————-
8. (SBU) If there is one area of policy difference between
Thai political parties affecting U.S. interests, it may well
be certain elements of foreign policy. PM Abhisit and FM
Kasit have stated that Thailand’s foreign policy should
reflect that it is a democracy, rather than being reduced to
mere commercial interests of cabinet members, as they claim
pro-Thaksin governments did.
9. (SBU) Thailand’s Burma policy has shifted noticeably since
Abhisit/Kasit came to office last December. Abhisit and
Kasit met with Burmese activists, exiles, and 1990 MPs elect
in March on the margins of an ASEAN summit, the first such
engagement since 2000, pre-Thaksin. As the Chair of ASEAN,
Thailand released a May 18 ASEAN Chairman’s Statement
reminding the Burmese regime that ASEAN Leaders have called
for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and that
Thailand, as the ASEAN Chair, was gravely concerned about
recent developments relating to ASSK. The ASEAN and ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial statements issued in Phuket
by Kasit in late July adopted a similar tone.
10. (SBU) Border tensions with Burma have increased since
June as approximately 3,000 Karen have entered Thailand. The
refugee influx resulted from a Burmese Army and Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army offensive against the Karen National
Union. FM Kasit has directed the MFA to work closely with
NGOs to address the refugees’ needs while in Thailand and to
ensure they return home voluntarily.
11. (SBU) Relations with Cambodia continue to be volatile,
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the
Preah Vihear temple. While Thailand and France in 1904-8
agreed in principle on the Thai-Cambodian border, ownership
of Preah Vihear was not decided until 1962 when the
International Court of Justice ruled in favor of Cambodia.
Tensions spiked in mid-2008 when the pro-Thaksin Thai
government in power at that time supported Cambodia’s
application to UNESCO for the unilateral listing of the
temple as a world heritage site. The decision was seized by
the opposition in order to attack the government. Periodic
clashes between the two sides’ militaries since then have
resulted in the deaths of at least seven Thai soldiers. We
continue to stress to the Thai interlocutors that the dispute
should be resolved peacefully and bilaterally.
12. (SBU) The rise of China, and the perceived absence of a
focused U.S. presence in the region in recent years, is
another strategic issue of concern to Thailand and the
region. Thailand does not seek to choose between the U.S.
and China, rather preferring to have good relations with both
and hoping the U.S. strengthens engagement in the region.
There was universal praise for Secretary Clinton’s
ARF-related visit to Thailand in late July, including U.S.
BANGKOK 00001901 003.2 OF 004
accession to the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) and the holding of a U.S.-Lower Mekong
Ministerial that underscored Secretary Clinton’s comment
that: “The U.S. is back in Asia.” That said, Thailand
continues to develop closer relations with China. The Thai
military employs a range of Chinese weapons systems, and Thai
and Chinese special forces have in recent years conducted
joint exercises.
ENDURING, PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL ALLIANCE
—————————————
13. (SBU) As one of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and
straddling a major force projection air/sea corridor,
Thailand is crucial to U.S. security interests well beyond
Southeast Asia. Our bilateral military relationship provides
distinctive force projection opportunities from Thai military
facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support combat
and humanitarian assistance missions, and the opportunity to
conduct live fire training exercises, both bilateral and
multilateral, that are impossible to match elsewhere in Asia.
The COBRA GOLD exercise is PACOM’s largest exercise. The
event has evolved to facilitate important objectives such as
a greater role in the Asian Pacific region for Japan and
Singapore and re-establishing a partnership with Indonesia.
We access the Utapao Naval Air Field alone a 1000 times a
year. The base was a key for air-bridge operations to Iraq
and for combat operations in Afghanistan. Preserving such
unfettered, unquestioned access requires engagement and
remains a mission and USG priority. Thailand has performed
well on international peacekeeping missions, particularly in
leading UN forces in East Timor, to which Thailand
contributed 1,500 troops. The RTG is currently preparing to
deploy a battalion of peacekeepers for Darfur.
