Archive for the ‘HM King Bhumipol’ Category
10BANGKOK298 SCENESETTER FOR THE CSA-HOSTED VISIT OF THAI ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG
“247126″,”2/4/2010 5:35″,”10BANGKOK298″,
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MARR, MOPS, PINS, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE CSA-HOSTED VISIT OF THAI ARMY
COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) General Casey, the upcoming visit of Thai Army
Commander General Anupong Paojinda will be an important
occasion to demonstrate our appreciation for the U.S.-Thai
relationship. Despite ongoing domestic political challenges,
Thailand\’s adherence to democratic values should not go
unrecognized. General Anupong has been invaluable the past
two years as he has resisted pressures from all sides for
military intervention into politics; as a result, a full
range of actors on the Thai political scene are able to
openly and vigorously debate policies and the state of
democracy. This visit is a prime opportunity to demonstrate
clearly to our close ally that we intend to engage fully in
the partnership, at a time when many in Thailand question
U.S. commitment to the region in comparison to a sustained
Chinese charm offensive. As examples of benefits from the
relationship, the U.S.-Thai partnership has yielded a
promising new lead in the drive to develop an HIV vaccination
and the seizure of more than 35 tons of North Korean weapons
in just the last three months alone, two examples that serve
to illustrate the depth and breadth of a relationship.
Furthermore, the Thai Cabinet in December approved a
supplemental budget to facilitate a peacekeeping deployment
to Darfur.
2. (C) General Anupong is the preeminent military leader in
our steadfast ally and has been a strong advocate of not
staging a coup and permitting the democratic process to play
out, although with the Army ensuring security. Indeed, if
you look back at the political turbulence of the past two
years, he has been one of the more admirable figures in
Thailand, and this counterpart visit is one way to express
our appreciation for his actions. Anupong has had to make an
extraordinary series of tough decisions over the past
eighteen months, and his intellect and disposition have been
key ingredients that have enabled him to make the choice to
come down on the side of democracy, even as his troops wage a
counterinsurgency campaign in Thailand\’s troubled
southernmost provinces. We will also want to use this visit
to send a signal to the rest of the Royal Thai Army that the
United States values its relationship with the Thai military
and Thailand. Anupong will likely be interested in pursuing
discussions on regional security challenges, and how the
U.S.-Thai alliance can be focused to assist as Thailand
prepares for changing threats. Anupong will also look to
discuss areas of cooperation, such as bilateral exercises and
training, whereby we can assist the Thai military modernize.
Thai government officials and military leaders have also
expressed strong interest in receiving excess defense
articles by way of Thailand\’s status as a Major Non-NATO
Ally, as Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya raised in 2009 with
Secretary Clinton and other senior USG officials.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
———————
3. (SBU) The past eighteen months were turbulent for
Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from
office in 2008, and twice the normal patterns of political
life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets.
The yellow-shirted People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
occupied Government House from August to December 2008 and
shut down Bangkok\’s airports for eight days, to protest
governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra. The red-shirted United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship (UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a
regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in
mid-April 2009 after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the
wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution
to bring him home.
4. (C) 2010 promises to be contentious as well, with Thaksin
and the red-shirts having vowed to redouble their efforts to
topple the government. In recent weeks, the red-shirts have
steadily increased a campaign to discredit and undermine the
government, with promises of a \”final battle\” in late
February that has many worried that violence could again
return to the streets of Bangkok. Among their activities has
BANGKOK 00000298 002 OF 005
been an operation to spread rumors of an impending coup, a
rumor for which we have seen no basis.
5. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic,
eloquent 45-year old Oxford graduate who generally has
progressive instincts and says the right things about basic
freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to
address the troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency.
Delivering results has proved more elusive, though the Thai
economy is growing again, driven by expanding exports.
6. (C) While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim
to the mantle of democracy, both have ulterior motives in
doing so. Both movements reflect deep social concerns
stemming from widespread perceptions of a lack of social and
economic justice, but both seek to triumph in competing for
traditional Thai hierarchical power relationships. New
elections would not appear to be a viable solution to
political divide, and political discord could persist for
years. We continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need
for all parties to avoid violence and respect democratic
norms within the framework of the constitution and rule of
law, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to
work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more
participatory democracy.
RECEDING MONARCHY
—————–
7. (C) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the
future of the monarchy. On the throne for 62 years,
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand\’s most prestigious
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate.
Many actors, including in the military, are jockeying for
position to shape the expected transition period in Thailand
during royal succession after the eventual passing of the
King. Few observers believe that the deep political and
social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol
passes and Thailand\’s tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the
charisma of his beloved father, who has greatly expanded the
prestige and influence of the monarchy during his reign.
Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in
function after succession. How much will change is open to
question, with many institutions, figures, and political
forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining
the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what
it means to be Thai.
SOUTHERN THAILAND – SEPARATIST INSURGENCY
—————————————–
8. (C) An ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgency in
southern Thailand has claimed an estimated 3,500 lives since
2004. Fundamental issues of justice and ethnic identity
drive the violence as many Malay Muslims feel that they are
second-class citizens in Thailand, and ending the insurgency
will require the government to deal with these issues on a
national level. The insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and
beheadings to challenge the control of the Thai state in the
deep South; the government has responded through special
security laws that give security forces expanded power to
search and detain people. The Thai military is now deeply
involved in counter-insurgency efforts; in contrast, from the
late 1990s-2004, the military viewed the top national
security threat to be the flow of illegal narcotics from
neighboring Burma.
9. (C) The insurgents direct their anger at the government in
Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or
perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect
that anger towards us and link it to the international
jihadist movement — a link that is currently absent – we
ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the
\”location and label\” test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military
personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do
not label any assistance or training as directly linked to
the southern situation. This approach dovetails with the
BANGKOK 00000298 003 OF 005
Thai interest in keeping outside influences and actors away
from the internal conflict.
10. (C) General Anupong has dedicated more of his time to
overseeing RTA counter-insurgency efforts in South than past
Army Commanders, who often were more focused on politics in
Bangkok. Anupong makes almost weekly trips to the South, and
he and his senior staff have engaged the Embassy and USARPAC
in an effort to learn counter-insurgency and counter-IED best
practices.
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
——————————-
11. (C) Despite the political divide, Thailand\’s unparalleled
strategic importance to the U.S. should not be understated.
The U.S.-Thai military relationship, which began during World
War II when the U.S. trained Thais to covertly conduct
special operations against the Japanese forces occupying
Thailand has evolved into a partnership that provides the
U.S. with unique benefits. Our military engagement affords
us unique training venues, the opportunity to conduct
exercises that are nearly impossible to match elsewhere, a
willing participant in international peacekeeping operations,
essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes
that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a
partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to
promote democratic ideals.
12. (C) Thailand\’s willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success. While those
high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value
of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
military flights. A prime example was the critical support
Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in
support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan.
Approximately 1,000 flights transit Utapao every year in
support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally
and to strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides
valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls,
primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over sixty times per
year for exercises and visits.
13. (SBU) Beyond traditional military activities, our
bilateral military relationship provides benefits in other
important areas. One example is the Armed Forces Research
Institute of Medical Sciences\’ (AFRIMS) collaboration with
Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines. The
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is
to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as
in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to
children, were developed here, and the first partially
successful phase III, double blind trial for a potential HIV
vaccine occurred in 2009; a second such trial run by CDC is
currently ongoing.
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
——————————————–
14. (C) By means of access to good military base
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational and bilateral exercises than are other
countries in Asia. This has allowed us to use exercises in
Thailand to further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting
Japan\’s growing military role in Asia and engaging the
Indonesian and Singaporean militaries.
15. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program and being held during the visit, is the largest
annual multi-lateral exercise in the Pacific region and for
29 years has served to strengthen our relations with
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops.
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates
BANGKOK 00000298 004 OF 005
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the
Asian Pacific region for Japan, Singapore, and South Korea
and re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. As an
example of the tangible benefits of the exercise, USARPAC is
using this year\’s Cobra Gold to test a deployable command
post for crisis situations such as HA/DR incidents. Cope
Tiger, a leading air exercise with the Thailand and
Singapore, and CARAT, a bilateral naval event, are key
mechanisms for engagement of the Royal Thai Air Force and
Navy. The Thai military continues to highlight to us the
significance of these events for training and for
relationship building.
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND DARFUR DEPLOYMENT
——————————————
16. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of
UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation
to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Thai
generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to
which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a
Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh
Monitoring Mission. Thailand is preparing for deploying a
battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in Darfur
and has asked for USG assistance. State recently identified
$2.4 million to be used to support equipment needed by the
Thai for the deployment, and we have used various funding
sources to increase overall Thai peacekeeping capabilities,
both as a contributing nation and as a trainer of neighboring
nations.
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA
—————————–
17. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia remain volatile,
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the
11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple. Minor skirmishes
have erupted four times since mid-2008, leading to the deaths
of seven soldiers. Cambodian Prime Hun Sen\’s November 2009
decision to appoint Thaksin as an economic advisor further
stoked cross-border tensions. Furthermore, there have been
at least six reports of small-scale conflicts resulting from
cross-border illegal logging activities in recent months.
18. (C) The roots of the border dispute lie in the
Siam-France agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International
Court of Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but
left the rest of disputed land unresolved. Tensions spiked
in 2008 when the Thai government in power at that time
supported Cambodia\’s application to UNESCO for a joint
listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face
opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling. Thorny
internal political considerations and historical rancor
between Thailand and Cambodia make progress difficult. We
urge both sides to resolve their differences peacefully
through bilateral negotiations, border demarcation, and a
reduction of troops deployed along the border.