14. (SBU) The U.S. and Thailand have extensive cooperation in
medical research. Approximately 400 Mission staff work on
health issues, making the Embassy one of the USG’s largest
efforts to fight the world’s most dangerous diseases:
malaria; TB; dengue; HIV/AIDS; and pandemic influenza. CDC,
USAID, USDA/APHIS, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of
Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) closely collaborate with Thai
counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines. The
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is
to the Thai. A number of important breakthroughs, such as in
the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to
children, were developed here, and several phase III, double
blind trials for potential HIV vaccines are currently ongoing.
15. (SBU) Forty years of law enforcement cooperation
initially focused on counter-narcotics efforts has expanded
to all aspects of transnational crime, defending U.S.
interests and securing extraditions of both U.S. citizens and
third country nationals, and building capacity in the Thai
criminal justice system. Eighteen federal and local law
enforcement agencies are currently represented in the
Embassy. The U.S. and Thailand co-host the International Law
Enforcement Academy, a regional platform to promote law
enforcement professionalism. The extradition case of Russian
arms trafficker Viktor Bout, wanted in New York on charges of
conspiring to provide arms to terrorists, is our current law
enforcement top priority. The court decision is expected
August 11, your first day in Thailand.
16. (SBU) On refugees, Thailand continues to host more than
114,000 registered Burmese refugees and has allowed the
resettlement of nearly 10,000 refugees to the U.S. this
fiscal year, for which we are grateful. We continue to push
for greater self-sufficiency activities to end the
“warehousing” of refugees unwilling or unable to resettle
abroad. About 4,000 Burmese refugees crossed into Thailand in
June in response to an offensive by government-allied militia
groups. Thailand has provided temporary protection to this
latest influx, comprised mostly of women and children. A
group of 5,000 Lao Hmong is also of concern. 158
UNHCR-recognized refugees have been confined in an
immigration jail for 2.5 years. Another 4,700 are in an
army-run camp in Phetchabun. The RTG and Government of Laos
have insisted the issue will be handled bilaterally, although
the RTG recently assured the United States that none will be
forcibly returned to Laos. We have also been invited for the
first time to discuss the issue in a trilateral format on
August 7 at the Phetchabun.
BANGKOK 00001901 004.2 OF 004
THAI ECONOMY CONTINUES TO STRUGGLE
———————————-
17. (SBU) The United States and Thailand have long enjoyed a
robust trade relationship; annual bilateral trade has been
over $32 billion in recent years. Cumulative U.S. investment
over the past twenty plus years is estimated at $23 billion.
There is a large American Chamber of Commerce with some 650
members; you will have an opportunity to address the AMCHAM
membership at lunch on August 17. While U.S. direct
investment is down this year largely due to the global
economic crisis, many U.S. firms receive preferred national
treatment in a number of sectors under the bilateral Treaty
of Amity and Economic Relations, the bedrock of our economic
relationship since 1966. A number of large U.S. investments
in petrochemicals, computer parts, and automotives use
Thailand as an export manufacturing base for the region.
Thai officials still need to do more to strengthen the
overall investment climate, particularly on customs reform
and intellectual property rights enforcement.
18. (SBU) The global economic crisis hit Thailand’s
export-driven economy particularly hard over the last year.
Exports, historically the bright spot of the Thai economy,
declined 23.5 percent over the first six months of this year
when compared to the same period last year (with exports to
the U.S. declining 27.1 percent). The tourism industry,
another longtime economic growth generator, has experienced a
serious decline in the number of tourist arrivals for the
past 10 months; tourist arrivals in June alone fell 18.6
percent year-on-year. With the lessons of the 1997 financial
crisis under its belt, the banking sector remains sound due
to strong regulation and minimal exposure to risky or toxic
assets. The economy went into official recession with a 7.1
percent drop in GDP the first quarter of this year. Forecasts
show a three to five percent GDP contraction for all of 2009.
If global trade activity remains depressed, Thailand’s
export-dependent economy likely will continue to suffer
significant losses this year.
JOHN
“
09BANGKOK1822 EAP A/S CAMPBELL’S MEETING WITH DPM SUTHEP
“218577″,”7/29/2009 10:12″,”09BANGKOK1822″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",
“VZCZCXRO9077
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0032
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001822
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PBTS, PHUM, PTER, TH, CB
SUBJECT: THAILAND: EAP A/S CAMPBELL\’S MEETING WITH DPM
SUTHEP
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. During a July 21 meeting, Deputy Prime
Minister Suthep Thaugsuban told EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt
Campbell and the Ambassador that the Abhisit Vejjajiva
government was committed to resolving the political conflict
via the rule of law and democracy. The government would not
be able to come to an accommodation with fugitive ex-PM
Thaksin if he continued to evade criminal punishment and
persisted in pushing for the downfall of the government.
Suthep said that he had met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun
Sen to encourage a broad compromise that addressed
overlapping territorial claims beyond the vicinity of the
Preah Vihear temple, but that no progress had been made. A/S
Campbell stressed to Suthep the need for RTG attention to
concerns regarding the screening process for repatriating Lao
Hmong and highlighted the role Thailand could play in
assisting with international efforts to bring North Korea
back to the Six-Party Talks. End summary.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
—————–
2. (C) EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell, the Ambassador,
EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, and EAP Special
Assistant Mark Tesone met July 21 with Deputy Prime Minister
Suthep Thaugsuban at Government House. A/S Campbell
expressed USG appreciation for the bilateral relationship,
particularly the military alliance, and asked Suthep for his
view of the political situation in the coming months. Suthep
underlined the commitment of Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva\’s government to the rule of law and to moving
forward with resolving the political conflict via democratic
means. Suthep, emphasizing the destabilizing impact of
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, stressed that it
would likely take some time before the political situation
improved. Thaksin had continued to claim that he was being
treated unfairly even though he had been found guilty by the
Courts, Suthep said.
4. (C) A/S Campbell asked Suthep if the Thai government had
considered approaching Thaksin to discuss a way to promote
political reconciliation. Suthep replied that if Thaksin
stayed abroad, stirred up anti-government sentiments, and
evaded his sentence to prison, there was nothing that the
Thai government could do. The former Prime Minister had not
abandoned his involvement in Thai politics, and the April
2009 protests in Pattaya and Bangkok had demonstrated that
Thaksin was willing to advocate anti-government activities,
Suthep said. The Deputy Prime Minister said that he had
tried to reach out to Thaksin to talk by phone or to go to
meet him in the days following the formation of the Abhisit
government in December 2008, but Thaksin had refused to
consider the request. The Thai government would not enter
into a compromise with Thaksin that would involve the return
of the former PM\’s seized funds, as he had broken the law and
must accept the Court\’s ruling. Suthep said he was concerned
that Thaksin would take a more overt approach to undermining
the Thai monarchy after the reds suffered setbacks in the
aftermath of the April Pattaya and Bangkok disturbances.
CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE
————————
5. (C) Suthep told A/S Campbell that he had met Cambodian
Prime Minister Hun Sen three times in recent months in an
effort to encourage Cambodian cooperation on a wide range of
territorial issues, including overlapping territorial claims
in the Gulf of Thailand. A larger compromise that would lead
to exploration of gas and oil reserves in the Gulf would
greatly benefit both countries and likely lead to accelerated
resolution of the Preah Vihear temple issue. Suthep said he
believed that Hun Sen understood the larger benefits, but it
appeared that something was holding back the Cambodian Prime
Minister, possibly Vietnamese involvement. Suthep said that
the Thai government was engaging China on the border issue,
as Cambodia needed Chinese support.