ONGOING REFUGEE CONCERNS: HMONG AND BURMA
—————————————–
19. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai
military plays a prominent role in the management of the many
refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries.
Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and
facilitate resettlement of more than 14,000 refugees to the
U.S. annually, but the recent forced repatriation of two
groups of Lao Hmong in late December provoked international
outcry. The USG and Congress are also focused on 4,000
ethnic Karen in a Thai army-run camp along the Thai-Burma
border who came into Thailand last June fleeing an offensive
and who may be sent back in the near future. (Note: 140,000
Karen and Karenni have lived in RTG-sanctioned camps along
the border since 1990. End Note.) We underscore to the RTG
our disappointment with the Hmong deportation decision and
our continuing concern over access to the Hmong now that they
have been returned to Laos, as well as our concerns on the
Thai-Burma border.
BANGKOK 00000298 005 OF 005
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA
—————————-
20. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and
the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes. The Chinese
have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of
relations, including mil-mil. Thailand is not interested in
making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see
closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to
our interests here), but we will need to work harder to
maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed. While Thai
military links with the United States are deeper and far more
apparent than Sino-Thai links, China\’s growing influence in
Thailand is readily evident.
21. (C) The Chinese have made a strong effort to court the
Thai. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the
late 1980\’s. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese Special
Forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of
bilateral military VIP visits.
22. (C) During a visit to Thailand by Chinese Minister of
National Defense Liang Guanglie for the King\’s birthday
celebrations in early December 2009, the Thai and Chinese
militaries agreed to expand bilateral exercises to include
the two nations\’ navies, marines, and air forces. The
initial exercise will be conducted early this year, with the
PLA engaging Thai sailors and marines through an amphibious
landing event and a naval rescue and humanitarian relief
exercise. While some entities within the RTG resisted the
expanded engagement, reportedly the MFA and the Marine
Commandant, the Thai tell us that the Chinese pushed hard for
a rapid expansion of bilateral exercises. The Thai Marines
suggested to us that the exercise would be held at the
platoon or company level; it is unclear how many Navy
personnel may participate. While there are those in the Thai
military who have resisted expanding ties with the Chinese,
Foreign Minister Kasit during an early November meeting with
EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel warned that
Thailand could not continue to say no, and that the U.S.
military needed to more seriously re-engage with their Thai
counterparts.
23. (C) The expansion of joint exercises follows China
providing Thailand with $49 million in military assistance
following the 2006 coup. Beyond exercises and assistance,
the number of exchanges by Thai and Chinese officers studying
at military institutes has increased significantly in recent
years, particularly since the coup. The PLA has also
actively courted Thai military leaders, including Defense
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Chief of Defense Forces General
Songkitti Jaggabatra, and General Anupong, through multiple
hosted-visits to China.
JOHN
“
10BANGKOK226 SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ADMIRAL WILLARD
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RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000226
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MARR, MOPS, PINS, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ADMIRAL WILLARD
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Admiral Willard, Embassy Bangkok welcomes you to
Thailand. Despite ongoing domestic political challenges,
Thailand\’s adherence to democratic values should not go
unrecognized. That a full range of actors in the Thai
political scene can openly and vigorously debate policies and
the state of democracy is indeed evidence that Thailand is a
positive role model for other nations in the region. In
addition, Thailand, while chairing ASEAN last year, was a
leading proponent of democracy and human rights within ASEAN.
As such, now is a prime opportunity to demonstrate clearly
to our close ally that we intend to engage fully in the
partnership. Your visit will provide such an opportunity as
it will signal the United States\’ appreciation for the
long-standing bilateral relationship, which has facilitated
shared benefits in the fields of security, law enforcement,
and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking
health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee
support. In just the last three months alone, the U.S.-Thai
partnership has yielded a promising new lead in the drive to
develop an HIV vaccination and the seizure of more than 35
tons of North Korean weapons, two examples that serve to
illustrate the depth and breadth of a relationship.
Furthermore, the Thai Cabinet in December approved a
supplemental budget to facilitate a peacekeeping deployment
to Darfur.
2. (C) Thai interlocutors will likely be interested in
pursuing discussions on strategic views of regional security
challenges, and how the U.S.-Thai alliance can be focused to
assist as Thailand prepare for threats. The Thai will also
look to discuss areas of cooperation, such as bilateral
exercises and training, whereby we can assist the Thai
military modernize. The Thai have also expressed strong
interest in receiving excess defense articles by way of
Thailand\’s status as a Major Non-NATO Ally, as Foreign
Minister Kasit Piromya raised in 2009 with Secretary Clinton
and other senior USG officials.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
———————
3. (SBU) The past eighteen months were turbulent for
Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from
office, and twice the normal patterns of political life took
a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The
yellow-shirted People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied
Government House from August to December 2008 and shut down
Bangkok\’s airports for eight days, to protest governments
affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The
red-shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian
Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April 2009 after
Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of
power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home.
This year promises to be contentious as well, with Thaksin
and the red shirts having vowed to redouble their efforts to
topple the government. All sides hopefully learned a
valuable lesson against the use of violence, however, by
seeing their support plummet when such tactics were used.
4. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic,
eloquent 45-year old Oxford graduate who generally has
progressive instincts and says the right things about basic
freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to
address the troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency.
5. (C) While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim
to the mantle of democracy, both have ulterior motives in
doing so. Both movements reflect deep social concerns
stemming from widespread perceptions of a lack of social and
economic justice, but both seek to triumph in competing for
traditional Thai hierarchical power relationships. New
elections would not appear to be a viable solution to
political divide, and political discord could persist for
years. We continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need
for all parties to avoid violence and respect democratic
norms within the framework of the constitution and rule of
law, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to
BANGKOK 00000226 002 OF 005
work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more
participatory democracy.
RECEDING MONARCHY
—————–
6. (C) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the
future of the monarchy. On the throne for 62 years,
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand\’s most prestigious
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate.
Many actors are jockeying for position to shape the expected
transition period in Thailand during royal succession after
the eventual passing of the King. Few observers believe that
the deep political and social divides can be bridged until
after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand\’s tectonic plates
shift. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the
respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who
greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy
during his 62-year reign. Nearly everyone expects the
monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession.
How much will change is open to question, with many
institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for
influence, not only over redefining the institution of
monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai.
SOUTHERN THAILAND – SEPARATIST INSURGENCY
—————————————–
7. (C) An ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgency in
southern Thailand has claimed an estimated 3,500 lives since
2004. Fundamental issues of justice and ethnic identity
drive the violence as many Malay Muslims feel that they are
second-class citizens in Thailand, and ending the insurgency
will require the government to deal with these issues on a
national level. The insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and
beheadings to challenge the control of the Thai state in the
deep South; the government has responded through special
security laws that give security forces expanded power to
search and detain people. The Thai military is now deeply
involved in counter-insurgency efforts; in the late
1990s-2004, the military viewed the top national security
threat to be the flow of illegal narcotics from neighboring
Burma.
8. (C) The insurgents direct their anger at the government in
Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or
perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect
that anger towards us and link it to the international
jihadist movement — a link that is currently absent — we
ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the
\”location and label\” test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military
personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do
not label any assistance or training as directly linked to
the southern situation.
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
——————————-
9. (C) Despite the political divide, Thailand\’s unparalleled
strategic importance to the U.S. should not be understated.
The U.S.-Thai military relationship, which began during World
War II when the U.S. trained Thais to covertly conduct
special operations against the Japanese forces occupying
Thailand has evolved into a partnership that provides the
U.S. with unique benefits. Our military engagement affords
us unique training venues, the opportunity to conduct
exercises that are nearly impossible to match elsewhere, a
willing participant in international peacekeeping operations,
essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes
that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a
partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to
promote democratic ideals.
10. (C) Thailand\’s willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success. While those
high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value
of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
military flights. A prime example was the critical support
Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in
BANGKOK 00000226 003 OF 005
support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan.
Approximately 1,000 flights transit Utapao every year in
support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally
and to strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides
valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls,
primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over sixty times per
year for exercises and visits.
11. (SBU) Beyond traditional military activities, our
bilateral military relationship provides benefits in other
important areas. One example it the Armed Forces Research
Institute of Medical Sciences\’ (AFRIMS) collaboration with
Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines. The
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is
to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as
in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to
children, were developed here, and the first partially
successful phase III, double blind trial for a potential HIV
vaccine occurred in 2009; a second such trial run by CDC is
currently ongoing.
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
——————————————–
12 (C) By means of access to good military base
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational and bilateral exercises than are other
countries in Asia. This has allowed us to use exercises in
Thailand to further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting
Japan\’s growing military role in Asia and engaging the
Indonesian and Singaporean militaries.
13. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program, is the largest annual multi-lateral exercise in the
Pacific region and for 29 years has served to strengthen our
relations with Thailand, highlight our commitment to
Southeast Asia, and provide exceptional training
opportunities for our troops. The event has evolved over the
years and now facilitates important objectives such as
promoting a greater role in the Asian Pacific region for
Japan, Singapore, and South Korea and re-establishing a
partner role with Indonesia. Cope Tiger, a leading air
exercise with the Thailand and Singapore, and CARAT, a
bilateral naval event, are key mechanisms for engagement of
the Thai air force and navy. The Thai military continues to
highlight to us the significance of these events for training
and for relationship building.
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND DARFUR DEPLOYMENT
——————————————
14. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of
UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation
to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Thai
generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to
which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a
Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh
Monitoring Mission. Thailand is preparing for deploying a
battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in Darfur
and has asked for USG assistance. Using various funding
sources, we are working to support the request and to
increase overall Thai peacekeeping capabilities, both as a
contributing nation and as a trainer of neighboring nations.