HMONG
—–
BANGKOK 00001822 002 OF 002
6. (C) A/S Campbell highlighted strong USG support for the
U.S.-Thai alliance, particularly among members of Congress.
That said, A/S Campbell stressed to Suthep serious
congressional and executive branch concern regarding Lao
Hmong in Thai camps, some of whom likely fear repatriation.
RTG assistance in providing a transparent screening process
for the Hmong would go far in reinforcing goodwill in the
U.S. Suthep told A/S Campbell that a possible solution could
entail the Lao government taking discrete steps to care for
Hmong who voluntarily returned while the Thai government took
care of those who feared returning to Laos. Suthep said that
the Thai Cabinet was expected to soon appoint Tawin Pleansri
as the new Secretary-General of the National Security
Council, and that Tawin would address the Hmong issue.
THE SOUTH
———
7. (C) Noting that the U.S. viewed southern Thailand as a
domestic issue for the Thai government, A/S Campbell asked
Suthep for his thoughts on the ongoing violence in the South.
Suthep said that the Abhisit government was committed to an
approach to the South that was different from that of
Thaksin, which Suthep characterized as harsh. The RTG would
follow King Bhumibol\’s advice to know and understand the
southern people and to assist with development in the region.
The government would implement a budget of 63 billion baht
(approx $1.9 billion) to provide for accelerated development
in the South, and Suthep would manage the budget himself.
Suthep believed that as progress continued, southerners would
increasingly turn to the government. Already violent
incidents were down by forty-three percent.
PRESSURING THE DPRK
——————-
8. (C) A/S Campbell highlighted USG concerns to Suthep
regarding North Korea\’s threat to regional security. As
such, the U.S. and partners would pressure Pyongyang to
return to the Six-Party Talks. It would be important for
Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia to support
these efforts and to insure that North Korea was not able to
proliferate weapons and nuclear materials.
9. (U) This cable was cleared with A/S Campbell.
JOHN
“
09PHNOMPENH505 CAMBODIA SEEKS SUPPORT FOR BID TO JOIN UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE
“217489″,”7/21/2009 13:01″,”09PHNOMPENH505″,
“Embassy Phnom Penh”,
“UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”,
“09PHNOMPENH406″,”VZCZCXRO2417
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0505/01 2021301
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FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0963
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0715″,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000505
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
BANGKOK PASS TO S TRAVELING PARTY
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, IO
PARIS PLEASE PASS TO US MISSION TO UNESCO – S. ENGELKEN
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, KTIA, SCUL, UNESCO, CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA SEEKS SUPPORT FOR BID TO JOIN UNESCO
WORLD HERITAGE COMMITTEE
REF: PHNOM PENH 406 AND PREVIOUS
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary of
State Long Visalo July 20 appealed for United States support
of the bid by the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to join
the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC). Cambodia will
stand in an election for the one open East Asia and Pacific
seat on the 21-member WHC at the UNESCO General Conference in
October. Long Visalo cited Cambodia\’s participation in
UNESCO since the 1992 inscription of Angkor Wat on the World
Heritage List, Cambodia\’s deep cultural heritage, and its
growing experience on the Angkor Wat International
Coordination Committee since 1993 as reasons to support the
candidacy. This would be Cambodia\’s first time to sit on the
WHC and represents another attempt to seek legitimacy in the
international community. Passing a letter from Prime
Minister Hun Sen addressed to the President, Long Visalo
asked for the continued strong support of the U.S. Government
seen in the inscription of the ancient Preah Vihear temple
(Reftel) and for its vote. Full text of the diplomatic note
and attached letter from Prime Minister Hun Sen to the
President is reproduced in paras 6-7. Embassy will deliver
the letter to the Desk via registered pouch. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) Noting that Cambodia had more than 1000 ancient
Khmer temples, Long Visalo told A/DCM that the RGC revered
its deep culture and had tried to preserve its heritage
dating back hundreds of years. In the Khmer language\’s deep
roots, in Cambodia\’s unique royal ballet dance, and in the
cherished history of shadow puppets could be seen a
commitment to the preservation of cultural heritage.