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA
—————————–
15. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia remain volatile,
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the
11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple. Minor skirmishes
have erupted four times since mid-2008, leading to the deaths
of seven soldiers. Furthermore, there have been at least
five reports of Thai rangers firing upon illegal Cambodian
loggers in Thai territory in recent months. Cambodian Prime
Hun Sen\’s November 2009 decision to appoint Thaksin as an
economic advisor further stoked cross-border tensions.
BANGKOK 00000226 004 OF 005
16. (C) The roots of the border dispute lie in the
Siam-France agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International
Court of Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but
left the rest of disputed land unresolved. Tensions spiked
in 2008 when the Thai government in power at that time
supported Cambodia\’s application to UNESCO for a joint
listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face
opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling. Thorny
internal political considerations and historical rancor
between Thailand and Cambodia make progress difficult. We
urge both sides to resolve their differences peacefully
through bilateral negotiations, border demarcation, and a
reduction of troops deployed along the border.
ONGOING REFUGEE CONCERNS
————————
17. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai
military plays a prominent role in the management of the many
refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries.
Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and
facilitate resettlement of more than 14,000 refugees to the
U.S. annually, but the recent forced repatriation of two
groups of Lao Hmong in late December provoked international
outcry. We underscore to the RTG our disappointment with the
deportation decision and our continuing concern over access
to the Hmong now that they have been returned to Laos. The
Thai have asked privately about possible Congressional
repercussions due to the deportation.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA
—————————-
18. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and
the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes. The Chinese
have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of
relations, including mil-mil. Thailand is not interested in
making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see
closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to
our interests here), but we will need to work harder to
maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed. While Thai
military links with the United States are deeper and far more
apparent than Sino-Thai links, China\’s growing influence in
Thailand is readily evident.
19. (C) The Chinese have made a strong effort to court the
Thai. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the
late 1980\’s. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese Special
Forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of
bilateral military VIP visits.
20. (C) During a visit to Thailand by Chinese Minister of
National Defense Liang Guanglie for the King\’s birthday
celebrations in early December 2009, the Thai and Chinese
militaries agreed to expand bilateral exercises to include
the two nations\’ navies, marines, and air forces. The
initial exercise will be conducted early this year, with the
PLA engaging Thai sailors and marines through an amphibious
landing event and a naval rescue and humanitarian relief
exercise. While some entities within the RTG resisted the
expanded engagement, reportedly the MFA and the Marine
Commandant, the Thai tell us that the Chinese pushed hard for
a rapid expansion of bilateral exercises. The Thai Marines
suggested to us that the exercise would be held at the
platoon or company level; it is unclear how many Navy
personnel may participate. While there are those in the Thai
military who have resisted expanding ties with the Chinese,
Foreign Minister Kasit during an early November meeting with
EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel warned that
Thailand could not continue to say no, and that the U.S.
military needed to more seriously re-engage with their Thai
counterparts.
21. (C) The expansion of joint exercises follows China
providing Thailand with $49 million in military assistance
following the 2006 coup. Beyond exercises and assistance,
the number of exchanges by Thai and Chinese officers studying
BANGKOK 00000226 005 OF 005
at military institutes has increased significantly in recent
years, particularly since the coup. The PLA has also
actively courted Thai military leaders, including Defense
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Chief of Defense Forces General
Songkitti Jaggabatra, and Army Commander General Anupong
Paojinda, through multiple hosted-visits to China.
JOHN
“
10BANGKOK45 SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHAPIRO
“242728″,”1/7/2010 10:42″,”10BANGKOK45″,”Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”10BANGKOK3116″,”VZCZCXRO2954
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RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000045
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MOPS, PINS, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHAPIRO
REF: BANGKOK 3116
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Assistant Secretary Shapiro, Embassy Bangkok welcomes
you to Thailand. Despite ongoing domestic discord and
current inward focus, Thailand\’s strategic importance to the
U.S. cannot be overstated. Your visit provides an
opportunity to signal the United States\’ appreciation for the
long-standing bilateral relationship, which has facilitated
shared benefits in the fields of security, law enforcement,
and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking
health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee
support. In just the last three months alone, the U.S.-Thai
partnership has yielded a promising new lead in the drive to
develop an HIV vaccination and the seizure of more than 35
tons of North Korean weapons, two examples which serve to
illustrate the depth and breadth of a relationship. In late
December, the Thai Cabinet approved a supplemental budget to
facilitate the delayed peacekeeping deployment to Darfur.
2. (C) As your visit will take place in the run up to the
expected U.S.-Thai Strategic Dialogue, Thai interlocutors
will likely be interested in pursuing discussions on
strategic views of regional security challenges and how the
U.S.-Thai alliance can be focused to assist as Thailand
prepare for threats. The Thai will look to discuss U.S.
assistance through bilateral exercises and training, and
helping the Thai military modernize either by means of
procuring U.S. defense articles or via the hoped for receipt
of excess defense articles by way of Thailand\’s status as a
Major Non-NATO Ally, as Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya raised
in 2009 with Secretary Clinton and other senior USG
officials. In addition, with the Royal Thai Armed Forces
Headquarters (RTARF) preparing for a difficult deployment to
UNAMID in Darfur, the Thai military will look to explore ways
whereby the U.S. can assist.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
———————
3. (SBU) The last eighteen months were turbulent for
Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from
office, and twice the normal patterns of political life took
a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The
yellow-shirted People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied
Government House from August to December 2008, shutting down
Bangkok\’s airports for eight days, to protest governments
affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The
red-shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian
Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April 2009 after
Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of
power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home.
2010 promises to be contentious as well, with Thaksin and the
red shirts having vowed to redouble their efforts to topple
the government.
4. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic,
eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has
progressive instincts and says the right things about basic
freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to
address the troubled deep south, afflicted by a grinding
ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency.
Delivering is another matter, and Abhisit has disappointed us
recently on the repatriation of the Lao Hmong and his
handling of several foreign investment-related issues.
Despite recent higher approval ratings, Abhisit remains
beset by a fractious coalition, vigorous parliamentary
opposition in the form of a large block of politicians under
the Puea Thai Party banner, and street protests from the
red-shirts.
5. (C) While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim
to the mantle of democracy, neither side of this split is as
democratic as it claims to be. Both movements reflect deep
social concerns stemming from widespread perceptions of a
lack of social and economic justice, but both seek to triumph
in competing for traditional Thai hierarchical power
relationships. New elections would not appear to be a viable
solution to political divide, and political discord could
persist for years. We continue to stress to Thai
interlocutors the need for all parties to avoid violence and
respect democratic norms within the framework of the
constitution and rule of law, as well as our support for
long-time friend Thailand to work through its current
BANGKOK 00000045 002 OF 004
difficulties and emerge as a more participatory democracy.
RECEDING MONARCHY
—————–
6. (C) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the
future of the monarchy. On the throne for 62 years,
U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand\’s most prestigious
figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate.
Many actors are jockeying for position to shape the expected
transition period Thailand during royal succession after the
eventual passing of the King, who is currently in poor
health. Few observers believe that the deep political and
social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol
passes and Thailand\’s tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the
charisma of his beloved father, who greatly expanded the
prestige and influence of the monarchy during his 62-year
reign. Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and
change in function after succession. How much will change is
open to question, with many institutions, figures, and
political forces positioning for influence, not only over
redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally
fundamentally, what it means to be Thai.
SOUTHERN THAILAND – SEPARATIST INSURGENCY
—————————————–
7. (C) An ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgency in
southern Thailand has claimed an estimated 3,500 lives since
2004. The fundamental issues of justice and ethnic identity
drive the violence as many Malay Muslims feel that they are
second-class citizens in Thailand, and ending the insurgency
will require the government to deal with these issues on a
national level. The insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and
beheadings to challenge the control of the Thai state in the
deep South; the government has responded through special
security laws which give security forces expanded power to
search and detain people. The Thai military is now deeply
involved in counter-insurgency efforts; in the late
1990s-2004, the military viewed the top national security
threat to be the flow of illegal narcotics from neighboring
Burma.
8. (C) The insurgents direct their anger at the government in
Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or
perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect
that anger towards us and link it to the international
jihadist movement — a link that is currently absent — we
ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the
\”location and label\” test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military
personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do
not label any assistance or training as directly linked to
the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid feeding
rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow fomenting
the violence in the South in order to justify building
permanent bases — a very sensitive issue in Thailand. We do
not want to jeopardize our access to key military facilities
in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air Station.
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
——————————-
9. (C) Despite the political divide, Thailand\’s strategic
importance to the U.S. should not be understated. The
U.S.-Thai military relationship, which began during World War
II when the U.S. trained Thais to covertly conduct special
operations against the Japanese forces occupying Thailand has
evolved into a partnership that provides the U.S. with unique
benefits. Thailand remains crucial to U.S. interests in the
Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Our military engagement
affords us unique training venues, the opportunity to conduct
exercises that are nearly impossible to match elsewhere, a
willing participant in international peacekeeping operations,
essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes
that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a
partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to
promote democratic ideals.
10. (C) Thailand\’s willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success. While those
high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value
of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
military flights. A prime example was the critical support
BANGKOK 00000045 003 OF 004
Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in
support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan.
Approximately 1,000 flights transit Utapao every year in
support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally
and to strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides
valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls,
primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over sixty times per
year for exercises and visits.
11. (SBU) Beyond traditional military activities, our
bilateral military relationship provides benefits in other
important areas. One example it the Armed Forces Research
Institute of Medical Sciences\’ (AFRIMS) collaboration with
Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines. The
sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health
community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is
to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as
in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to
children, were developed here, and the first partially
successful phase III, double blind trial for a potential HIV
vaccine occurred in 2009; a second such trial run by CDC is
currently ongoing.