Cambodia\’s establishment of and participation in the
International Cooperation Committee (ICC) for Angkor Wat
since 1993 was another valuable experience that could be
depended on in the WHC, he said.
3. (SBU) During the process that led up to the July 2008
inscription of Preah Vihear temple on Cambodia\’s northern
Dangrek Range, the U.S. had shown itself to be a steady
friend of Cambodia, Long Visalo added. Since then, Cambodia
had shown itself to be a cooperative member in the UN,
committed to the peaceful resolution under international law
of ongoing dispute over the border with Thailand near Preah
Vihear temple. Now the U.S. could once again throw its
support behind Cambodia and cast a vote for Cambodia as the
East Asia and Pacific Islands group candidate at the WHC, he
concluded.
4. (SBU) When asked, Long Visalo mentioned that Indonesia
had shown a serious interest in promoting its candidacy for
the same single seat on the WHC in the EAPI region. He
expressed less certainty about the potential candidacy of
Thailand, rumors about which he had heard but which he could
not confirm. (NOTE: Both Thailand and Indonesia have
reportedly served on the WHC before. This would be a first
for Cambodia. END NOTE.)
5. (SBU) A/DCM told the MFA Secretary of State that the
request would be conveyed to Washington, although it was
often the case that the U.S. did not discuss candidacies in
advance of votes with other UN members.
6. BEGIN TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE:
No. 1013 OI/MFA-IC
COMPLIMENTARY OPENING
…has the honor to enclose herewith a letter dated 8 July
2009 of Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen, Prime
Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, addressed to H.E. Barack
H. Obama, President of the United States of America.
The Ministry would be very grateful if the Embassy
could kindly forward the enclosed message to its high
destination.
COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE
Phnom Penh, 20 July 2009
END TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE
7. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT:
PHNOM PENH 00000505 002 OF 002
Phnom Penh, 08 July 2009
H.E. Barack H. Obama
President of the United States of America
Washington
Your Excellency,
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Kingdom
of Cambodia, State Party to the Convention of 1972 concerning
the protection of cultural and natural World Heritage intends
to present its candidacy for a seat on the World Heritage
Committee during the upcoming Session of the General
Conference in October 2009.
The Royal Government is seeking to actively increase our
engagement with the international community in order to
contribute to the preservation and sustainable development of
world heritage and culture. Following the listing of the
Angkor (sic) on the World Heritage List in 1992, Cambodia,s
engagement has increased significantly, particularly in the
last ten years with the listing of the Royal Ballet in 2003,
the Shadow Theatre in 2005 and the Temple of Preah Vihear in
2008.
There are a number of reasons why Cambodia is submitting its
candidacy for the Committee for the first time. These
reasons include the importance of the Khmer heritage and its
fame around the world; the great success of the international
action at Angkor with the work of the International
Coordination Committee (ICC), which has been supported by
UNESCO since 1993; and the increasing affirmation of our
commitment to conservation and sustainable development.
According to the friends of our country, all of these reasons
justify why the Kingdom of Cambodia should serve as a member
of the World Heritage Committee.
The relations of mutual respect and friendship that the
Kingdom of Cambodia is proud to have with your country, lead
us to hope that you will support our candidacy and vote
accordingly.
Soliciting officially your support and your vote, I wish,
Your Excellency, to express my heartfelt gratitude and to
assure you of my highest consideration.
Prime Minister
Hun Sen (signature)
Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN
END TEXT OF LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
8. (SBU) COMMENT: Having secured membership in ASEAN in
1999 and as one of the first least developed countries to
join the World Trade Organization in 2004, Cambodia continues
to seek legitimacy in this and other world fora. Cambodia\’s
candidacy for the WHC should stand on its own merits.