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
——————————————–
12 (C) By means of access to good military base
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational and bilateral exercises than are other
countries in Asia. This has allowed us to use exercises in
Thailand to further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting
Japan\’s growing military role in Asia and engaging the
Indonesian and Singaporean militaries.
13. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program, is PACOM\’s largest annual multi-lateral exercise and
for 29 years has served to strengthen our relations with
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops.
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the
Asian Pacific region for Japan, Singapore, and South Korea
and re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. Cope
Tiger, a leading air exercise with the Thailand and
Singapore, and CARAT, a bilateral naval event, are key
mechanisms for engagement of the Thai navy and air force.
The Thai military continues to highlight to us the
significance of these events for training and for
relationship building.
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND DARFUR DEPLOYMENT
——————————————
14. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of
UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation
to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Thai
generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to
which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a
Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh
Monitoring Mission. Thailand is preparing for deploying a
battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in Darfur
and has asked for USG assistance (Ref A). During your visit,
the Thai will be very interested in discussing ways ahead on
the deployment. Using GPOI funding, we are working with the
military to increase its peacekeeping capabilities, both as a
contributing nation and as a trainer of neighboring nations.
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA
—————————–
15. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia remain volatile,
primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square
kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the
11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple. Minor skirmishes
have erupted three times since mid-2008, leading to the
deaths of seven soldiers. Cambodian Prime Hun Sen\’s November
2009 decision to appoint Thaksin as an economic advisor
further stoked cross-border tensions.
16. (C) The roots of the border dispute lie in the
Siam-France agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International
Court of Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but
left the rest of disputed land unresolved. Tensions spiked
in 2008 when the Thai government in power at that time
BANGKOK 00000045 004 OF 004
supported Cambodia\’s application to UNESCO for a joint
listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face
opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling. Thorny
internal political considerations and historical rancor
between Thailand and Cambodia make progress difficult. We
urge both sides to resolve their differences peacefully
through bilateral negotiations, border demarcation, and a
reduction of troops deployed along the border.
REFUGEE CONCERNS
—————-
17. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai
military plays a prominent role in the management of the many
refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries.
Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and
facilitate resettlement of more than 14,000 refugees to the
U.S. annually, but the recent forced repatriation of two
groups of Lao Hmong in late December provoked international
outcry. We underscore to the RTG our disappointment with the
deportation decision and our continuing concern over access
to the Hmong now that they have been returned to Laos. The
Thai have asked us privately about possible repercussions due
to the deportation.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA
—————————-
18. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and
the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes. The Chinese
have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of
relations, including mil-mil. Thailand is not interested in
making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see
closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to
our interests here), but we will need to work harder to
maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed. While Thai
military links with the United States are deeper and far more
apparent than Sino-Thai links, China\’s growing influence in
Thailand is readily evident.
19. (C) The Chinese have made a strong effort to court the
Thai military. The Thai military has a range of Chinese
weapons systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in
closer links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with
Thailand to improve air defense equipment provided to
Thailand in the late 1980\’s. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and
Chinese Special Forces conducted joint exercises, and other
mil-to-mil exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has
the number of bilateral military VIP visits.
20. (C) During a visit to Thailand by Chinese Minister of
National Defense Liang Guanglie for the King\’s birthday
celebrations in early December 2009, the Thai and Chinese
militaries agreed to expand bilateral exercises to include
the two nations\’ navies, marines, and air forces. The
initial exercise will be conducted early this year, with the
PLA engaging Thai sailors and marines through an amphibious
landing event and a naval rescue and humanitarian relief
exercise. While some entities within the RTG resisted the
expanded engagement, reportedly the MFA and the Marine
Commandant, the Thai tell us that the Chinese pushed hard for
a rapid expansion of bilateral exercises. The Thai Marines
suggested to us that the exercise will be held at the platoon
or company level; it is unclear how many Navy personnel may
participate.
21. (C) The expansion of joint exercises follows China
providing Thailand with $49 million in military assistance
following the 2006 coup. Beyond exercises and assistance,
the number of exchanges by Thai and Chinese officers studying
at military institutes has increased significantly in recent
years, particularly since the coup. The PLA has also
actively courted Thai military leaders, including Defense
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and Army Commander General Anupong
Paojinda, through multiple hosted-visits to China.
JOHN
“
09BANGKOK263 SCENESETTER FOR SENIOR MILITARY VISITORS TO THAILAND DURING COBRA GOLD
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BANGKOK 000263
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MARR, MOPS, PINS, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENIOR MILITARY VISITORS TO
THAILAND DURING COBRA GOLD
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. Coming visits by component commanders, and
other senior leaders of various U.S. military commands will
afford a chance to affirm the United States Government\’s
commitment to working with a democratically elected Thai
government, to promoting a continued strong bilateral
relationship, and to affirming our support for important
areas of our mil-mil relationship such as the Defense Reform
Management Study (DRMS), Cobra Gold, and Thailand\’s
deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur. End Summary.
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
——————————-
2. (SBU) The Thai public closely watched our recent
Presidential election, and the results received much scrutiny
regarding the potential impact on U.S.-Thai relations. Thai
government officials have expressed strong interest in
hearing assessments of the transition to a new administration
and U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia. We have stressed to
the Thai we do not anticipate significant changes in our
bilateral relationship due to the history and strength of our
alliance and the nature of long-standing U.S.-Thai security,
economic, and cultural bonds. However, the changing
generations in both Thailand and the U.S. require both sides
work hard to maintain the vibrancy in the relationship.
THAI POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT – YELLOW AND RED
——————————————-
3. (C) The December dissolution of the People\’s Power Party
(PPP), which led to the fall of the government of former PM
Somchai and installation of the Democrat-led coalition
government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva, has appeared
to quiet, at least temporarily, the political situation.
Gone are the street protests by the anti-government People\’s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which shut down Bangkok\’s
airports for a week and occupied the formal seat of
government for over three months. But the basic deep split
in society and the body politic remains, with the traditional
royalist elite, urban middle class, Bangkok, and the south on
one side (\”yellow\” in shorthand) and the political allies of
ex-PM Thaksin, currently a fugitive abroad, along with
largely rural supporters in the North and Northeast (\”red\”)
on the other.
4. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit is off to a reasonably good
start in his first month in office, but his government faces
significant policy challenges given the current economic
situation in Thailand and globally. Abhisit and the
Democrats also have to contend with former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra\’s continued attempts to influence the
political environment from abroad and to recover assets of
his that were seized by the government. Moreover,
demonstrations by United Front of Democracy for Dictatorship
\”redshirts\” loyal to the former PM will test the new
government.
5. (C) Calling for new elections would not appear to be a
viable solution to political divide, and political turmoil
could very well persist for years. The steadiest figure on
the political stage over the past months has been Army
Commander Anupong Paochinda, who steadfastly rejected
pressure from both sides for the army to intervene in the
political stalemate, either to conduct a coup d\’etat or to
clear the streets of protesters. We continue to stress to
Thai interlocutors the negative ramifications of a coup and
the need for all parties to avoid violence and respect
democratic norms within the framework of the constitution and
rule of law.
6. (C) King Bhumibol turned 81 on December 5. Many had
anticipated his commentary for his annual address to the
nation on the eve of his birthday; his address was canceled,
BANGKOK 00000263 002 OF 005
however, after he fell ill with bronchitis. (Note: The King
was hospitalized for a period of weeks in late 2007 for
appeared to be a minor stroke. End note.) The Palace has
since announced the King\’s recovery; as of late, he has been
shown on television more frequently in meetings with both
foreigners and Thais. The King\’s passing, whenever that may
be, will shock Thailand. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is the
King\’s designated heir. However, the current King\’s enormous
personal prestige, the lack of a precedent for royal
succession during the modern era (King Bhumibol has been on
the throne since 1946), and changing sentiment about the
proper role of the institution in the 21st century suggest
that the transition will be difficult.
THAI ECONOMY STRUGGLES TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES
———————————————
7. (SBU) Over the past few years, Thailand\’s economy has been
growing at a moderate pace, though the long-running political
uncertainty has stifled domestic investment, hamstrung
government stimulus programs, and kept Thailand from keeping
up with other ASEAN nations. The worldwide economic slowdown
of recent months has hit Thailand particularly hard as
exports, the one bright spot in GDP growth, have fallen,
causing growth forecasts for 2009 to be ratcheted down from
4% to less than 2%. This dreary scenario was made much worse
by the November airport closures, which devastated Thailand\’s
large tourism and convention industries just at the beginning
of the high season.
8. (SBU) Historically, Thailand\’s economy has hummed along
unaffected by frequent political squabbling, but the recent
willingness of political actors to take actions that clearly
damage the economy and the nation\’s international image is
changing that tenet. Thailand\’s largest foreign investors,
Japanese in particular, have expressed dismay at the new turn
in events. The full effect of the airport closures has not
yet shown up in the data, but FDI (especially from the U.S.)
was already trending down for 2008. The new government is
well aware of these challenges, has made an extraordinary
effort to put together an economically reasonable and
politically savvy economic stimulus package, and is reaching
out to the foreign business community to re-built Thailand\’s
image as a good place to do business.
IMPORTANT MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM, ACCESS
———————————————
9. (SBU) The long-standing U.S.-Thai military partnership
provides the U.S. with unique benefits. These include
distinctive force projection options, the possibility to
conduct training exercises that are nearly impossible to
match elsewhere in Asia, the opportunity to advance U.S.
strategic goals, access to military leaders in a nation that
is trying to strengthen democratic institutions, a willing
participant in international peacekeeping operations, and a
partner in medical research which has produced widely-used
vaccines.
10. (C) Thailand\’s willingness to allow the United States to
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations successful. While
those high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the
value of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for
flights in support of critical U.S. military operations to
strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides valued
port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls, primarily
at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over forty times per year for
exercises and visits.
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM
——————————————–
11. (C) By means of access to good military base
BANGKOK 00000263 003 OF 005
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for
exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing
to host multinational exercises than are other countries in
Asia. Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral
exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security,
or the Philippines, where planning for multinational
exercises has been difficult, or Australia, which refuses to
multilateralize Tandem Thrust, the Thai government encourages
multinational exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
This has allowed us to use exercises in Thailand to further
key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan\’s growing
military role in Asia and engaging the Indonesian and
Singaporean militaries.
12. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise
program, is PACOM\’s largest annual multi-lateral exercise and
for 28 years has served to strengthen our relations with
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops.
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the
Asian Pacific region for Japan and Singapore and
re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. Cobra Gold is
key to building partner nation capacity in humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, especially at a time when
U.S. forces face other global commitments. We have also been
able to incorporate into Cobra Gold a robust Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event with active
participation of Indonesia and Singapore. Our other primary
exercises with the Thai military are CARAT and COPE TIGER.
DEFENSE REFORM
————–
13. (C) We have been working closely with the Royal Thai
Armed Forces Headquarters (RTARF) on the U.S.-funded Defense
Resource Management System (DRMS) project which will help
rationalize the Thai military\’s procurement and other
resource needs. We use every appropriate opportunity to
emphasize our desire to work closely with the Thai military
leadership to accelerate DRMS process. Phase II of this
process will begin the first week of March following the
ASEAN summit scheduled for Thailand.
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS
——————–
14. (C) Thailand has been an active contributor in
peacekeeping missions, best known for leading forces in the
UNTAET mission in East Timor. The RTARF has been a close
partner for us as the Thai government continues preparations
to deploy a battalion of peacekeeping troops to Darfur as
UNAMID. With deployment currently scheduled for mid-2009, we
have continued to underscore to the leadership of the Thai
military that we stand ready to assist the Thai again where
possible.
SOUTHERN THAILAND: SECURITY AND JUSTICE
—————————————
15. (C) The Thai military, since General Anupong became Army
Commander, has taken a more assertive role in trying to quell
the ethnic Malay Muslim ethno-nationalist insurgency in
southern Thailand, a region that has witnessed episodic
violence since its incorporation into Siam/Thailand in 1902.
Regional violence has claimed more than 3000 lives since
January 2004, when the violence began to escalate. The root
causes of the insurgency — government neglect, human rights
abuses, and a lack of social justice, combined with a desire
for some form of self-determination, have not been addressed
by any Thai government to this point.
16. (C) While the Thai military has so far focused mostly on
trying to resolve the difficult security situation in the
BANGKOK 00000263 004 OF 005
South, with increased tactical success in security sweeps,
occasional abuses by security forces have added to the sense
of grievance and lack of justice by the local populace.
Efforts by civilian government ministries to solve the root
causes of injustice and the feeling of disenfranchisement by
the Thai-Malay majority in the three southern provinces have
so far lagged. While the Abhisit government appears set to
adopt an integrated government approach to solving the
insurgency with budgetary and policy decision making
responsibility possibly transferred to the Office of the
Prime Minister, it remains unclear how the civil-military
dynamic will change.
17. (C) The RTG has made clear its hesitancy in accepting any
direct USG role in the South. The Embassy maintains a
three-pronged focus to improve our military cooperation in
order to address the violence in the South:
1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed
Forces, especially the Thai Army;
2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai
military, police forces, and civilian agencies;
3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect
international human rights norms as they counter the violence.
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA
—————————–
18. (C) Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya\’s January 26
visit to Phnom Penh produced encouraging statements by all
sides regarding the border dispute that is centered on
overlapping claims to territory adjacent to Preah Vihear
temple. The next round of talks under the auspices of the
Foreign Ministry-led Joint Border Commission (JBC) are
scheduled for February 2, and the two nations\’ defense
ministers are scheduled to meet February 6 to discuss the
redeployment of soldiers stationed at the temple. Despite
continued talks between Thailand and Cambodia, we are not
optimistic for quick resolution to the dispute. Difficult
issues lay at the heart of the matter, and political conflict
in Bangkok may make tough decisions more difficult for the
Thai government. We continue to stress to the Thai
interlocutors that the dispute should be resolved peacefully
and bilaterally.
REFUGEE/MIGRANT CONCERNS: LAO HMONG AND ROHINGYA
——————————————— —
19. (C) Thailand has hosted millions of refugees since the
IndoChina wars and currently has more than 150,000 refugees
from Burma in camps along the Thai-Burma border. The RTARF
has the lead on resolving the difficult problem of the
thousands of Hmong from Laos who arrived in 2006-2007 seeking
resettlement in the U.S.; many of them likely would not
qualify for refugee status and will be returned to Laos.
However, the Thai government has so far failed to set up a
transparent screening process for the Hmong currently in a
camp in Petchaboon province; we believe that a portion of the
group may have a legitimate claim to refugee status and could
face harsh treatment by the Lao government if returned. Some
are former fighters (or their descendants) allied with the
U.S. against the communist Pathet Lao during the IndoChina
wars. We want to take every opportunity to underscore to the
RTARF the importance of transparently handling the Lao Hmong
cases.
20. (C) Media reports in recent weeks over Thai actions
regarding Rohingya \”boat people\” have resulted in strong
criticism of the RTG and its policy toward groups that
attempt to enter Thailand, primarily from Burma. Rohingya
typically cross from Burma\’s Northern Rakhine state into
Bangladesh to board vessels bound for Malaysia. This year
many have instead found their way to the Ranong area in
Thailand, the Andaman Islands of India, and Aceh Province,
Indonesia. According to various reports, several hundred
BANGKOK 00000263 005 OF 005
Rohingya went missing from at least one vessel encountered by
the Indian coast guard off Port Blair in the Andaman Islands
in early January. Survivors have alleged being towed out to
sea and being abandoned by Thai military or marine police
vessels.
21. (C) A recent visit to the Ranong area by Embassy RefCoord
suggests to us that two loosely defined groupings of unpaid
civilian defense volunteers drawn from fishing villages were
involved in the alleged mistreatment of the Rohingya, but
that they received general policy direction and some
financial support from the Thai Army-led local Internal
Security Operations Center. It remains unclear what boats
may have been involved in towing the Rohingya back out to
sea. We continue to stress to our contacts in the Thai
government that Thailand should provide access for UNHCR to
Rohingya boat people who reach Thai shores, and that
push-outs to sea are not consistent with basic humanitarian
principles.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA
—————————-
22. (C) Thai leaders continue to develop closer relations
with China while simultaneously emphasizing the vital role of
the U.S. in the region. While Thai military links with the
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai
links, China\’s growing influence in Thailand and Southeast
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media, and the
military. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the
late 1980\’s. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese special
forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of
bilateral military VIP visits. A yet to be disclosed marine
corps exercise between China and Thailand near the eastern
seaboard port of Sattahip in the April-May timeframe
highlights the continuing push by China to expand their
mil-to-mil relations with Thailand\’s military.
JOHN
“
06BANGKOK5836 THE MONARCHY\’S ROLE IN THAILAND\’S SEPTEMBER 19 COUP
“79224″,”9/21/2006 11:40″,
“06BANGKOK5836″,”Embassy Bangkok”,
“CONFIDENTIAL”,”06BANGKOK5812″,”VZCZCXRO5747
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
SUBJECT: THE MONARCHY\’S ROLE IN THAILAND\’S SEPTEMBER 19 COUP
REF: BANGKOK 5812 (WHO\’S IN CHARGE?)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
——-
1. (C) It remains unclear whether Thailand\’s King encouraged
or provided approval in advance for the September 19 coup
d\’etat by the Council for Democratic Reform Under the
Monarchy (CDRM). However, the CDRM is publicly linked to the
monarchy to a greater extent than previous coup plotters, and
the CDRM\’s September 19 royal audience sent a clear public
signal of Palace endorsement. Palace endorsement likely
contributed to public support for the coup, although polls by
two prominent institutions provide divergent accounts of the
coup\’s popularity. The ill health of the King might have
influenced the timing of the coup. End Summary.
ROYAL AUDIENCE KEY TO COUP SUCCESS, ACCEPTABILITY
——————————————— —-
2. (C) On the night of September 19, soon after the CDRM
seized control of the media, word spread that CDRM leaders
would have an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The
audience took place at Chittralada Villa from 12:19 a.m.
until 1:24 a.m. the same night, according to an Embassy
contact at the Palace. The willingness of the King to
receive the CDRM representatives so quickly sent a clear
public signal of royal endorsement of the coup. And by
including Supreme Commander Ruangroj, previously thought to
be firmly in Thaksin\’s camp, the audience displayed the
military\’s unity and loyalty to the King — to the point of
deflating Thaksin\’s hopes that he could prevail against the
rebellious soldiers (reftel).
3. (C) The CDRM\’s public claims that it acted to maintain
peace and order, and to protect the King against acts of lese
majeste, were not unexpected or atypical. The CDRM\’s
inclusion of reference to the monarchy in the coup-plotters\’
group name, however, appears unprecedented in Thai history.
(A literal translation of the Thai version is: \”Council for
Reforming Governance in the Democratic System having His
Majesty the King as Head of State.\”) Also unprecedented is
an alleged Royal Command, published online by the Prime
Minister\’s Office, in which the King \”appoints General Sonthi
as leader of the (CDRM), and demands… all government
officials follow the orders of General Sonthi.\” (Full text
of the alleged Royal Command provided septel.) Embassy
contacts at the Palace tell us they have not seen a copy of
the signed Royal Command, however.