However, on another front, given a recent move to use court
defamation cases to check dissent, we should not hesitate to
underline the RGC\’s quest for legitimacy within the
international community, and to appeal for more civil
political discourse as Cambodia goes through an apparent
cyclical downturn in its overall political climate, including
the narrowing of protections for freedoms of speech and press.
RODLEY
“
09BANGKOK1720 SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL CASEY’S MEETING WITH THAI ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG
“216975″,”7/16/2009 23:43″,”09BANGKOK1720″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",”VZCZCXRO9603
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TO RUEADWD/HQDA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
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“C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05
BANGKOK 001720
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FOR GENERAL CASEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MOPS, PINS, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL CASEY\’S MEETING WITH THAI
ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. General Casey, your meeting with Thai Army
Commander General Anupong will afford the opportunity to
highlight the importance of Thailand to our regional security
interests and emphasize our support for important areas of
our mil-mil relationship. Our military relationship provides
distinctive force projection opportunities from vital sea and
air lanes, the opportunity to conduct training exercises that
are nearly impossible to match elsewhere in Asia, and a
willing participant in international peacekeeping operations.
As Army Commander, General Anupong is among the most
influential figures in Thailand, and he was an invaluable
steadying factor during political turmoil over the past year.
Anupong firmly resisted calls from a wide range of actors
for military intervention and has insisted both publicly and
privately that Thailand\’s political troubles can only be
worked out through the democratic process. End Summary.
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
——————————-
2. (C) Our military relationship began during World War II
when the U.S. trained hundreds of Thais as part of the \”Free
Thai Movement\” that covertly conducted special operations
against the Japanese forces occupying Thailand and drew
closer during the Korean War era when Thailand provided
troops for the UN effort. Thai soldiers, sailors, and airmen
also fought side-by-side with U.S. counterparts in the
Vietnam War and, more recently, Thailand sent contingents to
Afghanistan and Iraq.
3. (C) The relationship has evolved into a partnership that
provides the U.S. with unique benefits. As one of five U.S.
treaty allies in Asia and straddling a major force projection
air/sea corridor, Thailand remains crucial to U.S. interests
in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Underpinning our
strong bilateral relations is the U.S.-Thai security
relationship, which is based on over fifty years of close
cooperation. The relationship has advanced USG interests
while developing Thai military, intelligence, and law
enforcement capabilities.
4. (C) Thailand\’s strategic importance to the U.S. should not
be understated. Our military engagement affords us unique
training venues in Asia training, training exercises that are
nearly impossible to match elsewhere in Asia, a willing
participant in international peacekeeping operations,
essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes
that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a
partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to
promote democratic ideals.
5. (C) The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services. As such, General
Anupong Paochinda wields more power than does the Chief of
Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabartra and is currently
among the most influential figures Thailand. Anupong was an
invaluable steadying factor during political turmoil over the
past year. Anupong firmly resisted calls from a wide range
of actors for military intervention, and has insisted both
publicly and privately that Thailand\’s political troubles can
only be worked out through the democratic process. Anupong
reportedly is close to the Thai Royal Family and has
well-established support among the Army ranks. He has
shifted the RTA\’s focus away from politics, as it was under
the previous RTA Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, to
the South, where he visits once a week.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
———————
6. (C) The December 2008 installation of the Democrat-led
coalition government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva has
calmed for now the political situation. Street protests by
People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) appear to be finished
and while demonstrations by the now anti-government United
Front of Democracy for Dictatorship (UDD) turned violent in
April, the political situation now appears calmer. Prime
Minister Abhisit is off to a reasonably good start in his
first months in office, but his government faces significant
political challenges and a tough economic situation.