4. (C) Given the widespread public understanding, especially
in Bangkok, that Thaksin was increasingly engaged in
confrontation with members of the Privy Council (if not with
the King himself), most Thais view the CDRM as acting on
behalf of the King\’s interests. Almost universal Thai
reverence for the King has likely contributed significantly
to popular acceptance of the coup.
5. (C) The King is in ill health and has not been seen in
public since his August 4 departure from a Bangkok hospital.
However, we hear that the CDRM has requested the release of
photographs and video footage of the royal audience with the
CDRM. Our contacts told us that the King\’s Secretary will
likely release the photographs, but is unlikely to release
the video footage. Release of images from the audience would
convey further signals of royal endorsement.
KING\’S HEALTH INFLUENCING COUP TIMING?
————————————–
6. (C) Given the King\’s ill health, we do not dismiss the
possibility that the coup\’s timing was determined in part not
only by Thaksin\’s travel abroad, but also by a desire by CDRM
figures to make their move while they could still obtain the
support of the King. (Not only does the King\’s imprimatur
carry much more weight than the Crown Prince\’s would, but a
coup mounted during any period of mourning would be seen as a
deep affront to Thai sensibilities, no matter how unpopular
the government. Similarly, whatever constitutional reform
efforts begin under the CDRM will likely be suspended for a
lengthy period in the event of the King\’s demise.)
COMMENT
——-
BANGKOK 00005836 002 OF 002
7. (C) The now-terminated 1997 Constitution provided no basis
for military intervention in politics. The monarchy appears
to be the sole institution capable of legitimizing the
September 19 coup in the eyes of the Thai people. By its
actions to date, the Palace seems to be playing that role.
The King\’s imprimatur — combined with widespread hatred of
Thaksin in elite circles — appears to have provided a
certain amount of breathing room for the CDRM.
BOYCE
“
06BANGKOK5706 WHAT IS THE “SUFFICIENCY ECONOMY”?
“78540″,”9/15/2006 10:08″,”06BANGKOK5706″,”Embassy Bangkok”,
“UNCLASSIFIED”,”",”Debra P Tous 02/16/2007 09:56:33 AM
From DB/Inbox: Search Results
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RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2446″,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005706
DEPT PASS TO USTR
TREASURY FOR OASIA
SENSITIVE/NOFORN/SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ETRD, EINV, PGOV, SOCI, SENV, TH
SUBJECT: WHAT IS THE \”SUFFICIENCY ECONOMY\”?
1. (SBU) Summary: Much has been written about a \”Sufficiency
Economy\” this year due to the King\’s championing the idea in his
birthday speech last December and the perceived \”capitalist
excesses\” of the Thaksin administration. The Sufficiency Economy\’s
Buddhist-like principles, promoting hard work, moderation and
self-reliance, are considered by many as antidotes to crony
capitalism, corruption, consumerism and indebtedness. The general
idea is not recent. It was first floated by the King in 1974 to
justify royal development projects and was revived after the 1997
Asian financial crisis. Economists note that the principles have
been expressed in vague terms that limit their practicality, and
while RTG institutions pay lip service to them (as with any ideas
supported by the King), they have so far been applied only to
small-scale farming projects. End Summary.
2. (SBU) The term \”Sufficiency Economy\” has been a fixture of
newspapers, conferences and political debate through much of this
year, since the urging of King Bhumipol in his December 4, 2005
birthday address to consider self-sufficiency and moderation as
cures for the perceived excesses plaguing Thailand\’s economy. The
King\’s speech summarized the idea as follows: \”If one is moderate
in one\’s desires, one will have less craving. If one has less
craving, one will take less advantage of others. If all nations
hold this concept, without being extreme or insatiable in one\’s
desires, the world will be a happier place.\”
3. (SBU) The King has in fact been advocating \”Sufficiency Economy\”
ideas for over 30 years, initially borrowing from the \”Small is
Beautiful\” movement inspired by economist E.F. Schumacher. They
gained renewed prominence after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the realization that the speculative boom/bust of the mid-1990s
could have been avoided with curbs on excessive investment. Yet,
beyond exhortations to \”live within one\’s means\” and to \”act
prudently\”, no specific policy recommendations were made to rein in
the factors that led to the 1997 crisis. Likewise, guidance for
economic policy today is sorely lacking from pro-sufficiency
pronouncements, despite growing popular belief that cronyism,
corruption, consumerism, and household debt are on the rise in
contravention of sufficiency economy principles
Background
———-
4. (SBU) Some general observations about the Sufficiency Economy
\”model\”:
– It was first advocated by the King in 1974 to support royal
development study centers for farmers.
– It borrows from a chapter titled \”Buddhist Economics\” in E.M.
Schumacher\’s 1973 book \”Small is Beautiful\”, which the King
translated into Thai.
– Royal advisers insist it is not anti-trade, nor does it place
environmental considerations above the need for economic
development.
– Its tenets are vague and malleable (calling for prudence,
reasonableness, moral behavior, and resistance to excess) and
subject to interpretation.
– Viewed as the King\’s personal economic model, it benefits from
public reluctance to criticize anything associated with the revered
King.
– It has been seized by Thaksin\’s critics as an indictment of
economic growth fueled by consumption, over-investment and
indebtedness.
– A government advisory board includes its recommendations in
five-year plans that carry little weight in policy formulation.
– Practical programs inspired by it are limited to agriculture,
with royal research projects focused on sustainable development for
small-scale farmers.
5. (SBU) The Sufficiency Economy framework is not easily described
in traditional economic terms. The economist who inspired it,
Schumacher, said himself that economists suffered from \”metaphysical
blindness\” by measuring standards of living only by material wealth.
Schumacher\’s aim, in his words, was to \”obtain the maximum of
well-being with the minimum of consumption,\” with \”well being\”
defined in spiritual as well as material terms. This, he said,
dovetailed neatly with Buddhist or Gandhian principles, which he
observed while during his research in the early 1970\’s in Burma and
India. His \”Small is Beautiful\” ideas were particularly
well-received by environmentalists, inspiring the formation of
Greenpeace among other groups. (Western economists were not so
inspired, however, with one Oxford economist publishing a rebuttal
book titled \”Small is Stupid\”.) Thai observers have also noted
similarities with ideas put forth in 1972 by the King of Bhutan, who
called for the measurement of a GDH, Gross Domestic Happiness, to
replace the more materialistic GDP.
6. (SBU) Thailand\’s King, as his advisers have admitted in the past,
adapted Schumacher\’s thinking as a reasonable \”middle path\” of
development between the extremes of socialist autarky and laissez
faire capitalism. The aim, his advisers said, was to eschew the
pursuit of fast economic growth in favor of balanced growth,
self-sufficiency, and immunity from shocks in the domestic or
international economy. Development, in the King\’s view, should
proceed in stages, with farmers first providing basic sustenance for
their families and their communities before seeking greater income
through long distance trade. (An example of a non-sufficient farmer
might be one who converted his entire production to a single export
crop, borrowed on credit to invest in the technology to produce that
crop, only to find himself in debt and unable to feed his family in
the event of a market collapse.)
7. (SBU) The King\’s advisers sought to put his agricultural ideas
into practice by creating a series of rural Royal Development Study
Centers from 1979 to 1983. Their aim was to \”improve the living
standards of farmers by means of land development, water resource
development, forest rehabilitation and application of plant and
animal production techniques.\” The centers were to demonstrate the
King\’s 1992 \”New Theory of Agriculture\”, which, among other things,
directed small farmers (those with less than 2.4 hectares of land)
to devote 30 percent of their land to water storage, 30 percent to
rice cultivation, 30 percent to multiple other crops, and 10 percent
to a residence and farm buildings.
Easier Said Than Done?
———————-
8. (SBU) Although couched in terminology that makes it difficult to
criticize (as one economist said, \”Who can oppose a model that
promotes \’reasonableness\’, \’good behavior\’, \’and \’protection from
shocks\’?\”) schisms have arisen where activists interpret
\”Sufficiency Economy\” to oppose policies or projects supported by
the King. NGO activists, for example, incurred the King\’s anger in
the 1980s and 1990s when they cited the model\’s environmental
language in opposing the construction of large-scale reservoir dams.
The King, who has long advocated dam construction as a necessary
water management tool, sharply criticized those groups, explaining
that limited deforestation was in some cases necessary to provide
consistent energy and water sources for farmers.
9. (SBU) Likewise, anti-trade activists have used Sufficiency
Economy language to oppose trade expansion, arguing that trade
exposed farmers to market risks that threatened their ability to be
self-reliant. Members of the King\’s Privy Council, however, explain
that the model is not anti-trade or anti-globalization, but seeks to
accommodate global trends through \”reasonable trade\” to generate
farmer income and promote the rational allocation of resources.
Thaksin\’s \”Dual Track\” Vs. \”Sufficiency Economy\”
——————————————— —
10. (SBU) The King and his advisers have maintained their customary
restraint from directly attacking specific policies of the ruling
political party. Yet their public pronouncements are carefully
studied for nuance. The King\’s renewed emphasis on the Sufficiency
Economy in his recent public statements are interpreted by many as
an oblique criticism of Thaksin\’s economic priorities. Thaksin\’s
critics have increasingly cited \”Thaksinomics\”, with its emphasis on
GDP growth fueled by exports, domestic consumption and
infrastructure investment, as antithetical to the \”moderation is
good\” ethos of the Sufficiency Economy.
11. (SBU) Thaksin\’s has described his economic policies as having a
\”Dual Track approach\”:
– 1) Promote domestic demand by emphasizing grassroots and
small-to-medium size enterprise development.