BANGKOK 00001720 002 OF 005
7. (C) The basic split in Thai society and the body politic
remains. The traditional royalist elite, urban middle class,
Bangkok, and the south on one side (\”yellow\” in shorthand)
and the political allies of ex-Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, currently a fugitive abroad, along with largely
rural supporters in the North and Northeast (\”red\”) on the
other. Neither side of this split is as democratic as it
claims to be, and both movements reflect concerns stemming
from perceptions of a lack of social and economic justice in
Thailand. New elections would not appear to be a viable
solution to political divide, and political discord could
very well persist for years. We continue to stress to Thai
interlocutors the need for all parties to avoid violence and
respect democratic norms within the framework of the
constitution and rule of law.
IMPORTANT MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM
————————————-
8. (C) Thailand\’s willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success. While those
high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value
of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
military flights. A prime example was the critical support
Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in
support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan.
Approximately 300 flights have transited Utapao this year in
support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally
and to strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides
valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls,
primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over forty times per
year for exercises and visits.
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
——————————————–
9. (C) By means of access to good military base
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational exercises than are other countries in
Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral
exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security,
or the Philippines, where planning for multinational
exercises has been difficult, or Australia, which refuses to
multilateralize Tandem Thrust, the Thai government encourages
multinational exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use exercises in Thailand to further
key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan\’s growing
military role in Asia and engaging the Indonesian and
Singaporean militaries.
10. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program, is PACOM\’s largest annual multi-lateral exercise and
for 28 years has served to strengthen our relations with
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops.
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the
Asian Pacific region for Japan and Singapore and
re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. Cobra Gold is
key to building partner nation capacity in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, especially at a time when
U.S. forces face other global commitments. We have also been
able to incorporate into Cobra Gold a robust Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event with active
participation of Indonesia and Singapore.
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA
—————————–
11. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia continue to be
volatile, primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6
square kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent
to the 11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple. Minor
skirmishes have erupted three times in the past year, leading
to the deaths of seven soldiers.
12. (C) The roots of the dispute lie in the Siam-France
BANGKOK 00001720 003 OF 005
agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International Court of
Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but left the
rest of disputed land unresolved. Tensions spiked in
mid-2008 when the Thai government in power at that time
supported Cambodia\’s application to UNESCO for a joint
listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face
opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling.
13. (C) Difficult issues lay at the heart of the matter and
political conflict in Bangkok may make tough decisions more
difficult for the Thai government. We urge both sides to
resolve their differences peacefully through bilateral
negotiations, border demarcation, and a reduction of troops
deployed along the border.
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS
——————–
14. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of
UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation
to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Thai
generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to
which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a
Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh
Monitoring Mission, Thailand\’s success in peacekeeping has
led the RTG and the military to seek a more prominent role in
international stabilization and peacekeeping missions. For
instance, Thailand is currently preparing for a deployment of
a battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in
Darfur. We have continued to underscore to the leadership of
the Thai military that we stand ready to assist the Thai
where possible.
15. (C) We are working with the military to increase its
peacekeeping capabilities, both as a contributing nation and
as a trainer of neighboring nations. Using GPOI funding,
necessary upgrades and modernization work to a peacekeeping
training facility at Pranburi will be completed in FY10.
Thailand will provide instructors and maintain the facility,
which will be used for Thai peacekeepers for deployments
abroad and for peacekeeping training events with regional
partners. Thailand is also working to become a center for
training peacekeeping troops from around the region.
CONTINUED REFUGEE CONCERNS
————————–
16. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai
military plays a prominent role in the management of the many
refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries. The
Thai government has so far failed to set up a transparent
screening process for the thousands of Lao Hmong, many of
whom we believe have a legitimate claim to refugee status,
who seek resettlement in the U.S. Some are former fighters
(or their descendants) allied with the U.S. against the
communist Pathet Lao during the IndoChina War. We want to
take every opportunity to underscore to the military the
importance of transparently handling these refugee cases.
SOUTHERN THAILAND
—————–
17. (C) The Thai military, since the installation of General
Anupong as Army Commander, has taken a more assertive role in
trying to quell the ethnic Malay Muslim-led insurgency in
southern Thailand, a region that has witnessed episodic
violence since its incorporation into Thailand in 1902.
Regional violence has claimed more than 3,500 lives since
January 2004, when the violence began to escalate. The root
causes of the conflict are political and reflect larger
issues of justice, decentralized democracy, and identity in
Thai society. More specifically, however, Malay Muslims feel
that they are second-class citizens in Thailand.
18. (C) The Thai military currently has the lead in trying to
resolve the conflict, but has focused solely on the difficult
security situation. General Anupong has made clear his
feeling that political leaders need to take charge of efforts
to solve the root causes of the insurgency. There is little
political will in Bangkok to take on this issue, however, and
effort of civilian agencies have lagged, focusing on economic
development projects – which most analysts agree will have
BANGKOK 00001720 004 OF 005
little impact on the violence. While the Abhisit government
appears to want to adopt an integrated government approach to
solving the insurgency with budgetary and policy decisions
possibly transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister, it
remains unclear how the civil-military dynamic will change.
19. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a
U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South
could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement — a link that is currently
absent — we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the \”location and label\” test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases — a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station.
20. (C) The Embassy maintains a three-pronged focus to
improve our military cooperation in order to address the
violence in the South:
1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.
INTEROPERABILITY
—————-
21. (SBU) The U.S. remains the country of first choice for
arms procurement by the military, and has more than $2
billion of arms procurements currently in process. We
continue to look at ways to improve interoperability with the
Thai military, but must take into account the presence of
other regional and global players. Following U.S. sanctions
imposed by the coup in 2006, other countries such as China,
Israel, Sweden, and South Africa were looked at more closely
for procurement. As of late the RTA has embarked on an
equipment mondernization program. The most recent near-term
procurement opportunity with the Army is the expected
purchase of three UH-60L helicopters, which would bring their
fleet to ten, with the possibility of an additional six
being purchased in the next two to four years. Procurement
of UH-60Ls are seen as a workhorse replacement for the
current fleet of Vietnam-era UH1H helicopters that are
nearing the end of their lifecycle.
22. (SBU) The Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS)
program is in its second phase in Thailand. There has been
excellent acceptance at the Royal Thai Armed Forces
Headquarters, and more moderate support from the Ministry of
Defense, the Army, Air Force, and Navy. (Note: The Army has
the largest service component budget funded at a 2:1:1 ratio
respectively. End note.) The DRMS program has powerful
resource management and budget modeling tools which can help
the RTA better manage limited resources, although some
resistance can be expected as the Army stands to lose the
most from the additional transparency provided by the
program.
23. (SBU) The Royal Thai Army Directorate of Operations has
expressed strong interest in building a non-commissioned
officer development program (NCODP). JUSMAG is supporting
this program and has incorporated NCODP tasks into all JCET
and COIN SMEE engagement venues. We are working with USARPAC
to send two Thai officers to evaluate the Philippine NCODP
and will program future year IMET funding for future years to
further this initiative.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA
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24. (C) Thai leaders continue to develop closer relations
with China while simultaneously emphasizing the vital role of
the U.S. in the region. While Thai military links with the
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United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai
links, China\’s growing influence in Thailand and Southeast
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media, and the
military.
25. (C) The Chinese through hosting visits have made a strong
effort to court the Thai military, particularly General
Anupong. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the
late 1980\’s. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese Special
Forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of
bilateral military VIP visits. A yet to be finalized
bilateral Marine Corps exercise between China and Thailand
near the eastern seaboard port of Sattahip next year
highlights the continuing push by China to expand their
mil-to-mil relations with Thailand\’s military.
26. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and
the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes. The Chinese
have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of
relations, including mil-mil. Thailand is not interested in
making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see
closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to
our interests here), but we will need to work harder to
maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed.
JOHN
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