– 2) Improve international competitiveness and linkages, including
the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
12. (SBU) A member of the National Economic and Social Advisory
Council (NESAC) told us that the first track of Thaksin\’s approach
diverges from Sufficiency Economy principles by \”fostering
consumerism and encouraging easy credit for farmers, which have led
to high rates of indebtedness among rural households.\” \”As for
the second track,\” he said, \”your FTA has gone nowhere since
Thaksin\’s political troubles began.\” He added that the national
organ charged with implementing Sufficiency Economy principles in
economic planning, the National Economic and Social Development
Board (NESDB), \”has an advisory capacity only and no authority to
implement change.\”
13. (SBU) Similarly, Kosit Panpiempras, executive chairman of
Bangkok Bank and former head of the NESDB, has publicly criticized
the Dual Track approach for promoting an \”unsustainable level of
domestic consumption\” that can only diminish in the face of rising
household debt and inflation. Easy credit for farmers, he said, was
being used to purchase cellphones, refrigerators and TV sets rather
than farming equipment
14. (SBU) The NESAC economist cautioned, however, that Thaksin\’s was
not the only administration at fault. \”There is no political party
that stands out as promoting \’sufficiency economy\’ ideas.\”
\”Everyone pays lip service to it,\” he said, \”but their plans offer
vague language and no practical proposals.\” \”In any case,\” he
added, \”crony capitalism and corruption have been around forever -
the only difference being who\’s in power and who benefits from the
excesses.\”
15. (SBU) COMMENT: Pretty much every political party has included
fealty to \”sufficiency economy principles\” as part of their platform
in the run-up to election scheduled for later this year. The
question we have asked ourselves is whether there is any intention
by any serious political group of actually implementing sufficiency
economy elements. The answer seems to be \”no\” because 1) no one
really has a clue what such elements would look like for anyone but
a small-scale farmer and 2) politicians realize that sufficiency may
sound good, but in practice people are going to want to continue
consuming beyond the level of mere sufficiency. No one here (at
least overtly) has noted the irony of adherence to the \”sufficiency
principle\” with the reality of Thailand\’s status as one of the most
export-dependent economies on earth.
Arvizu
“
06BANGKOK5565 THAKSIN LOYALIST SEES LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL
“77853″,”9/11/2006 9:32″,”06BANGKOK5565″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",”VZCZCXRO6549
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“C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005565
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PHUM, MOPS, ASEC, TH
SUBJECT: THAKSIN LOYALIST SEES LIGHT AT THE END OF THE
TUNNEL
Classified By: DCM Alex Arvizu, reason: 1.4 (d).
SUMMARY
——-
1. (C) Former House of Representatives Speaker Bhokin
Bhalakula claimed the upcoming legislative election would
reaffirm majority support for Thai Rak Thai (TRT), although
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra likely would not seek to
remain as Prime Minister. In a September 8 lunch with the
Ambassador, Bhokin — a Deputy Leader of TRT rumored as a
potential successor to Thaksin — claimed the King also
wanted elections as soon as possible and would refrain from
undemocratic political intervention. Upcoming elections
would further deflate the challenge from Thaksin\’s opponents,
and an upcoming reshuffle of top military, police, and civil
service positions would ensure the complete loyalty to the
administration of state bureaucracies and the security
forces. End Summary.
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTIONS
————————–
2. (C) In a September 8 lunch at the Ambassador\’s residence,
former House of Representatives Speaker Bhokin Bhalakula
expressed optimism about upcoming legislative elections. The
northern and northeastern regions of Thailand — which
together accounted for a majority of the constituency-based
seats in the House — remained solidly pro-TRT, he asserted.
Reviewing the background behind TRT\’s populist policies,
Bhokin noted TRT would continue the programs that had
generated enthusiasm among the lower and middle class; future
government grants under the small, medium, and large-scale
(SML) village fund program would increase by at least 50
percent. Other political parties could not compete with
TRT\’s proven approach of delivering benefits. Rival Democrat
Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva was too young to challenge TRT
effectively; Abhisit knew only how to criticize, and he did
so in a long-winded manner that most Thai found unappealing,
according to Bhokin.
THE KING\’S POSITION
——————-
3. (C) Bhokin said the King wanted elections as soon as
possible, highlighting that the King had quickly signed the
Royal Decree (issued on September 6) calling for an
extraordinary session of the Senate (September 8-10) to
select Election Commission members. Prior to receiving the
decree for approval, Bhokin related, the King had signaled
his eagerness by asking unspecified persons about the
decree\’s disposition. The King respected democracy and
viewed elections as a source of legitimacy; he would continue
to refuse to take drastic steps affecting political
processes. However, the King did not want to speak out
publicly on this matter, according to Bhokin, because his
words often created controversy as various sides offered
rival interpretations.
SONDHI WENT TOO FAR, PEOPLE ARE WEARY
————————————-
4. (C) Thaksin was a victim of his own success, Bhokin
lamented. Democrat Party leaders had come to realize that it
would take at least 15 years before they could hope to regain
power through elections. Meanwhile, the armed forces had
become split, partly because soldiers benefiting from illegal
activities, such as the drug trade, had suffered under TRT\’s
policies. And academics found their status diminished under
Thaksin, as TRT had sufficient human resources that the party
did not need to rely on ivory tower experts. It became easy
for those upset with Thaksin to generate negative publicity,
as they could easily pay off journalists to write negative
stories.
5. (C) Media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul proved able to unite
disgruntled members of the elite. Bhokin noted Sondhi had
successfully installed various associates in key government
positions, but his influence began to wane; the final blow
pushing Sondhi into opposition was the dismissal of crony
Viroj Nualkhair from his position as CEO of state-owned Krung
Thai Bank. However, although Sondhi benefited from the
support of royalist oligarchs, he had gone too far in
projecting himself as a representative of the King\’s
interests. The public did not appreciate Sondhi\’s approach,
and it led to diminished participation in the rallies of
BANGKOK 00005565 002 OF 002
Sondhi\’s People\’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). In a recent
survey (NFI), 60 percent of respondents blamed the PAD for
the current turmoil, Bhokin claimed, and he predicted further
tapering off of PAD support after the upcoming election\’s
reaffirmation of TRT\’s majority support.
RESHUFFLE
———
6. (C) Bhokin predicted an upcoming reshuffle of top
military, police, and civil service positions would ensure
that government and security forces officials would \”totally
obey\” the administration. Comparing the government to a
ship, Bhokin said there currently were some holes in the
hull, but after the election, it would be smooth sailing.
The King would endorse the reshuffle plan as received from
the government, Bhokin said, noting parenthetically that, if
the King did not, \”the whole country will blow up.\”
THAKSIN TO STEP DOWN
——————–
7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Thaksin might try to
return as Prime Minister after the next election. Bhokin
believed Thaksin had already made a decision not to do so,
irrespective of the election results. Citing Thaksin\’s early
April audience with the King, Bhokin said Thaksin would
likely opt not to be Prime Minister, in order to lessen the
degree of tension in the country. Bhokin observed that
Thaksin nevertheless wanted to remain TRT Party Leader,
claiming Thaksin was motivated not by a desire to protect
himself and his assets, but rather by patriotism and his
longstanding interest in politics.
MORE ON PALACE INFLUENCE
————————
8. (C) When the Ambassador asked about the wisdom of
Thaksin\’s decision to dissolve the parliament in February,
Bhokin replied that Thaksin had received advice to do so from
Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda as well as
then-Cabinet Secretary Borwornsak Uwanno. Bhokin then
confided that Thaksin had discussed the matter directly with
the King; when Thaksin had presented various alternatives to
resolve growing political tension, the King had said it would
be better to dissolve the parliament.
9. (C) The Ambassador also asked about the June resignations
of Borwornsak and then-Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu
Krea-ngam. Bhokin claimed that the two came under pressure
from an individual named Meechai, who was close to Prem and
presumably reflected Palace views. (We presume the reference
was to law professor Meechai Ruchupan, a former cabinet
minister in Prem\’s administration.)
COMMENT
——-
10. (C) Bhokin made a persuasive but hardly unbiased case
that TRT has reason for optimism as elections approach. His
claim that Thaksin is inclined not to remain as Prime
Minister tracks with a relatively common perception among the
political class, although we noted Bhokin stopped short of
offering categorical assurance on this point. We believe
Thaksin has not yet made a firm decision on this matter.
BOYCE
“
06BANGKOK4416 PALACE APPROVES OCTOBER 15 THAI ELECTION
“72135″,”7/21/2006 10:40″,
“06BANGKOK4416″,”Embassy Bangkok”,
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SIPDIS
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DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2026
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH
SUBJECT: PALACE APPROVES OCTOBER 15 THAI ELECTION
REF: A. BANGKOK 004373 (SHUFFFLING DECKS IN A
HIGH-STAKES GAME)
B. BANGKOK 004277 (JOCKEYING INTENSIFIES)
C. BANGKOK 004041 (STEAK WITH THAKSIN)
Classified By: CDA ALEX A. ARVIZU. REASON 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) In a royal surprise, the King (currently recovering
from surgery) has formally approved the October 15 general
election, setting the stage for a possible breakthrough in
one aspect of the political crisis. While the palace\’s
assent to a new vote was not in itself unexpected, most
observers believed that it would not come until next month,
and would be granted only if the controversial Election
Commission (EC) was replaced. Indeed Thaksin told the
Ambassador on July 7 (ref C) that he expected the EC to
resign, but also believed that the date of the next vote
would slip.
2. (C) Other members of the political elite agreed on the
latter point. The ongoing court cases against both Thaksin\’s
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and the opposition Democrat parties–as
well as wrangling over the EC–would delay a new election.
Even before today\’s announcement, however, conventional
wisdom on this issue had begun to shift. In a possible nod
to the untenability of the current situation (a PM without a
parliament for five months, rising investor wariness, etc.)
various tentacles of TRT have publicly stated this week that
the election really has to happen on October 15. Some
observers now believe that there will be no resolution to
many of the pending court cases (and potential dissolution of
the two main parties) until after the election. It\’s not
clear yet why the palace decided today to release a decree
that won\’t be valid for another month. The palace may be
trying to counter coup fears that have increased with the
rising tension between the military leadership and the
government (refs A,B.) The King seems to be signaling that
the crisis must be resolved at the ballot box and not through
other means.
3. (C) We do not know the details of the deal that
facilitated this development (or if there even was one), but
the EC remains the key stumbling block to a new vote. Adding
weight to rumors of a deal involving the EC, the King called
for a real, fair and clean election in a rare statement
following the royal order. If the EC members do resign, it
will take some time (and involve some creative legal
maneuvers) to establish a new EC and prepare for the vote.
But it will be one major and welcome step forward.
ARVIZU
“
06BANGKOK4277 THAI POLITICAL UPDATE: JOCKEYING INTENSIFIES
“71679″,”7/18/2006 9:25″,”06BANGKOK4277″,
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2026
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH
SUBJECT: THAI POLITICAL UPDATE: JOCKEYING INTENSIFIES
REF: A. BANGKOK 03916 (WHAT\’S THAKSIN UP TO?)
B. BANGKOK 004041 (STEAK WITH THAKSIN)
C. BANGKOK 04181 (\”UNCLE SAM I\’M BEING BULLIED!\”)
D. BANGKOK 004211 (SCENESETTER AND POLITICAL UPDATE
FOR ADMIRAL FALLON)
E. BANGKOK 004212 (AND THE PAD MARCHED ON)
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON. REASON 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) Summary. Privy Council chairman Prem Tinsulanonda
struck back at PM Thaksin on July 14 in a speech to military
cadets. The PM appeared to step back from his normally
strident self over the weekend, with an appeal to
reconciliation, even as he moves to set the stage for a new
election October 15. The opposition parties remain opposed
to a new election under the current, controversial Election
Commission. Speculation that members of the PM\’s party may
be preparing to jump ship–or toss Thaksin over the side–is
making its way into the press. The opposition People\’s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) continues to tear into the PM
over his letter to President Bush and is preparing for a
final push to unseat Thaksin starting July 19. PAD leader
Sonthi Limthongkul may be running out of money. Finally, the
palace announced that the King will be undergoing surgery to
alleviate a long-standing spinal problem. End Summary.
MILITARY JOCKEYING CONTINUES
—————————-
2. (C) In a bold response to the most recent coup rumors,
speculation over preparations for the October military
reshuffle (ref D) and Thaksin\’s thinly veiled attack on him
earlier this month (refs A,B), Privy Council chairman (and
former Army Chief) Prem Tinsulanonda paid a high-profile
visit to the Chulachomklao Military Academy on July 14.
Prem–who arrived in uniform with former Army Chiefs Chawalit
Yongchaiyudh, Surayud Chulanont, Oud Buengbon and Pongthem
Thespratheep alongside him–told the cadets, \”in horse
racing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride the horses. The
jockeys do not own the horses. They just ride them. A
government is like a jockey. It supervises soldiers, but the
real owners are the country and the King…the government
comes and goes.\”
3. (C) Prem\’s comments–which landed on the front page of
most papers Saturday–are only the first in a series of
lectures he plans to give to cadets and soldiers over the
next few weeks, to \”raise awareness.\” Indeed, the press
coverage of Prem\’s speech prompted the PM to publicly deny on
July 15 that he specifically intends to sideline the current
Army Chief–Sonthi Boonyaratglin–in favor of one of his
former classmates from his military academy days.
THAKSIN OPENS HIS ARMS
———————-
4. (SBU) In his weekly radio address on July 15, Thaksin
announced that his caretaker government plans to submit the
decree calling for a new election October 15 to the palace
for approval by mid-August. The PM pleaded for \”national
reconciliation\” and explained that he was not trying to cling
to power, but to fulfill his constitutionally required
duties. Thaksin urged all sides to come together. Officials
from the opposition Democrat party did not publicly reject
the new election date, but reiterated their demand that the
controversial Election Commission (EC) be replaced before a
new vote.
DISSENT IN TRT RANKS
——————–
5. (C) While the Democrats rejected the PM\’s call for a
meeting to discuss reconciliation, speculation is mounting
that members of Thaksin\’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party have met
without the PM to discuss a way out of the current morass.
Thai-language press reported on July 18 that several
cabinet-level TRT figures, including Minister of Commerce
Somkid, Deputy PM Surakiat and Education Minister Chaturon,
held a \”secret\” meeting on July 17 to discuss the political
situation
THE OTHER SONTHI-RUNNING ON FUMES
———————————
6. (C) Following the high profile march of the People\’s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) late last week to deliver
BANGKOK 00004277 002 OF 002
letters of apology and protest to foreign embassies (refs
C,E), the PAD convened at Lumpini park for their weekly
broadcast on July 14. Although the crowd of hard-core PAD
supporters barely topped an estimated 1,000 people, PAD
leader Sonthi Limthongkul and his cohorts spent several hours
dissecting Thaksin\’s letter to President Bush and attacking
the PM. In a new twist, Sonthi also discussed the
controversial book \”The King Never Smiles\” by an American
journalist, which is very critical of the monarch. According
to Sonthi, one of Thaksin\’s closest advisers played a key
role in the development of the book. Details about the book
have now been posted on Sonthi\’s \”Manager\” newspaper website
and PAD elements may march on U.S. Embassy Bangkok to protest
the book. Sonthi also said that the PAD plans to announce
details about their \”final effort\” against Thaksin on July
19.
7. (C) According to several journalists who work for Sonthi,
this new \”final effort\” against the PM may be a desperation
move. The media magnate has apparently failed to pay both
his local and foreign staff for nearly six weeks, citing the
financial drain of ongoing lawsuits against him and his
funding support for PAD activities. Some senior members of
Sonthi\’s staff have even speculated that if Thaksin is not
out of office by September, Sonthi will have to fold his tent
and declare bankruptcy.
SURGERY FOR THE KING
——————–
8. (SBU) Local press reported on July 17 that the King will
soon undergo surgery to alleviate a long-standing
condition–lumbar spinal stenosis. According to newspaper
accounts, the monarch has suffered from this problem–a
pinching of the nerves running to his right leg–since 1995.
The date of the surgery has not been released.
ARVIZU
“
06BANGKOK4040 KING’S PRIVATE SECRETARY DISMISSES THAKSIN CLAIMS
“70590″,”7/7/2006 11:05″,”06BANGKOK4040″,
“Embassy Bangkok”,”CONFIDENTIAL”,”",”VZCZCXRO1775
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RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC”,
“C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 004040
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, TH
SUBJECT: KING\’S PRIVATE SECRETARY DISMISSES THAKSIN CLAIMS
REF: A. BANGKOK 3916 (WHAT\’S THAKSIN UP TO?)
B. BANGKOK 3349 (NOODLES WITH THAKSIN)
C. BANGKOK 2990 (THAKSIN SEES SELF AS THAILAND\’S
ASSK)
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)
1. (C) The Ambassador met July 7 with the King\’s Principal
Private Secretary, Asa Sarasin, to discuss the political
situation. Asa confirmed several of our assumptions. First,
he admitted that the government\’s proposed election decree
was on hold in the Palace. They wanted more clarity on
certain issues, especially the status of the Election
Commission, before the King would sign the decree, Asa said.
He expected the embattled election commissioners to step down
soon, and this would necessitate some delay in holding the
elections. (Comment: many Thaksin opponents have forecast
that the King would not sign the decree until the
controversial election commissioners were replaced. Asa
stopped short of saying this, but did indicate that the
Palace is not ready to go along with the current election
plans. End comment.) Asa complained that the main opposition
Democrat Party was hopeless; Thaksin was keeping it on the
defensive with a series of lawsuits. Asa joined most
commentators here in presuming that neither major party
would, in the end, be dissolved by the Constitutional Court.
Asa expected Thai Rak Thai to win the majority of seats in
the next parliament. (Note: Democrat Party leader Abhisit
also admitted to the Ambassador last week that the party was
not able to reach out as effectively to the voters and
formulate a winning platform because it was so busy defending
itself from Thaksin\’s attacks. End Note.)
2. (C) Asa also dismissed Thaksin\’s \”revised history\” of
his audiences with the King. (Asa is one of the few people
present when the King has an audience.) Thaksin has recently
taken to claiming that the King had ordered him to leave
office during his April 4 audience. Thaksin also says that
the King told him on May 19 that Thaksin could never return
as PM (reftel B,C). Asa\’s account parallels the original
story we had from Thaksin: the PM told the King right after
the election that he would step down, and the King just
nodded in response. Asa said that, during the May audience,
Thaksin told the King that he would return to a more active
role as caretaker, and the King approved. They then
discussed practical issues about the replacement for the two
vacant seats on the Election Commission.
3. (C) The Ambassador and Asa discussed the motivation for
Thaksin\’s lightly-veiled attack on the highly respected Privy
Council President Prem. Asa was quite upset by Thaksin\’s
comments, and joined in wondering what Thaksin could be
thinking (ref A). Asa suggested that it might be a misguided
attempt at gaining public sympathy, to keep his options open
for a potential return as PM some day.
4. (C) Comment: Asa does not always level with us, but we are
inclined to buy his version of the meetings between the King
and Thaksin, especially since Thaksin\’s story is constantly
changing.
BOYCE
“
